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I. INTRODUCTION

When organizations in technology industries attempt to advance their
innovative activities, they must be cognizant of the intellectual property
rights of others. When further innovation is thwarted, however, the
situation can be described as a patent thicket. Although the term "patent
thicket" seems to have originated in litigation in the 1970s regarding
Xerox's dominance of a portion of the photocopier industry, economist
Carl Shapiro re-introduced the term in academic discourse in 2000.2
Shapiro defines a patent thicket more broadly to encompass the
intellectual property portfolios of several companies that form "a dense
web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a company must hack
its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology," 3 and
he points out that "with cumulative innovation and multiple blocking
patents, . . . patent rights can have the perverse effect of stifling, not
encouraging, innovation." 4
Despite all that has been written about patent thickets, an objective
methodology for verifying the existence of a patent thicket has never been
fully developed.s Throughout the last 150 years, however, organizations
have stumbled into a number of patent thickets and have occasionally
responded by constructing patent pools, which Professor Clarkson has
defined as "organizational structures where multiple firms collectively
aggregate patent rights into a package for licensing, either among
themselves or to any potential licensees irrespective of membership in the

1. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C.
364 (1975).
2. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & EcON. 119-50 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2000).
3. Id. at 120.
4. Id.

5. As part of his doctoral thesis at the Harvard Business School, Professor Clarkson
developed a network analytic method of measuring patent thicket density, a first step in
objectively evaluating patent pools. See generally Gavin Clarkson, Objective Identification of
Patent Thickets: A Network Analytic Approach, in Essays on IntellectualAsset Management 22-

29 (June 2004) (unpublished doctoral thesis, Harvard Business School) (on file with Baker
Library Historical Collections, Harvard University) [hereinafter Clarkson Thesis].
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pool." 6 Such collaboration among technologically competing firms,
however, has often encountered difficulty from an antitrust standpoint,
even if the formation of the pool is pro-competitive. 7
While the existence of a patent thicket is a necessary but insufficient
condition for demonstrating that a given collection of patents is a procompetitive solution to a particular patent thicket problem, the antitrust
regime has never had an objective method of verifying the existence of a
patent thicket in a given section of patent space. Lacking such an
objective measure, the legal history of patent pooling in the United States
throughout most of the twentieth century was arguably clumsy with
judges and justices often destroying potentially pro-competitive patent
pooling structures without a detailed examination of the patents within
the pool. This article argues, however, that such blunt machete approach
was unnecessary and empirically demonstrates that when the judicial
examination of the pool examined the underlying patent thicket,8 the pool
was much more likely to survive. The importance of such an examination
has not diminished even though patent pooling has become more
palatable. As Professor Barnett has noted, the resurgence of patent
pooling in the early twenty-first century closely mirrors the level of
pooling activity in the early twentieth century. 9 As our historical
examination demonstrates, however, judicial analysis of patent pooling
without an examination of the underlying patent thicket can lead to the
destruction of pro-competitive pools.
The concern for patent pools based on technology standards is less,
however, than it is for pools that are not based on technology standards
due to changes in antitrust enforcement policies. Having amassed an
impressive set of victories in patent pool enforcement cases prior to 1970,
which we discuss at length in Part III, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ
articulated what came to be known as the "Nine No-No's" or essentially
a watch list of nine specified licensing practices1 0 that the division viewed
6.

Id. at 2.

7. This history is discussed in infra Part III.
8. Such an examination, at a minimum, involves answering two proposed "Thicket
Questions." First, "Does a given collection of patents constitute a thicket?" Second, "What is the
nature of the relationship between the patents in the thicket?"
9.

Jonathan Barnett, From Patent Thickets to PatentNetworks: The Legal Infrastructure

of the DigitalEconomy, JURIMETRICS J. (Aug. 18, 2014); U.S.C. Class Res. Paper No. Class 1422; U.S.C. Law Legal Studs. 14-23.
10. These licensing practices were described in at least one speech by then Deputy
Assistant Attorney General Bruce B. Wilson as practices "which in virtually all cases are going
to lead to antitrust trouble because of their adverse effect upon competition" (Bruce B. Wilson,
Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Patent and Know-How License Agreements:
Field of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, Remarks Before the Fourth New
England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 6, 1970)). The prohibited licensing practices consisted of the
following:
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as anticompetitive and that would attract the scrutiny of the DOJ."
Conspicuously absent from the Nine No-No's, however, was any
consideration of patent thicket questions.
The attitude of the antitrust enforcement regime thus remained quite
hostile toward patent licensing, 12 and the contractual focus of both the
DOJ and the FTC resulted in a presumption of market power to the patent
grant without any consideration of the structural characteristics of the
marketplace in which the patented products competed, and little weight
was afforded to efficiency considerations of any licensing restrictions. 13
Although the trend started in the 1960s, after the Nine No-No's were
issued, the number of pooling cases that were litigated dwindled
significantly, and few of the opinions addressed the legality of the pools
themselves. 14 As Merges notes,
federal antitrust policy is the most likely explanation for the small
number of patent pools existing today. Ever since myriad forms of
inter-firm cooperation were condemned in the "trust-busting era,"
firms have been reluctant to initiate industry-wide arrangements of
every ilk, including pools. . . . [T]he relative scarcity of pools on
the present landscape-especially given the increasing presence
and strength of patents in many industries-suggests a classic case

1.
2.

3.

Requiring the licensee to purchase unpatented supplies (tie-ins);
Requiring the licensee to assign to the patentee patents that may be issued
to the licensee after the licensing arrangement is executed (mandatory
grant-backs);
Imposing post-sale restrictions on resale by purchasers of patented
products;

4.

Restraining licensees' commerce outside the scope of the patent (tie-outs);

5.
6.
7.

Giving licensees veto power over grants of further licenses;
Mandating package licensing;
Requiring payment of royalties in amounts not reasonably related to sales
of the patented product;
Restraining sales of unpatented products made by a patented process;
Specifying prices licensee could charge upon resale of licensed products.

8.
9.

11. See generally Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of
Intellectual Property: The Nine No-No's Meet the Nineties, 28 BROOKINGS PAPERS:
MICROECONOMICs 283-333 (1997); see also Willard K. Tom & Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust and
IntellectualProperty:From Separate Spheres to Unified Field, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 167 (1997).
12. See generally Steven C. Carlson, Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J.
ON REG. 35999 (1999).
13. See discussion infra notes 16-31.
14. Carlson, supra note 12, at 376.
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of excessive deterrence. 15
While the patent pooling case law could thus be appropriately
classified as muddled and often hostile to potentially pro-competitive
patent pools, a possible regulatory solution was forming over the horizon
that would provide a degree of clarity. 16
As technology progressed in the 1980s, intellectual property rights
became more and more important. 17 As patent thickets became denser,
the level of economic thought that could be applied to antitrust analysis
in the intellectual property arena continued to increase in sophistication.1 8
Beginning in the early 1980s, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ began to
question the theoretical foundation of the Nine No-No's, in part because
of the emerging notion that unconstrained patent licensing might actually
increase the value of patents and encourage subsequent licensing and
innovation. 19

The first attempt at revising the official position of the antitrust
enforcement regime came in 1988 with the release of the Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations ("1988
Guidelines"). Included in the 1988 Guidelines was a repudiation of the
notion that a patent, copyright, or trade secret automatically created a
"monopoly" for its owner, and therefore should be subject to close
antitrust scrutiny. 20 Instead the 1988 Guidelines established a core
principal that the owner of intellectual property is entitled to whatever
market power exclusive ownership of the property itself confers.
Additionally, the 1988 Guidelines incorporated a concept that recognized
that intellectual property licensing allows firms to combine
complementary factors of production and is generally a pro-competitive
response to the problem posed by patent thickets. 2 1 The 1988 Guidelines
also provided that intellectual property licenses where the licensor and
licensee did not directly compete in the market affected by the license
would almost never be challenged.2 2 In the case of a horizontal
arrangement, where the licensor and licensee did compete in the market
for the licensed product, the 1988 Guidelines called for an analysis of the
license under the "rule-of-reason" that allowed for the balancing of the
pro-competitive benefits of the license against any potential

15. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations,84 CALIF. L. REv. 1295, 1355-56 (1996).
16. Carlson, supra note 12, at 375.
17. Id. at 363-64.
18. Merges, supra note 15, at 1295.
19. Carlson, supra note 12, at 375-76.
20. Id. at 375.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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anticompetitive effects, if there were any. 2 3 Although the 1988
Guidelines included certain provisions that could be helpful in clearing
patent thickets, the focus was still on contractual and marketplace issues
and no specific methodology was proposed to identify the existence of
patent thickets.
Seven years later, on April 6, 1995, the DOJ and the FTC jointly
released the 1995 Guidelinesfor the Licensing of Intellectual Property
("IP Guidelines"),24 which superseded certain portions of the 1988
Guidelines as they pertained to intellectual property. However, several
core principles were retained including:
* An endorsement of the validity of treating intellectual property
as essentially comparable to tangible or intangible property for
the purposes of antitrust analysis; 25
* An acknowledgement that intellectual property does not
necessarily create market power in the antitrust context; 2 6 and
* An explicit recognition of the generally pro-competitive nature
of licensing arrangements. 27
The IP Guidelines specifically mention patent pools, noting that such
arrangements may provide pro-competitive benefits by "integrating
complementary technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing
blocking positions, and avoiding costly infringement litigation. By
promoting the dissemination of technology,... pooling arrangements are
often pro-competitive." 28
While the IP Guidelines describe the likely response to various
outcomes of an inquiry into thicket questions, 29 they provide no
indication of how such an inquiry would be conducted outside of the
context of technology standards. Even the most recent scholarship on
patent pools focuses exclusively on standards-based pools. 30 Thus, while
the antitrust and intellectual property regimes were frequently in tension
23. Id. at 16.
24. See Dep't of Justice & Federal Trade Comiission (FTC), Antitrust Guidelinesfor the
Licensing ofIntellectualProperty(Apr. 5, 1995), reprintedin 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ¶ 13,132.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 5.

28.

Id.

§ 5.5.

29. Under the IP Guidelines patent pools that aggregate substitute patents are immediately
suspect while patent pools that aggregate complementary or blocking patents are unlikely to be

challenged absent "collateral restraints that would likely raise price or reduce output in the
relevant goods market or in any other relevant antitrust market and that are not reasonably related
to an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity." Id. § 5.5 ex. 10.
30. See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 9; see also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., PATENT
POOLS AND ANTITRUST - A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2014).
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for most of the 20th century, with patent pooling often facing rather
aggressive antitrust enforcement even in situations where the pool was
pro-competitive, antitrust activity subsequent to the issuance of the IP
Guidelines demonstrates the problematic nature of the antitrust regime's
inability to verify objectively the existence of a patent thicket and the lack
of a methodology for evaluating patent pools outside of the technology
standards context. 31
On June 26, 1997, the DOJ issued a business review letter indicating
that a patent pool based on MPEG-2, a technology standard for compactly
representing digital video and audio signals for consumer distribution,
was not in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States. 32 Less than
a year later, however, on March 24, 1998, the FTC filed a complaint
against a patent pool formed around photorefractive keratectomy (PRK),
or laser eye surgery technology, and ultimately forced the pool to
dissolve. 3 3 After leaving the FTC after being part of the FTC litigation of
the PRK pool, Professor Newberg later wrote that the pool in question
might actually have been a pro-competitive solution to a patent thicket,
but by the time his article was published, the damage was done, and the
threat of antitrust enforcement has likely thwarted the development of
patent pools that do not follow the MPEG model of patent essentialness
based on technology standards. 34 In fact, recent searches have only turned
up five surviving patent pools that are not based on technology standards,
and all five are royalty free. 35 Research to date has been unable to identify
a single, active patent pool that charges royalties and is not based on a
technology standard. Despite Clarkson & Dekorte's call for patent
pooling in nanotechnology and other emerging technologies, to date,
none have been publicly formed.36
So, if both the MPEG pool and the PRK pool were formed in response
to the patent thicket problem, why did the antitrust regime destroy one
pool and allow the other pool to live? What about other patent pools that
are not based on technology standards, particularly medical device patent
pools or pharmaceutical patent pools? In order to answer those questions,
it is necessary to examine the patent thicket phenomenon in depth. Part II
31. Id.
32. DOJ letter on file with author.
33. FTC Complaint on file with author.
34. Joshua A. Newberg, Antitrust, Patent Pools, and the Management of Uncertainty, 3
ATLANTIC L.J. 1, 26-29 (2000).
35. The Medicines Patent Pool, http://www.medicines patentpool.org/about//. The Pool for
Open Innovation Against Neglected Tropical Diseases, http://us.gsk.com/en-us/research/sharingour-research/researchopen-innovation/. Mattioli identifies two additional pools for CleanTech
and one for Gene Fragments. See Michael Mattioli, Power and Governance in Patent Pools, 27
HARV. J.L. TECH. 421, 451 n.196 (2014).
36. See generally Gavin Clarkson & David DeKorte, The Problem of Patent Thickets in
Convergent Technologies, 1093 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 180, 197 (2006).
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of this Article reviews the literature and prior research on patent thickets
and patent pools, and Part III of this Article reviews the history of patent
pool litigation to identify when courts examined those questions in the
process of assessing the legality of patent pools in the shadow of the
antitrust regime. In addition to examining other recent historical reviews
of patent pooling, Part IV analyzes this review and finds a general lack
of focus on patent thicket questions in both the judicial and regulatory
history. We then empirically demonstrate the importance of patent thicket
examination to pool survival with a statistical analysis of the correlation
between juridical examination of thicket questions and patent pool
survival. Part V concludes this article with a discussion of the personal
motivation for this article as a tribute to the memory of Professor
Newberg as well as proposing the following Newberg Rule for judicial
examination of patent pools outside of the standards-based context:
any judicial examination of patent pooling must apply the rule of
reason and, in the absence of a technology standard to guide a
determination of essentialness, must thoroughly examine the
technological and economic interrelationships among and between
the pooled patents. 37
This Article argues that such a rule will facilitate the formation of procompetitive patent pools to solve the problem of patent thickets in
industries without dominant technology standards, particularly in
biomedical industries, including industries that might have developed a
cure for the affliction that plagued Professor Newberg until his untimely
and tragic passing.

II. BACKGROUND

A. The Problem of Patent Thickets
Patent thickets are not a new phenomenon, and when the total number
of owners of the conflicting intellectual property rights is small, the
response to the patent thicket problem has often been to cross-license. 3 8
When more than two parties are involved, however, the transaction costs
of cross-licensing between all of the parties can be prohibitive, and
37. See infra Part V.
38. See generally Peter C. Grindley & David J. Teece, Managing Intellectual Capital:
Licensing and Cross-Licensingin Semiconductors and Electronics, 39 CAL. MGMT. REV. 1, 8-41
(1997; see also David J. Teece, Capturing Value from Knowledge Assets: The New Economy,
Marketsfor Know-How, and IntangibleAssets, 40 CAL. MGMT. REV. 55, 55-79 (1998); DAVID J.
TEECE,

MANAGING

INTELLECTUAL

DIMENSIONS (reprt. 2002) 2000.

CAPITAL:

ORGANIZATIONAL,

STRATEGIC,

AND

POLICY
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additional economic barriers exist such as hold-ups and double
marginalization. 3 9 In response to these challenges throughout the last 150
years, organizations have attempted to solve the multi-party patent thicket
problem by constructing patent pools. 40 Usually, each firm assigns or
licenses its individual intellectual property rights to a specific entity that
in turn exploits the collective rights by licensing, manufacturing, or
both.4 1 Different licensing arrangements are then available, depending on
whether the licensee is a member of the pool and how the resulting
royalties are subsequently distributed among the members of the pool.4 2
While even the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has
suggested patent pooling as a solution to the patent thicket problem, the
cooperative formation of patent pools by technologically competing
firms has often encountered difficulty from an antitrust standpoint, even
if the pool itself has pro-competitive benefits. 43 While few technological
spaces have had more concern about patent thickets than biomedical
research, despite the fact that the patent thickets in medicine and the life
sciences are just as dense if not denser as those in standards-based
industries such as telecommunications and consumer electronics, the
treatment of the PRK pool seems to have had a chilling effect on
subsequent pool formation outside of standards-based industries. 44
B. Composition of a Patent Thicket
In order to further analyze a patent thicket to determine which
combinations of patents might be pro-competitive, a classification
scheme that describes the different ways that patents can relate to each
other is needed. Professor Gilberts Blocking, Complementary,
Independent, or Substitute (BCIS) categorization scheme identifies those
relationships as follows. 45

39.

William K. Viscusi & John M. Vernon, Economics of Regulation andAntitrust (3d ed.

2000).
40. Grindley & Teece, supra note 38, at 1.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Id.
43. Jeanne Clark et al., PatentPools:A Solution to the Problem ofAccess in Biotechnology
Patents, 20 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 607, 607-22 (2001).
44. Id.; see also Gregory J. Glover, Patent Thickets and Innovation Markets Reviewed, 24
NAT'LL.J., Oct. 31, 2002, at C10; Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can PatentsDeter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Larry Horn,
Alternative Approaches to IP Management: One-Stop Technology Platform Licensing, J. CoM.
BIOTECHNOLOGY 119 (2003).
45. Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 11.
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1. Blocking Patents
When Patent A blocks Patent B, the owner of Patent B cannot practice
the invention without a license from the owner of Patent A.4 6 For
example, an improvement on a patented machine (improved Patent B)
can be blocked by the original Patent A on the machine. The owner of
Patent A, however, cannot practice the particular improved feature
claimed in Patent B without a license from Patent B's owner. 4 7
Sometimes the blocking can be discerned from the patent citations, but at
other times the blocking would only be evident from an evaluation of the
text of the respective patents themselves and the application of the socalled "Doctrine of Equivalents."
Professor Newberg notes that the "connection between blocking
relationships and innovation bears emphasis because what is
paradigmatically 'blocked' in a 'blocking' relationship among patents is
the practice of an innovative, patented improvement upon an existing
patented invention."48 Merges & Nelson identify the blocking problem as
one of patent scope.
Two patents are said to block each other when one patentee has a
broad patent on an invention and another has a narrower patent on
some improved feature of that invention. The broad patent is said
to "dominate" the narrower one. In such a situation, the holder of
the narrower ("subservient") patent cannot practice the invention
without a license from the holder of the dominant patent. At the
same time, the holder of the dominant patent cannot practice the
particular improved feature claimed in the narrower patent without
a license.4 9
2. Complementary
Two patents that provide an additional benefit when used in
combination are complements.5 0 A catalyzing technology would be
considered complementary to the technology that is enhanced by its
inclusion. Unlike blocking patents, however, complementary patents can
each be practiced independently without requiring a license for the other
patent.
Combining complementary patents establishes a vertical relationship
46. Id. at 285.
47. Id.
48. Newberg, supra note 34, at 4.
49. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope,
COLUM. L. REv. 839, 860-61 (1990).

50.

Id. at 285.
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and provides many of the benefits of vertical integration, including the
reduction of transaction costs and the elimination of double
marginalization.
3. Independent
Two patents that do different things and have a different intellectual
heritage are independent.5 1
4. Substitute
Two patents that perform substantially identical functions or fulfill the
same role but can be practiced independently are considered substitutes. 52
By definition, a pool cannot be pro-competitive if it includes substitutes,
as such a situation will reduce competition both in the consumer markets
as well as potentially in innovation markets.
The analysis of the relative competitive benefit or harm from a given
combination of patents would of course be much easier if all of the
potential relationships between patents neatly fell into one these four
categories, but such is rarely the case. As Professor Newberg notes,
"intellectual property often defies orderly categorization. The
relationships among patents may, for example, have both complementary
and horizontal aspects. Alternatively, the relationship among some
patents may be best described as fundamentally uncertain or
indeterminate." 53
Similarly, while the standard economic theory definition of
substitutability suggests that two items are substitutes if increasing the
price of one increases the demand for the other, Lerner and Tirole argue
that two patents may be complements at low prices but substitutes at high
prices. 54

While the difficulty of categorizing patent interrelationships is
apparent, the determination of the actual existence of a patent thicket is a
threshold question that needs to be answered first before proceeding with
any attempt at categorization. 55 Whether the history of patent pool
litigation includes judicial determinations of the existence or nonexistence of a patent thicket is examined in the next Part.

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Newberg, supra note 34, at 5-6.
54. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 729, 2002).
55. Id. at 3 (discussing that patents can be substitutes or compliments and the challenge of
determining which is which).
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C. PriorResearch on Patent Thickets and Patent Pools56
Since the issuance of the IP Guidelines, the problem of patent thickets
caught the attention of much of the scientific and engineering community
in a number of technological arenas. 57 For example, firms in the
semiconductor industry "find it all too easy to unintentionally infringe on
a patent in designing a microprocessor, potentially exposing themselves
to billions of dollars of liability and/or an injunction forcing them to cease
production of key products."5 8 Heller and Eisenberg lament the
"anticommons" in biomedical research due to the problem of patent
thickets. 59 Particularly in the biopharmaceutical industry, patent thickets
threaten the process of cumulative innovation because they act as
"barriers to entry [that prevent new entrants] from using the technologies
protected by such patent thickets." 60
A 2003 FTC report notes that in certain industries the large number of
issued patents makes it "virtually impossible to search all the potentially
relevant patents, review the claims contained in each of those patents, and
evaluate the infringement risk" or the need for a license. 6 1 For the
software industry, the report cites testimony about the hold-up problems
and points out "that the owner of any one of the multitude of patented
technologies constituting a software program can hold up production of
innovative new software." 62 For many firms, the only practical response
to this problem of unintentional and sometimes unavoidable patent
infringement is to file hundreds of patents each year so as to have
something to trade during cross-licensing negotiations. 63 In other words,
the only rational response to the large number of patents in a given field

56. An earlier version of this literature review can be found in Clarkson Thesis, supranote
5, at 4. A variation of that literature review was subsequently incorporated into Clarkson et al.,
supra note 36.
57. See e.g., Clark, supra note 43, at 617; FTC, Patent Pools and Cross Licensing, in FTC
HEARINGS ON COMPETITION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 61 (2002); FTC, To
PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY

(2003); Glover, supranote 44, at 1; Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 698; Horn, supra note
44, at 120; Lerner & Tirole, supra note 54; ROBERT P. MERGES, INSTITUTIONS FOR INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: THE CASE OF PATENT POOLS (rev. 1999); Newberg, supra note 34, at 4
(discussing patent blocking).
58. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 121.
59. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 44, at 698 (stating that the anticommons issue is
economically and socially costly).
60. Glover, supra note 44, at 1.
61.

FTC, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT

LAW AND POLICY 28 (2003).
62. Id. at 3, ch. 2.
63. Id. at 26, ch. 2 (recognizing that some firms file hundreds of patents to avoid any
infringement).
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may be to contribute to it. 64
Patent pools are perhaps an alternative response, but although the
revenues generated from sales of devices based in whole or in part on
patent pool technologies are at least $100 billion US per year, the patent
pooling phenomenon received few scholarly treatments, and most of
those have been historical and/or anecdotal in nature. 65 Vaughan
describes patent pool formation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century and examines a number of early pools. 66 Three examinations of
the phenomenon have been in the form of case studies. Cassady examines
the formation and operation of a patent pool by Thomas Edison that
aggregated all of the important patents for the early motion picture
industry. 67 Thompson describes the first patent pool, which was formed
in the nineteenth century around intellectual property conflicts in the
sewing machine industry. 68 Bittlingmayer examines the formation of an
aircraft patent pool during World War I.69 While many scholars have
written favorably about patent pool formation, 70 others have focused on
potential competitive problems posed by patent pools.

71

A number of economists have also written on patent pools. Both
Choi72 and Shapiro 73 examined patent pools in the context of patent
litigation settlements constrained by antitrust law. In a different article
specifically examining patent pools, Shapiro uses Cournot's original
analysis of the "complements problem" to argue that patent pools raise
welfare when patents are perfect complements and harm welfare when
they are perfect substitutes.74 Work by Lerner and Tirole extends the
analysis by examining the strategic incentives to form a pool in the
64. Id. at 30.
65. Clarkson, supra note 5, at 5.
66. Floyd L. Vaughan, Patent Pools, ECONOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM 34, 34-68
(1925).
67. Ralph Cassady, Jr., Monopoly in Motion Picture Productionand Distribution:19081915, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 325 (1959).
68. Ross Thomson, Learning by Selling and Invention: The Case of the Sewing Machine,
47 J. OF ECON. HIST. 433-45 (1987).
69. George L. Bittlingmayer, Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent
Agreement, 31 J.L.& ECON., 227-48 (1988).
70. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 15; Newberg, supra note 34; Vaughan, supra note 65.
71. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 12; George L. Priest, Cartels and Patent Licensing
Arrangements, 20 J.L. & ECON. 309-77 (1977); David S. Taylor, The Sinking of the United States
ElectronicsIndustry Within JapanesePatent Pools, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'LL. & EcoN. 181-212
(1992).
72. Jay P. Choi, PatentPoolsand Cross-Licensing in the Shadow of PatentLitigation, (Ctr.
for Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. 1070, 2003).
73. Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. EcON. 391-411
(2003).
74. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and
Standard-Setting, 1 INNOVATION POL'Y & EcON. 119-50 (2001).
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presence of current and future innovations that are either substitutes for
or complements to the patents in the pool. 75 Their model allows
examination of the full range between the polar cases of perfectly
substitutable and perfectly complementary patents. 76 Their paper
concludes that while much research is yet to be done, the construction of
procompetitive pools is certainly possible.7 7 Organizations can form
stable pools by clearly defining patent essentialness and by scrutinizing
the economic incentives provided to patent holders through pool
membership versus independent licensing. 78 As Clarkson notes, however,
the determination of essentialness is far easier for pools based on
technology standards.79
Their second paper on patent pools empirically examines the positive
aspects of these arrangements, developing a set of theoretical predictions
concerning the pool structure.8 0 They predict how the attributes of the
pool vary with their key characteristics, such as the number of members
of the pool and the rate of technical advances in the industry.8 1 They
sampled sixty-three pools established between 1895 and 2001 from the
dockets of court cases, the archives of congressional hearings, and many
other sources, to determine the actual structure of the pooling
agreements. 82 Their study concluded that the dynamics of management
become more centralized as the pool grows larger. 83 As pool membership
increases, third-party licensing becomes more common. 84 Such a finding
is significant because restrictions on third-party licensing have
historically been a trigger for antitrust scrutiny.85
Gilbert reviews the antitrust treatment of patent pooling over the same
time period and examines the factors that the courts identified as pertinent
to the antitrust outcome. 86 He concludes that until recently, the
competitive relationship of the patents was not a major determinant of the
antitrust outcome in most cases. 87 Instead, he suggests that the courts
75. Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient PatentPools (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 9175, 2002).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Clarkson Thesis, supra note 5.
79. Id.
80. John Lerner et al., CooperativeMarketing Agreements Between Competitors:Evidence
from Patent Pools (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 9680, 2003),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9680.pdf.
81. Id. at 2-3.
82. Id. at 13-14.
83. Id. at 22.
84. Id. at 3.

85.

Id.

86. Richard J. Gilbert, Antitrust for Patent Pools: A Century of Policy Evolution, 2004
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 118 (2002).
87. Id.
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have focused on restrictive licensing terms that affect downstream
prices.8 8 Our statistical analysis, discussed in Part IV, takes Professor
Gilbert's analysis one step further and empirically demonstrates the
necessity of judicial examination of thicket questions in terms of pool
survival.
D. Antitrust, PatentPools, and the Management of Uncertainty
The origins of this Article can be found in Professor Newberg's article
that appeared in the somewhat obscure Atlantic Law Journal in 2000.
Although repeatedly cited by patent pool researchers, its lack of
availability via Lexis and Westlaw meant that many legal researchers,
including judicial law clerks, may not have access to its insights.
In that article, Professor Newberg provides a rather devastating
critique of much of the historical patent pooling jurisprudence, even when
pools were upheld. 89 In particular, Newberg critiques the Standard Oil
case as reading "more like a cautionary tale of how easy it is to mishandle
the basic analytical questions presented by patent pools." 90 He
characterizes the opinion as "a frustrating series of useful principles
articulated and missed opportunities for their application." 91 He chastises
the court for properly identifying the problem of blocking patents but then
failing to actually "analyze the patents at issue in the case as blocking." 9 2
Newberg describes the Court as being "like the drunk who searches for
his lost keys only under the light of the street lamp [because it] looked in
the wrong place for anticompetitive effects and found none." 93
He does compliment the court, however, for establishing the
proposition that patent pools should be analyzed under the rule of
reason. 9 4 As he notes, the "purpose of the rule of reason is to inquire into
all relevant facts in order to determine whether the procompetitive
benefits of a business arrangement outweigh its anticompetitive effects.
In the case of patent pools, which will often be efficient combinations of
complementary assets, such analysis of costs and benefits is likely to be
an appropriate use of judicial resources." 9 5 Additionally, despite his
assertion that the court misapplied it, Newberg nonetheless compliments
88.
89.

Id.
Newberg, supra note 34, at 8-9. (Newberg demonstrates that the Bement decision was

"fundamentally flawed," He also excoriates the courts failure to examine the underlying
technology market for "patents covering the manufacture of float spring tooth harrows" that was
separate and distinct for the goods market for the harrows themselves.).
90. Id. at 11.
91. Id. at 12.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 13.
94. Id. at 12-13.
95. Id. at 13.
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the court on establishing the notion that "a patent pooling agreement
among competitors that does not confer market power, can be, like some
horizontal mergers, competitively benign or even procompetitive." 96
Newberg then turns his acerbic wit toward the next Supreme Court
case on patent pooling, United States v. Line Materials Co.,97 which he
characterizes as "the blocking patents case that is rarely cited for what it
says about blocking patents." 9 8 He points out that, despite being
repeatedly cited by the courts, the holding "that a patent pool established
to resolve a blocking relationship between a dominant patent and a far
more efficient improvement patent is per se unlawful -- is defended by
no one." 9 9 Newberg also laments that despite eschewing "any serious
inquiry"loo into whether the patent pool may have been procompetitive,
the Court's misguided per se analysis "remains the law of the land." 10 1
Although the IP Guidelines facilitate the formation of patent pools based
on technology standards, 102 if patent pools outside of the technology
standards context are to survive, or "if the Supreme Court's antitrust
analysis of patent pools resolving blocking relationships is to facilitate
wealth maximization and technical advance, Line Materials must be
overruled."

103

Professor Newberg's admonition led to the collaboration for this
Article. But in order to truly justify the elimination of any per se rule for
patent pool analysis, we needed to examine the historical importance of
the examination of patent thicket questions of the rule of reason in terms
of pool survival.

III. THE HISTORY OF PATENT POOLING IN THE UNITED STATES

In order to construct a legal history of the patent pooling phenomenon,
the research team identified a number of instances of litigation involving
patent pools. 104 The search for cases began with the Lexis databases
GENFED and Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) Cases - Federal. The
96.

Id.

97.
98.

United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
Newberg, supra note 34, at 15.

99.

Id.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 20.
Id. at 15.
Id.; see also Clarkson Thesis, supra note 5, at 25.
Newberg, supra note 34, at 18.
Again, Professor Clarkson is deeply indebted to the research staff at both the Harvard

Law School Library and the University of Michigan Library. Professor Clarkson's doctoral thesis
advisor, Professor Josh Lerner of the Harvard Business School, not only guided his initial forays
into patent pooling research, but also share the initial methodology used to identify and collect
patent pooling data.
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GENFED search resulted in 361 hits and the M&A search resulted in 126
hits (all of these turned out to be repeats of the GENFED results). The
searches were then repeated in the Westlaw databases ALLCASES and
ALLCASES-OLD. The ALLCASES search resulted in 282 hits and the
ALLCASES-OLD search resulted in 45 hits.
The next step was to inspect the results and remove cases where patent
pooling was not a major theme (in some instances, the courts cited a case
involving patent pooling for reasons unrelated to the pool itself). The
resultant set of cases was compared to the "Pooling and Interchange"
section of the CCH Trade Regulation Reports, and a few cases were
added that were not previously identified in the Westlaw/Lexis searches.
So as not to miss potentially relevant cases, Professor Clarkson's formal
definition of a patent pool was relaxed slightly in terms of the search for
historical cases. While an organizational structure existed where multiple
firms collectively aggregate patent rights in a number of instances, the
distinction between certain cross-licensing regimes and a formal patent
pool was not readily discernable in some cases. This exhaustive search
yielded 124 cases of patent pools accused of antitrust violations by either
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade
Commission, or private antitrust actions.10 5
Although the set of pools identified is limited to those that were
litigated, it is sufficient to provide a degree of insight into the evolution
of antitrust enforcement and the criteria used to evaluate such pools. I
also supplemented this list with a patent pool that I was aware of that had
not been litigated but had been written about in other sources by the
scholars identified in Part II.B above. In examining the cases, I
specifically looked for instances where the historical pools were formed
for purposes of adhering to a standard or for reasons of interoperability,
as well as instances where the pools were formed to clear blocking patents
or for other procompetitive reasons.
It should be noted that to be included in the list, a case merely had to
raise the issue of patent pooling. A comparison of the actual agreements,
such as those identified by Lerner, would certainly facilitate a further
refinement of this list of cases, as it is possible for one party to raise
allegations regarding the operation of a pool without a patent pool
actually existing. 106

A. Early PatentPool Formation: 1856-1910
As the rate of inventive activity progressed in the nineteenth century,
105. Note that several of the identified cases involved the same patent pool. At times a given
pool was the subject of multiple litigation proceedings, while at other times unfavorable decisions
were appealed and the appellate proceeding was then separately identified in the search for cases.
106. Lerner et al., supranote 80.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

18

[Vol. 22

it was inevitable that patent rights would eventually block competing
firms from further development. The sewing machine, first invented in
1846, soon encountered such a blocking situation. 107 In response to
several infringement suits and countersuits, the four main manufacturers
established a patent pool in 1856.108 Although the required royalties
declined over time, this pool dominated the market until after 1877, when
most of the fundamental patents expired. 10 9 Throughout the life of this
pool, the legality of the pool itself was never challenged, perhaps because
no formal antitrust enforcement regime yet existed.1 10
While the creation of the formal antitrust regime originated with the
passage of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, patent pools continued to
enjoy protection from antitrust scrutiny for two more decades.1 11
Beginning in 1895, however, a series of cases involving spring-tooth
harrow agricultural implements were the first identified cases of patent
pool litigation; these cases occasionally referenced the Sherman Act. 112
The National Harrow patent pool was formed in 1890 after several years
of a proliferation of patent infringement litigation involving multiple
companies. National Harrow was thus formed to receive by assignment
all patents relating to spring-tooth harrows held by all major harrow
producers. 113 Under the pooling agreement, National Harrow did not
manufacture or sell harrows but rather licensed other firms, collected one
dollar in royalties for each harrow manufactured, and sold and organized
the legal defense of the patents. The agreement gave National Harrow the
power to regulate the members' sale prices. Over time, the pooling
agreement grew to include twenty-two parties. 114 Each member of the
pool agreed to cooperate with National Harrow, assign all patents to it,
pay royalties for each harrow produced or sold. In return, each member
received stock in National Harrow equal to the value of their assignment
as determined through arbitration. Eventually more than 90% of the
industry fell within the pool members' operations. 1 15
The first case, National Harrow Co. v. Quick, discussed the legality
of the pool. 116 While combinations were not per se illegal, the district
107.

Thomson, supra note 67, at 434.

108.

FLOYD L. VAUGHAN,

THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC

CONFLICTS IN AMERICAN PATENT HISTORY 41 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press eds., 1st

ed. 1956).

109.

Id.

110. Id. at40-41.
111. Id.at39-40.
112. Nat'l Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 F. 130 (C.C.D. Ind. 1895); Nat'l Harrow Co. v. Hench,
83 F. 36 (3d Cir. Pa. 1897); Nat'l Harrow Co. v. Hench, 84 F. 226, 227 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1898).
113. Quick, 67F.at 131.
114. Hench, 83 F. at 37.
115. Id.
116. Quick, 67 F. at 131-32.
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court was reluctant to embrace an agreement that had the effect of leading
to "the creation of combinations, trusts, or monopolies." 1 17 Therefore the
law could not give aid to such an illegal combination by supporting
National Harrow's claim against licensees for infringement. The court
also concluded that a strict reading of the relevant patents indicated that
the particular improvement in question did not constitute an "invention"
and was therefore not entitled to patent protection.1 1 8
The next case involving the National Harrow patent pool, National
Harrow Co. v. Hench, revisited the issue of the pooling agreement. 119 The
court noted that the original agreement forming National Harrow required
each manufacturer to assign the patents they "respectively owned or
should thereafter acquire"120 to the new corporation. The agreement
obligated each member to pursue the manufacture or sale of spring-tooth
harrows only as licensees; they could produce or sell no unlicensed
harrows. The court held that the purpose of pooling patents did not
insulate National Harrow from the scope of the Sherman Act. 12 1
"Patents," the court wrote, "confer no right upon the owners of several
distinct patents to combine for the purpose of restraining competition and
trade." 12 2 The court held the agreement in violation of the Sherman
Act. 12 3

&

In a companion case from the Northern District of New York, the
court underscored the reasoning in the Indiana district court opinion in
National Harrow Co v. Quick. 124 Unlike the prior case relating to
licensing, National Harrow pressed an infringement claim against Samuel
Hench and others in this case. 125 The court upheld the lower court,
arguing in a brief but strongly worded opinion that each step of the
pooling, from assignment through licensing, were "part of one illegal
scheme" to control an industry and enable price setting. 126 The court
declared National Harrow was not entitled to enforce its claim against
pool members because it had "no title except such as it got through this
agreement." 127 Because the entire scheme was held illegal, both the
assignment and the licensing were held void. 128
When the Supreme Court examined the patent pool in E. Bement
117. Id. at 132.
118. Id. at 133.
119. Hench, 83 F. at 36.
120. Id. at 37.
121. Id. at 38.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 39.
124. Nat'l Harrow Co. v. Hench, 84 F. 226, 227 (C.C.N.D.N.Y.
125. Id. at 226.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 227-28.
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Sons v. NationalHarrow Company, however, it upheld the legality of the
pool even though the licensing restrictions clearly restrained
competition. 129 In this first patent pooling case to appear before it, the
Supreme Court essentially established that rights under patent law
trumped other concerns, including antitrust concerns under the Sherman
Act of 1890. This decision reversed the trend established by many lower
courts, particularly the numerous prior cases involving the same National
Harrow pool. After a failed effort to join the pool in 1890, E. Bement
Sons successfully negotiated an agreement with National Harrow in
1891.130 The agreement involved transferring all its issued patents in
exchange for capital stock in National Harrow and the right to license for
use the eighty-five then-pooled patents on certain conditions. 131 These
conditions included a requirement that E. Bement & Sons pay an annual
royalty of one dollar, provide regular business reports, prohibit selling at
prices below a schedule provided in a companion contract, and sell only
harrows using patents covered under the pool, without changes in design
or challenges to existing patents. 132 The price-fixing portions of the
agreement stipulated that E. Bement & Sons could offer a maximum
discount of 42% on the sale of harrows throughout the Northeast and
Mid-Atlantic states. 133
When National Harrow sued E. Bement & Sons for refusing to follow
the price schedule, E. Bement & Sons argued that the contract violated
the Sherman Act and was therefore unenforceable. 134 The Court
disagreed, stating that
The general rule is absolute freedom in the use or sale of rights
under the patent laws of the United States. The very object of these
laws is monopoly, and the rule is, with few exceptions, that any
conditions which are not by their very nature illegal with regard to
this kind of property, imposed by the patentee and agreed to by the
licensee for the right to manufacture or use or sell the article, will
be upheld by the courts. The fact that the conditions in the contracts
keep up the monopoly or fix prices does not render them illegal. 13 5
Justice Peckham wrote that the agreement between E. Bement & Sons
and National Harrow was in "all respects legal and valid [and] embodied
no illegal restraints, were not repugnant to any rule of public policy as in
129.
130.
131.
132.

E. Bement & Sons v. Nat'1 Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 72-74.

133.
134.

Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 70-71.

135.

Id. at 91.
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restraint of trade, and were not intended to create a monopoly, trust or
illegal combination."136 Viewing the matter narrowly, the Court restricted
itself to the facts established by the court below which did not link the
licensing contracts formed between National Harrow and E. Bement
Sons to those contracts held in violation of antitrust regulations. 137 More
broadly, Justice Peckham wrote on behalf of the Court that the "first
important and most material fact" in assessing whether or not the pool
violated the Sherman Act, was the fact that it was a patent. 13 8 Justice
Peckham argued the Constitution and Court precedent (citing Chief
Justice Marshall's opinion in Grant v. Raymond1 39) conferred strong
monopoly rights to patent holders in order to provide incentives for
innovation. 14 0 Answering all the various arguments advanced as to the
illegality of the agreement, Justice Peckham argued it was a necessary
remedy to pervasive and pernicious litigation, that price setting was a
valid action by a patent holder, and that requiring members to offer only
products covered by patents in the pool did not prevent improvements but
protected the rights of other pool members. 14 1 In short, the decision
provided the strongest support for the permissibility of patent pools.
Notably, the Court did not examine the economic relationship
between the patents in the pool. Perhaps because of its expansive view of
the patent grant, the Court found it unnecessary to examine those
relationships. Lower courts, however, did conduct such examinations and
found that most or all of the National Harrow members held patents that
covered competing methods or designs. Although the pool may have
provided an economic benefit by clearing certain blocking positions, the
pool membership appears to have included a combination of
complementary and substitute patents. Additionally, since pool members
could only use the technology they had originally licensed to National
Harrow, they were unable to realize the potential economic benefit from
combining complementary technologies.
One year later a lower court cited the E. Bement & Sons, decision in
upholding a similar patent pool for the seeding and processing of raisins,
however, the license terms were perhaps a bit less anticompetitive as they
allowed for the combination of any potentially complementary
technologies. 14 2 After nearly two years of litigation, in June 1900, all
raisin producers had entered into a patent pooling agreement that the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

1903).

Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 83-84.
Id. at 88.
Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 (1832).
E. Bement & Sons, 186 U.S. at 89.
Id. at 93.
U.S. Consol. Seeded Raisin Co. v. Griffin & Skelley Co., 126 F. 364 (9th Cir. Cal.
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Ninth Circuit examined in U.S. ConsolidatedSeed Raisin Co. v. Griffin
& Skelley Co. 143 Consolidated held two patents and the other parties
collectively held at least eight others that they assigned to Consolidated
as the pool administrator. 144 The agreement provided for Consolidated to
defend the various patents, grant licenses, and collect royalties (minus
expenses) allocated among the various parties according to a particular
formula. 145 The agreement also included a shared management structure
comprised of four members with the authority to grant licenses and
determine terms and conditions. 146 Each member received a license to use
the covered patents in their operations, paying one eighth of one-cent per
pound of processed raisins in royalties from 1900-1901 and one-fourth
cent per pound thereafter. 147 The agreement also required parties to
exclusively employ machines covered by the agreement and precluded
licensing to third parties for less than half a cent per pound. 148
A central issue of the case was whether or not the members assigned
their patents to Consolidated under the agreement to achieve domination
of the industry or to end expensive litigation of potentially blocking
patents. 149 In light of E. Bement & Sons, the judges concluded the contract
at issue here was not "obnoxious to the provisions of the Sherman
antitrust act." 15 0

The next patent pooling case was Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J.L Case
Threshing Mach. Co., in which the court considered the legality of an
agreement pooling patents related to pneumatic straw stackers. 15 1 The
main patent in the pool combined old and new inventions in a generally
useful and novel way that set the standard for the industry. 152 The two
other subordinate patents were only minor improvements thus, making
the pooling of all three permissible. 153 By agreement, licensees were
required to sell above a set price, affix a patent label, and pay a royalty
per unit sold. 154 After addressing several other issues, the court addressed
the question of whether or not the pooling arrangement violated the
Sherman Act.15 5 The court concluded that even if, "as a condition of
enjoying the inventions," the entity holding the patents coordinated
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

150.

Id. at 360.

151.
152.

Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 154 F. 365 (7th Cir. Wis. 1907).
Id. at 366.

153.

Id.

154.

Id.

155.

Id. at 369.

364.
364-65.
365.

370-71.
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licensees for the purpose of controlling prices, it would not necessarily
violate the Sherman Act. 15 6 The court also stressed that the unique
combination of prior arts constituted an important advance worthy of
patent protection.157 Unlike in Bement, their analysis focused on the
economic interrelationships between the patents. The concurring opinion
was even more explicit in stressing that the pool was permissible in noting
that because one patent was dominant and the others wholly dependent,
a pooling of these patents was not anticompetitive but an advance in
innovation. 158

B. Early Antitrust Restraintof PatentPools: 1910 -938
This seeming immunity from antitrust enforcement only lasted for
another decade. In 1912 the Supreme Court again addressed patent pools
in Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. United States, reversing
course and invalidating the pool even though the terms of the license were
much less anticompetitive than those in Bement.159 In the first case
brought by the U.S. government against a patent pool, manufacturers of
sanitary enameled hardware including tubs, drinking fountains, wash
bowls, sinks, and other related products were found to have entered into
an illegal combination. 160 In 1899, the Arrott process of enameling iron
ware by means of a mechanically-vibrated sieve delivering a continuous,
even flow of enamel powder producing a superior, more uniform product
more quickly and with less waste was invented. 16 1 Some competitors used
inferior, older, processes while others were infringing the Standard
Sanitary patent, yielding poor products, and significant litigation. 162
Alarmed by the inferior quality of products entering the market from
producers, Edwin L. Wayman, Secretary of the Association of Standard
Enameled Ware Manufacturers, persuaded Standard Sanitary to
contribute its patent to a patent pool along with patents from two other
manufacturers. 163 While this agreement required licensees to forego the
marketing of any and all "seconds" (or products with defects), each party
agreed to a standard price and royalty payments. 164 On March 30, 1910,
the Manufacturer's Association formed a committee to fix prices and
review licensing agreements. 165 At the same gathering, Association
156.

Id. at 370.

157.

Id. at 368-69.

158.
159.

See id. at 372.
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912).
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Id.
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Id. at 35.
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Id. at 35-36.
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Id. at 37.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 42-43.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY LAW & POLICY

24

[Vol. 22

members adopted a resolution proposing the formation of an agreement
to license the three patents and to regulate sale price and conditions of
ironware produced under these licenses for jobbers. 166 The final licensing
agreement accomplished giving manufacturers the right to use the three
patents, releasing all from prior infringement claims, fixing royalties at
five dollars per day per furnace, setting preferential discounts and
limiting them to approved jobbers, and establishing certain labeling
requirements. 167 A second agreement for jobbers limited their rights to
sell only at prices set by the committee, including the discount rate, and
required them to refrain from purchasing, advertising, or soliciting orders
for any sanitary enamel ware not licensed by Wayman's association. 16 8
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Court observed that the
agreement ended the competitive independence among the various
existing manufacturers and jobbers that prevailed prior to its formation:
fixing prices and controlling their position in the industry from
manufacturer to consumer through the licensing conditions
established. 16 9 The Court opined that the agreement went far beyond
reasonable steps to protect the gathered patents contemplated in
Bement. 17 0 While rights under patent law are very "definite and
extensive," the Court noted, "they do not give any more than other rights
a universal license against positive prohibitions" in the Sherman Act. 171
Where these rights produce illegal consequences, the Court held that
those rights can be restrained.
Another patent pool case brought by the federal government, United
States v. Winslow, reached the U.S. Supreme Court in 1913, the year after
Standard Sanitary.172 At the time of the case, nearly all shoes made by
machine in the U.S. used lasting machines, welt-sewing machines,
outsole-stitching machines, heeling machines, and metallic fastening
machines. 173 In February 1899, the individual owners of three companies
formed the United Shoe Machinery Company and assigned to it the
stocks and business of all the corporations they together owned. 174
Following the formation of the agreement, the three agreed to cease the
sale of shoe-making machinery in favor of leasing, on the condition that
lessees refrain from using machines produced by competitors on pain of
removal of all the United Shoe Machinery machines. 175
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 49.
United States v. Winslow, 227 U.S. 202 (1913).
Id. at 215.
Id. at 216.
Id.
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The United States alleged that the defendants used their market
position and the terms of the agreement to punish competitors, discourage
innovation by others, and deepen their control of the trade. 176 The appeals
court limited the scope of review to the legality of the original
combination agreement of February 7, 1899, excluding the leasing
arrangements incorporated later. 177 Because each essentially operated in
different spheres, the court below and the Supreme Court saw no restraint
in competition stemming from the original combination.
The United States challenged two additional patent pools in 1913 that
did not fare well. In the first case, United States v. Krentler-ArnoldHinge
Last Co., a shoe lasts manufacturer was perpetually enjoined from
engaging in certain practices used in its licensing agreements alleged to
violate antitrust statutes. 178 The license contained several onerous
provisions. Section 2 of the licensing agreement compelled licensees to
purchase hinges, lasts, and their parts only from Krentler-Arnold to
refrain from manufacturing other hinged lasts, and to agree to a pricing
schedule applied equally to all licensees set by an adjuster. Section 6
required licensees to agree never to challenge any of the patents it held in
any way or at any time. Additionally, Section 7 attempted to extend
licenses beyond the point at which the patents expired.
In the second district court case, United States v. New DepartureMfg.
Co., six corporate defendants and eighteen individuals together
controlled about 85% of the domestic market for bicycle and motorcycle
coaster brakes and accessories using different types and designs under
different and distinct patents. 179 The government charged that the
defendants engaged in a variety of anti-competitive practices, including
price setting; offering non-competitive discounts; refusing to sell brakes
except on limited terms; requiring purchasers to refrain from trading with
competitors; intimidating competitors with threats of patent litigation;
advancing a deceptive licensing arrangement in which New Departure
became the licensor of patents held by the other defendants as licensees;
requiring New Departure to obtain approval of these licensees prior to
offering additional licenses; granting only licenses with attached price
schedules; discontinuing pending litigation among the various parties;
paying royalties to New Departure that were credited back for its use of
other licenses; establishing an arbitrator to settle disputes and supervising
a guaranty fund insuring against breach of the agreement; setting prices
for sale to jobbers; limiting sales only to proscribed jobbers; and using
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litigation to prevent parties from selling to competitors.18 0
The court held that the agreement was a conspiracy or combination
under the language of Sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act.18 1 The court
also rejected the defendant's argument that the agreements were legal
instruments legally entered into by all parties by noting that otherwise
legal means and the intent to achieve illegal ends are violations. 182 The
defendants' claim that they were merely licensees and that New
Departure was the patent holder was rejected by the court as a defense
because each held competing, not complimentary patents, and New
Departure received patents only to parts, not the entirety of the
processes. 183 In the eyes of the court, the licensing arrangement involving
New Departure and the other defendants was merely designed to provide
legal cover under patent law to collusive behavior. By the commingling
of "separate interests in separate patent[s]" in an agreement that fixed
prices and imposed other restrictive conditions in restraint of trade, the
court found that the agreement violated the Sherman Act. 184
The aggressive antitrust enforcement continued with the government
bringing another case against a patent pool in 1915, United States v.
Motion Picture Patents Co. 185 In that case, the Motion Picture Patents
Company had been formed by numerous corporations holding patents
related to the production and distribution of movies. The total number of
patents pooled together came to sixteen, of which ten were minor to the
industry. 186 The remaining six were wholly owned by single parties and
covered distinct innovations. An agreement was reached in 1908 between
the makers, distributors, and importers of motion pictures. Following the
consummation of the agreement, an additional provision was added to
consolidate film distribution, and the number of independent distributors
declined from 116 to a single such purveyor. 187 The defendants argued
that a "single directing and regulating head" was good for the industry.18 8
The core issue discussed in this opinion relates to the motives and
conscious purposes of the defendants. Conceding the possibility of their
declared intent to promote the industry, the court nevertheless held that
no violation of the law becomes permissible owing to noble intent. 189
Finding illegal intent in the scheme was not mitigated for the court by the
fact the defendants claimed or believed to be promoting the industry,
180.
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protecting public morals, or promoting the dramatic arts. 190 Nor was the
agreement a legitimate effort to protect monopoly rights under U.S.
patent law, but rather a naked effort to use the control of patents as part
of a "scheme, in the belief, or at least the hope, that this would render the
scheme (otherwise illegal) not open to the condemnation of the law." 1 9 1
Three years after Motion Picture Patents, and five years after United
States v. Winslow, the Supreme Court revisited that particular pool again
in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. of New Jersey.192 As in
Winslow, the government alleged United Shoe represented an illegal
restraint on interstate commerce, and as in Winslow, the Court rejected
that assertion and affirmed a decree for the defendants in the court below.
This Court found that the antecedent corporations were not competitors,
and therefore, their combination was not per se impermissible. In the
view of the Court, the expansive rights under the monopoly of patents
held by the various corporations did not lose their distinctiveness upon
combination and, therefore, particularly in light of the twelve-year delay
in enforcement action, were acceptable. 193 In this case, the Court found a
mutually blocking relationship: United Shoe held a blocking underlying
patent, but the optimal shoe-bottoming machine required improvements
patented by Plant; neither could operate free of the demands of the other.
Certain other rights were acquired and justified in the name of avoiding
excessive litigation. The Court also failed to see any great illegal design
in sheer number of patents acquired, and even where competition might
have been slightly reduced, in light of countervailing exigencies or
conveniences, the Court permitted the licensing arrangement.
Reviewing the leases United Shoe offered, the Court concluded none
of the specific clauses exceeded the powers lawfully available to
patentees. 194 The clauses reviewed include a uniform term: a requirement
that if the lessee has more work than his current supply of leased
machines can handle, he must lease more machines; use them
exclusively; prohibit the use of leased machines to produce work, also
relying on machines not leased from United Shoe adhere to the right of
termination; and charge an assessment upon return of leased
equipment. 195 Because the Court saw no particular intent in the forming
of the combination to dominate the industry, indeed that the various
parties individually relied on the same terms in their lease agreements
prior to the pooling agreement, none of these conditions were especially
novel or problematic. For the Court, they were the normal powers
190.
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extended to holders of issued patents.
In 1922, the government brought another antitrust action, United
States v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Corp, that resulted in a consent decree
ending a business association that combined manufacturers of flour
sifters, dish covers, and kitchen utensils in both a patent pool and an
agreement as to uniform freight allowances. 196 Association members
were enjoined from any further operations in combination. The next year
the government successfully challenged another pool in United States v.
United Gas Improvement Co. 19 7 United Gas, two other corporations, and
eight persons were alleged to have formed a conspiracy to monopolize
trade in incandescent lights bulbs, fixtures, and appliances by controlling
numerous patents, prohibiting licensing outside the pool, and acquiring
and intimidating competitors. The court issued a decree of
discontinuance, dissolving the pool.
The next government challenge to a patent pool was filed in 1925. In
United States v. PorcelainAppliance Corp., the government successfully
alleged an effort to monopolize trade in assembled, two-part porcelain
insulators by pooling competing patents and licensing to pool members
on condition of agreement to price-fixing. 19 8 In 1930, the court entered a
consent decree terminating the pooling arrangement, enjoining further
operation, and returning the individual patents to their pre-pool
owners. 199
The next patent pool case, Dial Toaster Corp. v. Waters-Genter Co.,
was a private action rather than government enforcement. 200 This case
arose from a pooling agreement formed on March 19, 1927, between Dial
Toaster Corporation and the Waters-Genter Company for patents related
to electric toasters. 20 1 The agreement was to lapse March 1, 1928 if no
licenses were secured.20 2 Dial Toaster sought relief following a WatersGenter veto of a licensing contract. They asserted that the royalty fees
negotiated reflected reasonable market rates: a claim which was disputed
by Waters-Genter. 203 The agreement did not set royalty rates except to
require they be "on the best royalty basis obtainable." 2 0 4 Dial Toaster
argued that the defendant acted improperly and should be compelled to
196.
1922).
197.
1923).
198.
1926).

United States v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Corp., Trade Cas. (CCH)
United States v. United Gas Improvement Co., Trade Cas. (CCH)
United States v. Porcelain Appliance Corp., Trade Cas. (CCH)

1 255

1252,
1

(S.D.N.Y.

258 (S.D.N.Y

305 (N. D. Ohio

199.

Id.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Dial Toaster Corp. v. Waters-Genter Co., 233 N.W. 870, 870 (Minn. 1930).
Id. at 870.
Id. at 871.
See id. at 873.
Id. at 871.

BLUNT MACHETES IN THE PATENT THICKET

2018]

29

honor the Fitzgerald contract with the additional effect of preventing the
lapse of the original agreement. 205 The court held that the lack of
specificity in the agreement regarding royalty rates required a rejection
of the plaintiff's claim for relief.206 The court believed that to intervene
against Waters-Genter would constitute, in effect, a court mandated
contract that the two parties were unable to reach by themselves. 207 This
opinion was upheld upon rehearing, with slight modification. 208 With an
eye toward recent Supreme Court decisions, including Bement, the
Minnesota court added that the original agreement did not violate
antitrust requirements because other agreements more restrictive of trade
were permitted by the Supreme Court. 209
A number of cases involving a large pool of patents related to gasoline
refining came before various courts in the early 1930s. The first case,
Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., was a private antitrust
action. 2 10 On February 26, 1926, Gasoline Products and Champlin
entered into a contract in which the non-exclusive patents held by the
plaintiff under a cross-licensing arrangement with Standard Oil of
Indiana and of New Jersey, the Standard Oil Development Corp., and the
Texas Company (the primary defendants in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, the next case to be discussed), coupled with other patents it held,
were licensed by Champlin Refining for use in two cross cracking
plants. 21 1 In return, Champlin committed to pay royalties of ten cents per
barrel.2 12 Gasoline Products sued to collect royalties of nearly $200,000
it believed it was owed.2 13 Champlain argued that the original agreement
was invalid because Gasoline Products and the other companies were
engaged in a price-fixing scheme that was illegal under Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. 2 14 The defendant also argued the agreement
essentially compelled Champlin to seek licenses from Gasoline Products,
making it a party to an illegal scheme against their wishes, a claim the
court rejected, noting that the defendant considered several different
licensing options and was free to choose among them all.2 15 Regarding
the Sherman Act claim-the Gasoline Products countered, and the Court
agreed-even if pooling agreements were illegal, there was nothing
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illegal about its sublicensing agreement with Champlin. 216 Because
Champlin was not a party to the cross-licensing, the court reasoned it was
not a party to a potentially illegal combination.
The issue of the gasoline refining pool reached the Supreme Court in
1931. In StandardOil Co. v. United States, the Court reversed a decision
from the Northern District of Illinois holding that an agreement pooling
the gasoline cracking patents of four large companies ("primary
defendants") and fifteen smaller companies violated the Sherman Act. 2 17
As demand for gasoline increased rapidly with the explosion of the
automobile industry, cracking produced more valuable petroleum
products per unit of crude oil input. 2 18 From 1913 to 1920 the Standard
Oil of Indiana held a patent on the only cracking process used in the
country. 219 The company manufactured gasoline and licensed its process
to others, receiving in excess of fifteen million dollars in royalties by
1921 .220 Because Indiana held patents to a particular cracking process and
not the underlying phenomenon, other operators created new processes
throughout this period. 22 1 Early in the 1920s litigation proliferated over
the scope and validity of the various patents held by these companies. 222
The primary motivation behind the formation of the pool was to avoid
litigation over blocking patents. The pooling agreement acquired through
seventy-nine contracts included seventy-three patents related to gasoline
cracking. 22 3 Three of the four primary defendants in the case were large
producers of cracked gasoline and held patents arising from their original
innovations. The fourth company was merely a holder of patents,
licensing them to manufacturers. Forty-six companies ("secondary
defendants") manufactured cracked gasoline under license from one or
more of the primary defendants. 224 By 1923 the primary defendants had
entered into a number of agreements that released pool members from
liability arising from prior or possible future infringement claims, and
that secured from each licensee the right to use the others' patents. 2 2 5
Each pool member shared in a fixed proportion of royalty fees derived
under the cross-licensing contracts. 226 New innovations built on the
individual patents that were previously controlled were not subject to the
agreement. Moreover, the agreement created an open pool in which
216.
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members could license to third parties.
Citing Standard Sanitary, the Court noted that the monopoly powers
conferred by patent law were limited and generally subject to Sherman
Act provisions. 227 The Court also held, however, that this limitation did
not mean that the patent pools per se violated the Sherman Act, but that
each "patent interchange agreement" 22 8 needed specific scrutiny to
determine whether such an agreement is "part of a larger plan to control
interstate markets." 229 The government asserted, for example, that
inclusion of royalty sharing itself indicated a conspiracy to restrain
competition and raise prices to licensees. 230 The Court held that where
blocking patents give rise to "legitimately conflicting" interference
claims, settling these disputes by agreement rather than litigation did not
necessarily violate the Sherman Act. 231 By noting that such agreements
could, in theory, remove blockages to innovation and encourage
companies to direct scarce resources to innovation rather than additional
litigation, the Court argued that patent pools could enhance innovation
and competition, and that they might be "necessary if technical
advancement is not to be blocked by threatened litigation." 2 3 2 This
portion of the Standard Oil opinion established a precedent that the rule
of reason should be applied to the analysis of patent pools.
The government also argued that the agreement was anticompetitive
in that it waived fees for three primary defendants while fees were
collected from all other current and potential licensees. 233 The Court held,
however, that unless the parties dominated the industry or directly limited
interstate commerce, such benefits were the legitimate fruits of
innovation and patenting that seem appropriate given that the three
primary defendants were the source of most of the pooled patents. Even
very high licensing fees did not by themselves violate the Sherman Act. 234
The government further asserted that because the arrangement fixed
royalty rates for competing patented processes (the product itself was not
patented), it constituted an illegal combination. 235 The Court
acknowledged that royalty sharing when pooling competing patents and
when the pool members in fact enjoy a dominant position would violate
antitrust agreements. 236 The Court noted, however, that prior to the
agreement, one member of the pool exercised greater control over the
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industry than was enjoyed by the members of the pool taken together
upon successful execution of the agreement. 237 The four parties to the
agreement owned and licensed together only 55% of the national cracked
gasoline capacity. 23 8 The Court concluded that whether or not the intent
to control the market motivated the agreement, pool members were not
in a position to impose their desires on the market. 2 39 Regarding the final
charge of collusion by the government, the opinion held the court below
erred as a factual matter in the evidence it used to discern price-fixing
effects stemming from the royalty-sharing provisions of the
arrangement. 240

The next private action, F.A.D. Andrea, Inc. v. Radio Corp. of
America, involved a pool that had formed during World War I.241 F.A.D.
Andrea approached RCA and attempted to obtain licenses to produce
radio receivers on the same terms given to others but was rebuffed.24 2
F.A.D. Andrea sued, asserting that RCA entered into an illegal conspiracy
in 1919 with other companies to monopolize the domestic and
international trade in radio devices, particularly the production, sale, and
shipment of radio receivers. 243 The plaintiff asserted that the pooling
agreement made it impossible for another party to secure a license to the
patents held by the any of the pool members except through RCA, in
violation of the Sherman Act. 244 The court dismissed the claim for two
reasons. First, it held that even if the pooling agreement afforded a
position of sufficient dominance for questions about whether a pool was
anti-competitive could arise under Standard Oil Co. v. United States, it
did not follow that the anti-competitive party was compelled to share its
property with anyone who longed for it. 24 5 Second, the court held that the
remedies available under the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act were
exclusive and did not imagine a right to a license. 246
Another radio technology case, Lynch v. Magnavox Co., was decided
two years later. 247 Plaintiff Lynch, the bankruptcy trustee for Jackson Bell
Company, a California manufacturer, argued that in 1932 four companies
illegally pooled their respective patents for the purpose of monopolizing
the manufacture, sale, and distribution of radio loud speakers and
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controlling prices.248 The plaintiff alleged that the agreement required
each party to cross-license its patents to the others, coordinate litigation
strategies to compel other companies to license only with pool members,
drive non-pool members from the industry, and force others to acquire
rights at fees generally raising the market price of loudspeakers. 249 in
October 1932, Lektophone and Utah filed 29 suits alleging patent
infringement in the Southern and the Eastern Districts of New York
against retailers selling radios with speakers not covered under the
pool. 2 50 Magnavox filed at least 26 similar suits alleging infringement of
its patent. 251 Lynch also alleged that pool members mailed hundreds of
letters threatening infringement suits specifically targeting key accounts
of competing manufacturers. 2 52
Lynch sought judgment for damages of $1,000,000 and $100,000 in
attorney fees, but the court below dismissed the case. 253 In this case the
Ninth Circuit Court reasoned that even if the individual acts alleged were
themselves legal, if the "agreement has an unlawful purpose, it is a
conspiracy." 2 54 The court also rejected the appellees' claim that the
appellant failed to sufficiently prove the matter affected interstate or
intra-national commerce, not merely intrastate. 255 Justice Matthews'
dissent accepted the appellees' view that no combination or conspiracy
was proven but merely the existence of a plan or scheme, thus denying
the appellant standing under the language of the Sherman Act. 256
The Supreme Court also decided a radio technology case in 1938. In
Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., the Court affirmed a lower
court decree for plaintiffs Western Electric in a suit alleging that General
Talking Pictures Corporation had violated a licensing agreement it signed
to secure the right to use seven pooled patents related to vacuum tube
amplifiers. 257 The patents related to this amplifier technology were used
in wire and radio telephony, movies, and for various other purposes. 25 8
These patents were pooled and licensed exclusively to the other
respondents to manufacture amplifiers for the commercial field of
recording and reproducing sound, including equipment used in movie
theaters. 259 Another class of licenses permitted licensees to manufacture
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amplifiers for the private field, that is radio broadcast reception, radio
amateur reception, or for radio experiments. 260 The Court summarily
dismissed several questions raised in the petition for writ. 2 61 The first
asserted that in collecting royalties paid by the defendants consented to
the use to which the patents were directed.2 6 2 The second asked the Court
to rule that the patents in question were invalid for want of sufficient
improvement over prior arts. 263
After admonishing General Talking Pictures for asking the Court to
visit issues not directly raised in their petition, Justice Butler, writing for
the majority moved the heart of the opinion. General Talking Pictures
argued that the owners of the patents could not "restrict the use" of a
device manufactured under license once it had come into its possession
under the normal course of commerce and for which it had paid.2 64
Rejecting this assertion, the Court declared that the knowing violation of
license restriction did not constitute "ordinary" trade. 2 6 5 It also declared
that consistent with the monopoly powers extended to patent holders,
they were entitled to impose licensing conditions. 266 Both General
Talking Pictures and American Transformer were guilty of patent
infringement. The final issue raised by General Talking Pictures was that
certain other inventions described but not explicitly claimed in patent
applications, could not obtain valid patents after some two years of use
by others merely through a 'divisional' or 'continuation' application. 2 6 7
The Court deferred to the court below that determined for the first two
patents, no proof existed of public use of the invention. 268 For the other
two, the Court held that the inventions were claimed in a timely
manner. 269

Justice Black, in his dissent, argued that the majority granted broad
new powers to the holders of patents, departing from established
precedent on the permissible reach of patent monopoly powers to color
subsequent exchanges or prices. 270 He asserted that the proliferation of
patents subverted the common good. 27 1 Toward the end of his dissent, he
turned directly to the question of patent pools, arguing that patent law
was designed to permit only one patent monopoly per one patentable
260.
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invention. 272 Citing Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., Justice
Black argued that Congress conferred no power to specifically authorize
the pooling of patents. 2 7 3 Finally, in noting the majorities' view that the
"public use" of the invention prior to the filing of the continuation was in
fact by the patentee and not an exception to the "public use" language of
relevant legislation. 274 To permit such an outcome would embolden
patent holders to crush potential opponents through the deceptive use of
"continuation" or "divisional" applications. 2 7 5
C. Inter Armas Clamor Leges: 1939-1945
While the Latin phrase inter armas silent leges suggests that during
war the law is silent, the opposite appears to be the case for patent pools.
The onset of war in Europe seemed to bias the antitrust enforcement
regime and the courts against a number of patent pools, including some
pools whose technologies were not directly related to the war effort.
In contrast to its general pro-pool ruling two years earlier in General
Talking Pictures, in 1940 the Supreme Court held that a licensing
agreement that included price-setting conditions violated the Sherman
Act in United States v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp.276 The Ethyl Gasoline held
patents over a fuel mixture of gasoline and a lead-based compound and
the means of burning this fuel within high compression internal
combustion engines. 277 Ethyl Gasoline held two patents for the fuel
additive compound and a third for the optimal blended mixture. 2 78 Ethyl
Gasoline also held a patent on a method of using the fuel. 279 Ethyl
Gasoline sold the patented fluid directly to oil refiners producing the
desired mixed fuel. 280 It also issued licenses to both refiners and jobbers
(resellers to individual gasoline retailers) to use the patented process,
without fee, deriving its sole source of revenue related to these patents
from the sale of the ethyl fluid additive. 28 1 The licensing agreement
required licensees to sell only to other licensed refiners, jobbers, and
retailers, requiring them to use the mix of ethyl fluid only in approved
equipment and in ways consistent with Surgeon General Regulations. 2 82
Licensees were required to terminate sales to refiners and jobbers upon
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notice that these other licenses were cancelled.2 83 Another condition
required licensees to market fuels with a maximum content of the additive
for their second-best fuel at a maximum seventy octane rating. 2 84 The
license further specified the minimum ethyl content and a seventy-six
octane rating for premium brand fuels and fixed the price of this product
relative to the average net price for the second-best product. 285 Finally,
the agreement governed the use of the Ethyl Gasoline trademark and trade
names in advertising to promote the blended fuel product. 2 86 Conditions
that were imposed on jobbers included a requirement to secure licenses
from designated refiners and an identification of specified territories in
which they could market to retailers. 287
The Court noted the market power of fuels sold including the patented
fluid, noting that it reached between 70-80% of the market, including
85% of all high-octane gasoline. 2 8 8 It noted that 11,000 of 12,000 jobbers
sold gasoline under license from Ethyl Corporation, which reserved the
right of arbitrary revocability. 2 89 Ethyl Gasoline advanced two primary
defenses against the decree reached in the court below nullifying the
licenses. First, the various licensing conditions were necessary to ensure
suitable return on investment consistent with the powers of patent
monopoly. 290 Second, Ethyl Gasoline argued its conditions were
permissible to enable it to guarantee consistent high quality in fuel
products and thereby protect the growing market for the fuel. 29 1 The
Court affirmed the broad monopoly powers conferred to control the use
of a patented commodity possessed by the jobbers, particularly the
regulation of prices and the suppression of competitors. 292 The Court
agreed with court below that sufficient evidence existed to reveal the
exercise of these powers by Ethyl Gasoline. The Court argued that if the
market position Ethyl Gasoline then enjoyed was secured without
reliance on its patents, little question of its illegality under the Sherman
Act would exist. 293 Then the Court reasoned that while the powers
conferred to patent owners was great, it did not include the power to
"condition his license" so as to limit the use of other processes, devices,
or materials not directly covered under the licensor's patent. 2 9 4 It also
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held, relying on Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film, among
others, that the license could not condition the conduct of licensees in
ways not covered by the patent monopoly. 295 Finally, the Court reasoned
that licenses could not impose conditions of resale prices. 29 6 Through
each of these practices, Ethyl Gasoline used the "leverage of its licensing
contracts resting on the fulcrum of its patents [to create a] combination
capable of use, and actually used, as a means of controlling jobbers'
prices and suppressing competition." 2 9 7 Finally, the Court held that the
legitimate purpose of ensuring that gasoline containing the patented
additive met relevant public health guidelines and could be achieved
without resort to illegal licensing conditions. 298
The government was successful in four separate antitrust enforcement
actions in 1941. In United States v. Johns-Mansville Corp., seven
manufacturers of mineral wool used in insulating materials had pooled
their respective patents and under a licensing scheme that sought to
control the industry. 299 The government successfully alleged that under
the agreement, the defendants restricted both production and distribution
of mineral wool, set prices, compelled licensees to sign exclusive
agreements, and attempted to drive unlicensed competitors from the
market. 300
In United States v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., three companies owned
by assignment five claims on a "Milling Machine Spindle and Tool."30 1
Under the terms of a consent decree entered here, the defendants agreed
to divest themselves of all rights and interests in the patent and transfer
such rights to the public without royalty or other consideration. The
decree also obligated the defendants to make readily accessible to duly
authorized representatives of the Department of Justice any records in
which it may have interest and to require that they issue regular reports
necessary for enforcement of the decree. 302
In United States v. Synthetic Nitrogen Products Corp., Synthetic
Nitrogen had been formed to import nitrogen-based fertilizer produced
by German fertilizer giant I.G. Farben into the United States. 30 3 Under
the trademark "Cal-Nitro," Synthetic Nitrogen marketed Ammonium
Nitrate-Dolomitic Limestone (A.N.-D.L.)
fertilizers across the
295.
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country. 304 The alleged illegal practices can only be inferred from the list
of activities prohibited under the decree. Synthetic Nitrogen was alleged
to have conspired with I.G. Farben in a scheme to set prices and restrict
the use of specific patents. 305 Under the terms of a consent decree,
Synthetic Nitrogen was prohibited from entering into an agreement with
any other producer or distributor of A.N-D.L., Nitrate of Soda,
Ammonium Sulphate, or Synthetic Ammonia Solutions for the purposes
of fixing prices, fixing terms and conditions of sale, designating sales
territories, limiting shipments, exchanging marketing information, setting
nitrogen content, or classifying buyers. 306 The decree also stipulated other
requirements, including full disclosure to the Attorney General the details
of any past or future agreements. 307
In United States v. Schering Corp., four manufacturers of hormones
and hormone products, had entered into a series of agreements governing
the production and sale of hormones imported to or exported from the
United States. 308 Judging by the prohibitions enumerated in the decree,
defendants were alleged to have engaged in a far-reaching scheme to
control the domestic market in hormones and hormone products. 309
Again, judging by the list of enjoined activities, it would appear the
parties conspired to fix prices, restrain competitors, allocate market
territory, and share internal pricing data and audit access to accounts.
Other patent-related activities that were enjoined included limiting the
number of licenses under a particular patent, designating licensees,
receiving royalties from unrelated patents, and requiring defendants to
exchange future patents. 3 10 The decree also enjoined any effort to use
licenses to set territory, to maintain condition, or to determine prices
charged by licensees. 3 1 1 Two classes of agreements, the "Schering
Agreements" and the "Roche-Organon Agreements," all formed in 1938,
were adjudged unlawful and declared void under antitrust laws. 312 The
decree ended the collusive elements of their agreements, including the
incorporation of future patentable innovations but left undisturbed the
ownership of current or future patents. 3 13
In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, a consent decree
cancelled the licenses of four companies covering patents for reducing or
304.
305.
306.
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308.
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Id.
United States v. Schering Corp., [1940-1943] Trade Cas. (CCH)

309.
310.

See id.
Id.

311.
312.

Id.
Id.

313.

Id.

¶

56,179 (D.N.J.

BLUNT MACHETES IN THE PATENT THICKET

2018]

39

smelting magnesium ores or chemical compounds by any machine or
process for the purpose of producing magnesium and patents for the
working and treating of magnesium or alloys of 50% or more
magnesium. 314 In addition to canceling their existing licensing
agreements, the decree compelled each of the four to offer non-exclusive,
non-assignable patents to all applicants without fee for the duration of
hostilities against German and Japan. 3 15 After the end of the war, they
would be allowed to charge a reasonable and non-discriminatory royalty,
provided that all licenses and accounts remained open to inspection by an
independent auditor. 3 16 Specifically enjoined under the decree, however,
were efforts to pool patents with I.G. Farben or its subsidiaries. 317
While anticompetitive practices were found in several of the patent
pooling cases, according to the Supreme Court, they paled in comparison
to what the Court found in United States v. Hartford-Empire Co. 3 18 In
that case twelve corporations and 101 of their officers were charged with
conspiring to monopolize the glass container industry by acquiring all
patents related to the manufacture, licensing, and sale of glass-making
machinery, and excluding others from engaging in the trade of glassmaking machinery or glass products. 3 19 The Glass Container Association
(Delaware) consisted of every glass company in the country except
two. 320 Glass Container was a statistical and research company making
neither glass nor glass-making equipment. 32 1 The government claimed
these twelve corporations dominated all aspects of the glass ware industry
in America via their control of the two principal automated glass
manufacturing process (suction and gob fed), the forming process and
machines, and the lehr ("closed tunnel") process and machinery to cool
glass and prevent cracking. 3 22 Under its exclusive license to the suction
machine, Owens licensed the use of its machine for specific uses by other
manufacturers (e.g., fruit jars, milk bottles).3 2 3 The Court observed that
as a result of the licensing strategies of Owens, other glass manufacturers
were forced to search for alternative methods or to meet Owens' price.
After the gob feeding process proved effective for highly variable
production lines, Owens began to purchase certain patents related to the
314. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, [1940-1943] Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 56,200
(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
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gob fed process. 3 24

Between 1916 and 1924 two companies engaged in a series of
infringement suits regarding the gob feeding process, occasionally
drawing in other parties. 325 Settlement conferences between 1921 and
1924 ultimately produced a written agreement in which one company
gave an exclusive license for the use of its patents for feeders and forming
machines to another and in return received the right to use the second
company's glass manufacturing patents. 3 26 With the carrot of money and
the stick of litigation threats, the two succeeded in acquiring patents held
by a variety of feeder manufacturers over the next few years. 3 27 Until
1932 the two companies were locked in intense litigation struggles with
two other companies. One infringement suit was resolved favorably for
each party in different circuits. 328 In July of 1932 these three parties
concluded a number of agreements to cross-license their various patents
subject to particular conditions. 3 29 In the face of the new agreements,
holdouts to licensing patents caved in until only a handful of marginal
players remained.3 30
The forming machine industry came to be dominated by two players
by the mid-1920s. 33 1 During the remainder of the 1930s one company
initiated a successful campaign to complete its control of various sectors
of the glass making industries, securing first effective control of the
closed tunnel business through agreements and the closed tunnel patent
from another company. 332 Through these various mechanisms and
acquisitions, Hartford and Owens came to completely dominate glassmaking machinery of every variety from feeders to forming machines to
closed tunnels. 333 In the eyes of the Court, the facts supported a clear
intent to conspire to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, these
industries by acquiring control of patents for glass making machinery, the
production of these machines, and the manufacture, distribution, and sale
of glass products. 3 34

Upon review of the facts described above, the Court determined that
the entire series of agreements acquiring 317 patents, including a number
of competing substitutes, violated the antitrust laws. 335 The Court
324.
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concluded by arguing that there "should be no doubt that an aggregation
of patents collected into the hands of one or two large concerns [are the
fruits of an] unholy alliance designed by the parties thereto to attain
selfish objectives at the ultimate expense of the public."33 6 The Court
upheld the district court's order requiring the appointment of a receiver
for the lead company free from any claim to a stay, that royalties received
pending final resolution be set aside for return to licensees, and that all
its patents be made available royalty free to any interested party, and
cancelled all current agreements, leases, and licenses required.337
Although Justice Hugo Black wrote the "history of this country has
perhaps never witnessed a more completely successful economic tyranny
over any field of industry than that accomplished by these appellants,"
the remedy was truly a nuclear bomb in terms of antitrust enforcement. 338
Although less harsh than Hartford-Empire, the government's
aggressive antitrust enforcement continued in United States v. Sperry
Corp., in which it obtained a consent decree that voided agreements
between American corporations and six citizens and corporations from
Japan, Germany, French and Italy or to transfer to certain German
corporations patent rights, techniques, manufacturing rights, or other
information without court approval. 33 9 The defendants signed agreements

with foreign corporations between 1931 and 1937 pertaining to
gyroscopes, that is, instruments that display the tilt angle or climb angle
of aircraft, act as directional indicators for steering, or for "gyro-pilots"
or autopilots. 340 Existing patents and royalties derived from them by
Sperry were unaffected provided it claimed only non-exclusive rights to
patents within the United States. 341 We were at war; enough said.
Even instances not directly related to the war effort did not fare well,
as in United States v. Certain-teed Products Corp.342 Certain-teed

Products and the United States Gypsum Company were both makers of
perforated gypsum lath (the material that spans the open spaces between
structural framing that provides a surface for the plasterer to apply mortar
is called lath).34 3 During June and July of 1936, U.S. Gypsum signed
essentially identical licenses with Certain-Teed Products and American
Gypsum relating to a patent for gypsum lath of particular dimensions and
with perforations of a particular spacing and relationship. 344 U.S.
336.
337.
338.
339.
1942).
340.
341.
342.
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344.
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Gypsum licensed to them the right to make and sell gypsum lath provided
they not contest the patent's validity for the life of the agreement, and
empower U.S. Gypsum to set prices under the licenses. 345 In addition, the
government alleged that the patent was in fact void, representing no
patentable improvement, but rather an instrument for fixing gypsum
prices for the benefit of Certain-teed Products and American Gypsum. 346
The court held that certain elements of the indictment were insufficiently
clear and directed the government to further specify its view of the prior
arts leading it to conclude the patent offered no improvements. 347
In United States v. Wayne Pump Co., the Supreme Court returned to
the issue of patent pools. 34 8 Four companies, their officers, and a trade
association were indicted for conspiring to set prices for gasoline
pumps. 349 A second indictment, omitting persons, alleged a broader

conspiracy to control the production and trade of gasoline pumps that also
computed the price of gasoline delivered. 35 0 Between 1932 and 1937,
Wayne Pump acquired ownership or control of patents relating to
computer pumps and the computing mechanisms. 351 Before 1932 the
record indicated that several parties authored numerous applications for
patents relating to computing mechanisms and pumps. 352 The Jauch
Patent, issued to employees of Wayne Company and assigned to Wayne
Pump, enabled Wayne Pump to enter into licensing agreements for
computer gasoline pumps. 3 53 By 1938 the defendants manufactured
computer pumps representing 56% of the value of the entire market in
computer gasoline pumps. 354 Through licenses held by Wayne Pump,
Gilbert & Barker, and Tokheim and eight others, however, licensees
agreed to buy all the computing mechanisms from defendant Veeder
Root, making it the producer of 100% of such mechanisms manufactured
in the United States. 355 The pool members accounted for 99 of the value
of all gasoline pumps (both with and without computer mechanisms) sold
in the United States. 3 56
The Court ruled that the price-fixing components of the licensing
agreements were permitted because they fixed the price only under the
345.
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Jauch patent, a right extended to patent holders, but not the prices for
pumps more generally. 357 The remainder of the opinion dismisses the
government's charges mainly for want of evidence, noting that the
government failed to present evidence of a conspiracy or intent as
required by previous holdings and found nothing illegal in Wayne
Pump's license conditions, including the requirement that licensees
acknowledge the validity of the Jauch patent. 35 8 While his opinion
recognizes that the regulation of future prices of jobbers in licensing
arrangements are illegal as a matter of settled law, Judge Sullivan asserted
that the government should have produced at least one such instance, and
that its failure to do so robbed the charge of any force. 359 Finally, Judge
Sullivan held that the government failed to prove the competing patents
were pooled and provided no mechanism by which to identify competing
as opposed to complementary patents. 360
In United States v. Aerofin Corp., the issue was the legality of a
licensing agreement between Aeorofin Corporation and three other
companies for the manufacture of air-conditioning equipment,
specifically encased coils. 36 1 Under the terms of the consent decree, in
addition to terminating all licensing agreements, Aerofin agreed to
provide in royalty-free licenses or sublicenses the right to make, sell, or
use the patented device. 362 Aerofin was enjoined from entering new
agreements with any other manufacturer to fix prices, whether for the
retail or wholesale market, publishing any method or formula for setting
prices, regulating territory, allocating customers, or participating in
licenses that fix the prices of coils, their parts, or substitutes. 363 The
decree also prohibited the granting of licenses to licensees who agree to
use only designated products or adhere to particular sublicensing price
structures. 364

Perhaps because of the war, the large German industrial company, I.G.
Farben, continued to be a source of concern to antitrust regulators, even
when it was not the major player. In United States v. StandardOil Co., 365
the government charged that the Standard Oil Company reached more
than a dozen specific agreements between 1929 and 1939 with numerous
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subsidiaries and other corporations, including I.G. Farben.3 66 This
consent decree terminates certain agreements, practices, and associations;
limits others; and imposes certain war-time conditions. 3 67 The decree
declared illegal every agreement and understanding between Standard
Oil and its subsidiaries and I.G. Farben and its subsidiaries. 368 It further
enjoined certain practices, including any future corporate relations,
transfer of ownership or interest in any patents to I.G. Farben, Standard
Catalytic (S.I.G), or Jasco used for certain manufacturing techniques,
processes, products, or treatments. 369 Standard Oil was required to issue
licenses relying on S.I.G. patents of Jasco without restrictions, except for
receipt of reasonable royalty fees upon conclusion of the war, and they
were to make available all required know-how. 370 Standard Oil was also
directed to submit to the government all licenses it intended to submit
under the terms of the decree and to make available to the public (i.e., the
government) any and all knowledge required for their effective use. 37 1
Reports detailing production costs and royalty rates were to be submitted
to the office of the Attorney General.3 7 2 Additional activities precluded
by the decree include dividing sales territory, restricting competition,
curtailing imports or exports, or effecting transfer or patent rights in any
form to I.G. Farben. 373 Finally, the government reserved the right to take
action against any reserved patent pool. 374
The second decree compelled Standard Oil to offer licenses for its
catalytic refining patents and permits the receipt of reasonable royalty
fees. 375 Catalytic refining refers to processes that produce motor or other
fuels, naphthas, or other petroleum products, in which a solid catalyst is
used in the reaction zone to regulate the reaction, and materials are heated
to greater than 500 degrees Fahrenheit for conversion of some
compounds to smaller hydrocarbon molecules. 376 Standard Oil was
directed to issue licenses for all patents at issue and the knowledge to use
them. 377 Standard Oil was permitted to require cross-licensing under
certain conditions to an acceptable licensing agent and to charge
reasonable royalty rates. 37 8
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In United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., a district court in
Delaware held that where the corporations that are party to a patent pool
dominate 95-98% of an industry are illegal if they combine previously
competing manufacturers in such a way that the market price of devices
produced under the various patents exceeds the prevailing price prior to
pool formation and where the members coordinate actions to preclude the
emergence of competitors. 379 A patent search in 1936 and individual
defendant revealed that a single patent owned by Parkrite Corporation
was the only patent on file capable of broad extension across the honor
system parking meter industry. 3 80 Joynt believed, however, that this
patent was vulnerable to certain prior inventions should it come to
litigation. To create a strong patent monopoly, Joynt proposed to pool this
patent with other patents and applications held by Dual Parking Meter
Co., expressing in a letter to two individual defendants his confidence
that such a pool was a "first rate step toward establishing a dominant
position in the parking meter field." 3 8 1 These individuals formed Karpark
Co. and joined with Parkrite in 1937 in assigning their patents and those
that they might later acquire to Vehicular Parking Limited (DE), with
Karpark paying Parkrite $100,000 and the newly-formed Vehicular
Parking licensing back to Karpark and Parkrite the right to manufacture
and sell meters. 3 82 During 1937 Parkrite was dissolved and its assets
absorbed by Karpark.3 83 Also in 1937 Dual, then the industry sales leader,
refused to assign its patents to Vehicular and join the pool. 384 In 1940,
following unsuccessful efforts at price coordination with lower priced
Rhodes meters, Vehicular notified several cities of its intent to pursue
patent infringement claims. 3 85 Rhodes eventually succumbed, but on the
condition that Dual and Duncan join the pool. 386 The participants
achieved this arrangement in 1940 after a year of adversarial litigation
when Dual assigned for $55,000 all seven of its patents to Vehicular,
triggering an earlier agreement with Duncan and with Rhodes. 3 87 The
agreement between Vehicular, Rhodes, Dual, Duncan, and Karpark, as
well as Mico and Standard, smaller players with automatic opt-in
agreements when the pool was of sufficient size, governed prices, terms,
and conditions for the sale of meters, parts, services, and accessories. 3 88
The agreement specified a price floor, a maximum allowable discount
379.
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rate, commission maximums for salesmen, maintenance and service
agreements, prices for used meters, credit sales, trade in allowances, fines
for violations, centralized defense under Vehicular, payments of 4% of
sales to Vehicular, and termination of the agreement with the expiration
of the youngest patent in the pool. 389

On these facts, the court found evidence of illegal intent to restrain
interstate commerce. 390 In particular, the court found the price floors
objectionable. The rights granted to patent owners were merely designed
to exclude trespass and implied no right to violate antitrust laws. 39 1 The
rights of patent holders are significant, but nevertheless limited and
conditioned by public purpose and limited directly to the patents in
question. Greater power would subvert public policy and become a
"ready instrument for economic control."3 9 2 The power to refuse a license
does not imply the right to promote a monopoly through the attachment
of conditions. The court concluded that even were all the patents held by
Vehicular Parking individually valid, they could not be used in such a
manner as to fix prices for non-patented products or services. 393
In a private antitrust action, Sbicca-Del Mac, Inc. v. Milius Shoe Co.,
Sbicca-Del Mac, a shoe manufacturer and the holder of a number of
patents relating to shoe manufacturing and machines for making shoes,
charged Milius Shoe with infringement. 394 Milius countered that the
patents at issue were invalid.3 95 The district court found that the patents
held by Sbicca-Del Mac were found invalid as failing to sufficiently
innovate beyond the prior art.396 On appeal, Sbicca-Del Mac reiterated its
charge that Milius was infringing its patents and prayed for damages. 397
Sbicca-Del Mac also sought unpaid royalties under a May 1, 1933,
licensing agreement and another signed September 1, 1937.398 n
response, Milius again asserted the invalidity of the patents, denied
infringement, and charged Sbicca-Del Mac with "unclean hands,"
alleging an illegal conspiracy to restrain trade by way of a patent pool. 399
The appellate court acknowledged that all of the methods and products
covered by Sbicca-Maccarone patents were merely combinations of
various elements of earlier patents but held that their combination was
unique and represented a notable improvement over prior art and,
389.
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therefore, was worthy of patent protection. 4 00 Milius produced shoes, in

the view of the appellate court, in a manner essentially identical to that
covered under the Sbicca patent.
In its final defense against infringement, Milius Shoe alleged that
Sbicca-Del Mac had formed an illegal patent pool for skeleton insole
shoes by acquiring or controlling patents held by Kelly and an application
controlled by Compo Machinery, in addition to the patents Sbicca-Del
Mac held itself.40 1 On May 1, 1933, Milius and Sbicca-Method Shoes
entered into an agreement in which the later licensed the former to
manufacture shoes under Sbicca's patent. 4 02 The license arrangement
applied to current, pending, and future applications through December
29, 1948.403 The agreement required royalty payments of two and onehalf cents per shoe to Sbicca-Methods. 404
Compo Shoe produced and licensed a leather-splitting machine during
the first half of the 1930s. 4 05 To settle ongoing litigation, in August of
1937, Sbicca-Methods and Compo agreed to assign their respective
patents exclusively to Sbicca-Del Mac, which was then empowered to
license the patents to other shoe and shoe-making machine producers. 406
Seventeen patents in all were pooled under Sbicca-Del Mac. 407 The
agreement forming the patent holding company included provisions to
release the parties from any and all liability arising from infringement
claims prior to 1937, directing Sbicca-Del Mac to license to all
manufacturers any or all of its patents at a royalty of one cent per shoe,
and refraining Compo from selling machinery except to licensees under
contract with Sbicca-Del Mac. 40 8 The appellate court held that the
agreements Sbicca-Del Mac consummated with Milius and others did not
violate the Sherman Act because they were open to all manufacturers on
the same terms. 409 The court further held that while a monopoly conferred
under patents could not be used to establish a monopoly in other areas,
no such pattern was proven here by Milius. 4 10 They also noted that while
Sbicca-Del Mac held a large number of patents relating to the
manufacture of shoes, Milius failed to demonstrate that the licensor
controlled substantially all the patents relating to insole shoes. 4 11
400.
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Moreover, the court reasoned that the agreement's language did not
imagine refusal to grant licenses to particular patents unless licensees
sought a blanket license to all patents in the pool.4 12

In another air-conditioning patent pool case, United States v.
Auditorium Conditioning Corp., the district court entered a consent

decree in which six corporate defendants and several individuals agreed
to the cancellation of all patents held in their pool and an injunction
against a variety of anti-competitive practices. 413 In their pooling
agreement, the defendant corporations assigned to Auditorium
Conditioning their various patents for coils, fans, blowers, humidifiers,
dehumidifiers, washers, filters, condensers, chemicals, and other devices
and equipment used in air conditioners. 414 In addition to dissolving
Auditorium Conditioning and reverting its patents to the public, the
defendant corporations and their officers were enjoined from initiating,
or threatening to initiate, patent infringement suits, fixed royalty rates, or
imposed restrictive licensing conditions. 415
D. After the War, No Peacefor PatentPools: 1946-1970

The government's aggressive stance against patent pools continued in
United States v. Western Precipitation Corp.4 16 Western Precipitation

and two other firms were alleged, during the early 1930s, to have entered
into agreements comprised of these American corporations, one British
and several German corporations to allocate territories, regulate imports
and exports, set prices, and illegally punish competitors. 417 The patents
pooled by agreement covered the art of separating suspended particles
from gases through any method in which at least one step involved the
use of an electrical field applied to gases between two electrodes. 418 This
consent decree cancelled all existing agreements, enjoined price-fixing,
prevented the importation new devices and processes, and prohibited the
licensing or assignment of any of the patents under review. 419 The decree
also precluded any effort by the defendants to assert any rights under
issued patents in the United States and compelled public distribution of
technical information broadly to libraries and universities. 420
412. Id. at 403.
413. United States v. Auditorium Conditioning Corp., [1944-1945] Trade Cas. (CCH)
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Another successful government effort broke apart the pool in United
States v. Rail Joint Company, where the consent decree enjoined the
defendants from any efforts to enforce any provision of an agreement to
pool patents relating to the reforming of worn rail joint bars used to bind
together the ends of lengths of rail. 42 1 Defendants, Poor & Company, The
Rail Joint Co., Woodlings-Verona Tool Co., McKenna Process Co., and
several other individuals formed a plan in 1928 to pool their various
patents, establish a licensing system, including conditions for price-fixing
and regional monopolies, and to initiate intimidating infringement suits
against competitors. 4 22
Woodlings held a patent for a "crowned bar" used at joints, while
McKenna Process had presented several applications to the patent office
for reforming bars. 423 The Rail Joint Company also held a patent for a
"crowned bar" as well as a patent for a "head free" bar.4 2 4 In 1925, Rail
Joint was alleged to have proposed a pooling arrangement to Woodlings
and McKenna Process in which a new corporation would receive their
various patents by assignment and would work to secure additional
patents covering all processes for reforming rail joint bars and for the bars
themselves. 42 5 The agreement conferred regional monopolies for
reforming with Rail Joint handling sales. 426 By 1929 the defendants had
entered into many sublicensing agreements with regional reformers. The
pool members believed the patents they held on two designs were
insufficient to establish control of the reforming industry. Thus, efforts
were initiated in 1929 to secure the Wegner patent, and in 1930, to obtain
from defendant Langford applications relating to the use of a "graduated
pressure" process for reforming "straight bars." 4 27 While the Langford
applications were initially rejected by the patent office, on June 2, 1931,
the office issued three patents: one covering the "graduated pressure"
process, a second covering a method for reforming bars, and a third
relating to dies used in reforming bars. 428
In September 1931, as required by the earlier pooling agreement, a
new arrangement was formed in which Woodlings agreed to accept Rail
Joint as the licensor of a larger patent pool. 42 9 Rail Joint and McKenna
reached agreements in which McKenna was given licenses to the
Langford patents and applications and the power to sublicense, subject to
421.
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conditions modeled on the lines of the earlier agreement. 4 30 Between
1931 and 1936, the three pool members initiated infringement suits
against a large number of unlicensed operators in several states, generally
ending in negotiated licensing agreements. 4 31 By 1936 every reforming
plant save one was licensed under arrangements with members of the
patent pool. 4 32

The court concluded the pool violated both Sections 1 & 2 of the
Sherman Act, declared each licensing agreement void, and enjoined the
defendants from forming new licensing agreements or enforcing any
provisions of earlier agreements. 433 Here, the key elements of the illegal
conspiracy were price and royalty fixing, territorial monopolies, and
harassment suits alleging patent infringement.
Even the necessity of unfettered access to a technology for the war
effort could not protect a patent pool once hostilities ended, as was
demonstrated in United States v. American Air Filter Co., Inc.4 34 After a
trial delay at the request of the War Department and Navy, a consent
decree was entered in 1946 enjoining American Air Filter Co., Metal
Textile Corp., and several individual defendants from further illegal
efforts to restrain trade in ventilating air filters by acquiring patents,
buying competitors, and by fixing prices. 43 5 The decree covered eightyone patents held by the two defendants relating to filters using viscous
coated surfaces to clean air in ventilating, air conditioning, or heating
systems, copper or other knitted mesh material used for screening at air
intakes for chemical processing, distilling, fractioning, extracting, or
absorbing, and also the apparatuses using these filters. 436
The decree enjoined the defendants from initiating infringement suits,
collecting damages obtained in prior successful suits, requiring exclusive
purchasing agreements, compelling purchases of un-patented products
under threat of infringement suits, or receiving any royalties whatsoever
on three specific patents. 437 The decree compelled the defendants to
dedicate to the public fifty-one separate patents and to license thirty
others on reasonable terms and free of the restrictive conditions
prohibited under the decree. 4 38
The government continued its string of victories in United States v.
430.
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American Locomotive Co. 439 American Locomotive Co. (NY), American
Steel Foundries (NJ), Baldwin Locomotive Works (PA), Crucible Steel

Company of America (NJ), Pittsburgh Spring & Steel Co. (PA), Union
Spring & Manufacturing (PA), Universal Railway Devices Co. (DE), and
the unincorporated trade association Railway & Industrial Spring
Association entered into a consent decree in October 1947 enjoining them
from further efforts to illegally restrain trade in railway springs and spring
plates. 440 Universal Railway Devices held two patents for spring plates

("universal plates") used in combination with "coil-elliptic" devices in
railways. 441
Under the consent decree, the agreements signed on September 28,
1932 and March 5, 1934 were cancelled, and the defendants were
enjoined from any future association with the intent, or effect, of reviving
any of the provisions deemed to violate the Sherman Act. 442 The specific
prohibited activities described in Article V of the decree included any
attempt to fix prices or other terms of sale for railway springs, to allocate
or distribute production or sales quotas, to refuse to enter bids or entering
bids under collusion, to exchange production or sales figures, to refrain
from production or distribution of any spring products on account of a

coordinated plan, or to impose licensing conditions "limiting, restricting,
or regulating" the sale or manufacture of springs. 44 3 Railway & Industrial
Spring Association was enjoined from disclosing data more specific than
general trade data, engaging in any activity other than basic research and
developing or limiting the distribution of the results of such research to
non-members, subject to reasonable cost recovery, and from refusing
membership to new applicants. 444 Collective bidding was prohibited
under the decree as were tying agreements requiring, as a condition of
sale or lease, the purchase of other devices, representing that unpatented
mechanisms were covered under patents, or efforts to deny other
companies to opportunity to manufacture coil-elliptic devices. 445 The
decree required open licensing by Universal Railway Devices Co.,
subject to reasonable royalties, conditions, inspections, the right to cancel

for licensees, and the defendants' acceptance of the court to arbitrate
reasonable royalties should agreement not reached within sixty days of a
licensing request. 44 6 Finally, the decree precluded Universal Railway

439. United States v. Am. Locomotive Co., [1946-1947] Trade Cas. (CCH)
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Devices from initiating infringement suits under either patent. 44 7
In United States v. NationalLead Co., National Lead, Dupont, several
of their subsidiaries, and major producers and sellers of titanium
pigments and compounds were found to have illegally conspired to
monopolize their industry by means of an international cartel in operation
from 1920 through the early 1940s. 448 Early agreements involved
National Lead and a Norwegian company, with the former granted
exclusive rights in North America and the latter everywhere else. 449
Agreements also included provisions for granting exclusive licenses and
the exchange of technical information and patent applications. 450 DuPont
joined the cartel in 1933, at least for those provisions relating to a global
division of territory. 4 51 The district court found the cartel illegal and
issued an opinion canceling all remaining agreements and enjoining
future efforts to resurrect their provisions. 452 While recognizing that
DuPont was a member of the cartel on special terms, Judge Rifkind
determined that it too was guilty of violating the Sherman Act. 453 Judge
Rifkind found that the agreement included such illegal provisions as
dividing territory on a global basis, in conjunction with foreign operators,
and regulating U.S. imports and exports. 454 Among the remedies
proposed was a requirement the defendants grant to all applicants a nonexclusive license to their patents but with certain conditions permitted,
including reciprocal grants at reasonable royalties. 455
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part an appeal by the
government, but agreed with the defendants as to the soundness of certain
remedies incorporated into the consent decree. 45 6 Specifically, the Court
found the government's appeal and request for remedies imposing
royalty-free licensing, permanently enjoining efforts to enforce patents,
and the compulsory divestiture of certain productive assets were
excessive and unnecessary to enforce the Sherman Act. 457 Although the
Court was careful to note that such remedies were permissible, but not
required in light of Hartford-Empire.4 5 8 Important in Judge Rifkind's
analysis was that while the agreement between DuPont and National Lead
was collusive, the two did compete in the market on a variety of closely447.
448.
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450.
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related products not covered by the agreement. 4 59 However, certain
provisions were removed prior to trial, including those relating to
exchange of technical information. 460 The Court observed that in addition
to some degree of competition between the two major players, both were
being challenged by smaller producers that were gaining market share. 46 1
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Murphy and Justice Rutledge,
concurred with the majority in part and dissented in part.4 62 He reasoned
that the defendant's abuse of their patents was sufficiently flagrant to
justify the denial of future royalties.4 63 Moreover, Justice Douglas argued
that Rifkind devised his remedies not on the sound exercise of the
discretion but in response to the poorly reasoned Hartford-Empire
case. 4 6 4 Because of the defendant's illegal practices, Justice Douglas
argued that only those remedies sought by the government would create
the possibility of restoring competition in the industry. 465
The hostility of the Supreme Court towards patent pools was more
evident in an opinion issued the following year. In United States v. Line
Material Co., the government alleged that Line Material Co. and
Southern Equipment Corp. conspired to fix prices of dropout fuse cutouts
for the entire industry through the formation and operation of a patent
pool. 4 66 Southern Equipment owned the Lemmon patent, while Line

Material held the Schultz and Steinmayer patents. 467 Southern
Equipment's patent related to a certain dropout fuse cutout with a double
hinge along the bottom and a solenoid latching mechanism. 4 68 Line
Material's patent was also for a double-jointed hinge on a dropout fuse
cutout, but used a less expensive, thermally triggered fuse link.4 69 Line
Material's patented device and process was both simpler and cheaper, but
was complementary to the Schultz patent. The Kyle patent included four
claims covering any fuse cutout design combined with a wet process
porcelain box. 470 Fuses produced under these patents represented nearly
41% of the aggregate sales of all cutouts produced by the defendants. 4 7 1
In the early 1930s, Southern Equipment offered licenses under another
459.
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broad patent that it owned on the condition licensees sell at or above the
price charged by Southern Equipment. 472 Line also used a similar
condition in its licensing agreements. 4 73 In 1934, the U.S. Patent Office
declared the Lemmon and Schultz applications were in interference. 474 in
1937, Lemmon was awarded the dominant claim while Line was awarded
a subservient patent for its double-jointed dropout fuse with a tube
design. 475 However, Line could not manufacture fuses under its design
without infringing on the Southern Equipment's patents. Yet, Line's
patent represented significant improvements over Southern Equipment's
Lemmon patents in terms of costs and ease of production. 4 76 In turn,

Southern could not exploit this cheaper, superior, device without
infringing on Line's patented improvements. 477 Line and Southern
Equipment agreed on May 23, 1938 to a cross-licensing, royalty-free
arrangement that also permitted Southern Equipment to sub-license under
the Line patents. 4 78 Sale prices by licensees of both patents were fixed as
a condition of the license, at or above that of Line and Southern
Equipment.47 9 A second agreement signed on January 12, 1940 gave Line
a license under the Southern Equipment patents, but only on cutouts
relying on the heat-induced rupture of elements contained within a
tube. 480 Southern Equipment received a license under the Line patents,
but subject to the condition they not undercut Line's prices. 4 8 1
The district court had considered three claims of restraint of trade by
the government. 482 First, the Line and Southern Equipment patent pool
was a scheme to fix prices. 4 83 Second, the pool represented an effort to
control competitors by threats of infringement suits. 484 Third, the pool
represented a plan to police illegal price-fixing schemes. 4 85 In observing
that the patents in question were complementary, the court held that
cross-licensing was required for the public to receive the full benefits of
the superior, but subservient, Line patents. 4 86 The court believed the
ruling in United States v. General Electric, conferred broad powers to
472.
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patentees to impose price conditions on licensees as a necessary power to
obtain the financial rewards of innovation. 4 87 As a result, the court found
that the agreement pooling patents for dropout fuse cutouts was legally
permissible. 4 88

On appeal, the primary issue taken up by the Supreme Court was the
lower court's reading of General Electric.489 In that case, a unanimous
Court held that patentees were entitled, by virtue of the limited monopoly
powers conferred under patent law, to control "selling by limiting the
method of sale and the price" of licensees by contract. 4 9 0 The Court held
that the district court had read GeneralElectric too broadly as conferring
an essentially unrestricted right to enhance profits. 49 1 The Court asserted
that the General Electric opinion merely conferred a power under
agreements to produce and sell, not "approval of all a patentee's contracts
which tend to increase earnings." 492 However, in this case, there was no
majority for either overturning General Electric and its conferral of a
broad right or accepting the lower court's conclusion as a whole. 4 9 3
Instead, the Court held that where no evidence exists of a conspiracy to
restrain trade or monopolize an industry, a patentee is entitled to impose
price guidelines on licensees. 4 94
Yet, the defendant Line Material, by virtue of its cross-licensing
arrangement with Southern Equipment, exercised not only the right to set
prices for goods produced under licenses for its patents, but also, to set
prices when it sub-licensed Southern Equipment's dominant Lemmon
patent. 49 5 Justice Reed argued that, "[w]here two or more patentees . .
combine and fix prices on all devices produced under any of the patents,
competition is impeded to a greater degree than where a single patentee
fixes prices for his licensees." 496 The defendant corporations argued that
the monopoly right of a patent holder, recognized in GeneralElectric and
a string of other cases, included the right to set prices under licenses and
assign patents to others. 497 They argued these rights must include the right
to assign or cross-license patents, and since it did, it must also include the
right to fix prices blessed in General Electric.498 Justice Reed countered
that such an interpretation would ignore the anti-competitive
487.
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consequences of an accumulation of multiple agreements. 499 Aggregating
in one entity the rights legally enjoyed by individual patent holders
represented a change in the scope of the monopoly power. Furthermore,
Justice Reed asserted that General Electric should not be read as
subverting the clear condemnation of price-fixing issued in Standard
Sanitary Manufacturing.50 0
Justice Reed authored the opinion but was unable to find a single
justice to join him.5 0 1 Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black, Murphy,
and Rutledge, authored a concurring opinion just one vote short of
explicitly overturning General Electric as unconstitutional. 502 Justice
Douglas's concurring opinion argued that the constitutionally granted
power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts," confers an
exclusive right of control to inventors and only secondarily a right to
reward.5 03 The opinion reads that the former is necessary to secure for the
public the benefits of promoting scientific progress while the private right
of the latter was an important but subsidiary concern. 504 Justice Douglas
argued that the Court had traditionally been faithful to a reading of the
Constitution that refused to "let the self-interest of patentees come into
the ascendancy" and thus the Court, as its author, should overturn
General Electric as contrary to this general approach. 0 5 Justice Burton
authored a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice
Frankfurter, arguing that the distinction promoted by Justice Reed poorly
read relevant precedents. 506 The dissent asserted that sublicensing of the
type before the Court posed no greater threat to trade than implied by the
monopoly powers permitted an individual patent owner. 507 The dissent
asserted that to embrace the logic of the Reed opinion would ignore the
controlling cases resting squarely on Bement and GeneralElectric.50 8 The
dissent included not a single reference to StandardSanitary, which seems
unusual given that its central argument was the supposed existence of an
unbroken string of opinions strongly favoring unfettered monopoly rights
for patent holders. In essence, the concurring opinion and the dissent
agreed as to the holding in General Electric, but drew different
conclusions as to whether this opinion was consistent with the
Constitution and public interest.
The Line Material decision is perhaps the Supreme Court's most
499.
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criticized patent pool opinion. The Court's holding that a patent pool
established to resolve a blocking relationship between a dominant patent
and a far more efficient improvement patent is per se unlawful is almost
never defended,5 09 even by the government.5 10
In United States v. Automatic Sprinkler Co., ten manufacturers and
distributors of automated fire extinguishing devices had entered into an
agreement during 1927 and 1928 to restrain trade by way of a restrictive
patent licensing arrangement. 5 11 The patents in this case related to both
devices and systems using "rate of rise" equipment in which sprinklers
are automatically triggered by an increase in temperature above a certain
rate in a proscribed area. 5 12 These agreements were conferred to
Automatic Sprinkler Company of America patents under an exclusive
licensing arrangement. 5 13 The complaint alleged that the agreement
directed defendants to receive all their licenses from Automatic Sprinkler,
purchase all equipment exclusively from Automatic Sprinkler while
avoiding competitive manufacturing, deny non-members access to the
patented devices, and compel distributors to eschew competitors'
devices. 5 14 Further, pool members agreed to a schedule of uniform pricing
for parts and materials. 515
The consent decree cancelled all existing agreements, required
Automatic Sprinkler offer open licensing for reasonable royalties, and to
offer its equipment for sale to any interested party. 5 16 Each individual
defendant, upon completion of a licensing agreement with any other
defendant, was required to make available the same terms to every other
manufacturer. 5 17 Infringement suits by the defendants were also enjoined,
as were tying agreements establishing exclusive purchase requirements
and conditions. 518
Another large patent pool was broken up in United States v. A.B. Dick
Co. 5 19 Defendants were required under the consent decree to dedicate to
the public all their patents reading on or claiming stencil duplicating
509. Newberg, supra note 34, at 30.
510. The IP Guidelines implicitly, but quite unmistakably, reject the holding in Line
Material. See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, [Apr. 1995] 4 Trade
Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 13,132, 20,740-41, 20,743-4 to -5 (Apr. 6, 1995).
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machines, stencils, or stencil duplicating supplies or raw materials. 520 The
civil case ended in a consent decree that terminated several agreements
alleged to constitute an illegal monopoly over the duplicating industry. 52 1
The defendants were alleged to have initiated a conspiracy to monopolize
the industry by intimidating competitors, pooling and cross-licensing
acquired patents, smothering evidence undermining patent validity,
fixing prices, prohibiting licensees from purchasing competitors'
supplies and products, excluding competitors from access to raw
materials, and erecting a global division of sales territory. 522 In the
criminal case the defendants pleaded no contest and paid fines totaling
$99,000.523 The defendants' global scheme to establish a monopoly was
alleged to include threats to pull products from distributors of competing
products. 524
Defendant A.B. Dick Co. was enjoined from entering into any
contract involving exchange of stock or assets with any other
manufacturer or supplier of stencil duplicating materials for fifteen years
and was prevented for seven years from maintaining or obtaining patents
related to same. 52 5 Within six months the firm was to assign to the public
without compensation its trademark "Mimeograph." 5 2 6 Within eighteen
months, the firm was to close its U.S. branches and offices and remain
closed for five years. 527
In United States v. Am. Bosch Corp., certain American and foreign
companies were alleged to have entered into a series of agreements to
control the global trade in fuel injection equipment, automotive electrical
equipment, and magnetos for aircraft and other engines. 528 On November
3, 1930, American Bosch and Robert Bosch consummated an agreement
to divide sales territory. 5 2 9 In the "Bosch Patent Agreement" signed May
22, 1931, American Bosch and Robert Bosch exchanged licenses to their
respective patents. 530 Two manufacturing agreements (January 1934 and
November 1939) established a plan to purchase certain materials
exclusively from each other, refrain from manufacturing competing
products, and coordinate efforts to drive mutual competitors from the
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market. 5 31 The second agreement expanded the scope of covered products
to include automobile windshield wipers, generators, and regulators. 532
Under the terms of the consent decree, all agreements entered into by
American Bosch and Robert Bosch were cancelled and both parties were
enjoined from enforcing any of the agreements' provisions. 533 American
Bosch was permitted to retain its right to manufacture under patents;
applications; and manufacturing rights, designs, or "necessary operative
technique[s]" previously received from Robert Bosch, though no longer
to the exclusion of American competitors. 534 American Bosch was also
required under the consent decree to offer unrestricted licenses and
sublicenses to any applicant, subject only to reasonable and
nondiscriminatory royalties. 535 American Bosch was additionally
enjoined from entering into any new agreements with its foreign partners
to allocate markets, limit production or distribution by agreement, restrict
U.S. imports or exports, exclude competing manufacturers, or fix
prices. 536 American Bosch was enjoined from plans effecting the transfer
of U.S. or foreign patents (current and future) or applications for any
"necessary operative techniques," manufacturing rights, devices, or
know-how without the approval of the Court. 537
In United States v. U.S. Pipe and Foundry Co., American corporations
entered into numerous lease-license agreements for patents covering the
manufacture of iron pressure pipe used to convey liquids or gases under
pressure, and the machines for making such pipe. 538 The defendants were
alleged to have conspired to restrain trade by aggregating relevant patents
in the hands of U.S. Pipe, with the other defendants obtaining licenses to
manufacture, use, and sell under U.S. Pipe patents. 539
The activities specifically enjoined by the consent decree give some
measure of the provisions of the lease-license agreements. 54 0 The
defendants were enjoined from conditioning licenses or immunity under
a patent, or compelling the disclosure of technical data. 54 1 Additionally,
the court enjoined the defendants from selling or leasing pipe-making
machines on the condition of acceptance of defendants' patents,
collecting royalty payments for unused patents, adopting certain
531.
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manufacturing specifications, using defendants' trademarks or trade
names, refraining from the purchase or leasing of machines from
competitors, cross-licensing of patents by compulsion, or setting prices
of production quotas. 542 For a period of three years the defendants were
required to license patents on a non-discriminatory basis. 543 The consent
decree also required U.S. Pipe to convey title to any machines then-leased
to the other defendants, to not acquire stock or assets in another pipe
manufacturer, and to dedicate to the public fifty patents it held relating to
manufacture of cast iron pipe. 544
In United States v. Gen. Cable Corp., the government alleged that

defendants entered into an illegal conspiracy to dominate the manufacture
and sale of fluid filled cables and accessories. 545 The defendants entered
into a series of agreements to allocate sales territories, fix prices or other
sale conditions in licensing agreements, exclude new manufacturers,
control the import and export of fluid filled cable, determine the
conditions for licensing and immunities under patents for others, or
impede the development or exploitation of patents, applications,
inventions, or technical information about fluid-filled cables. 546 The
agreements covered dozens of patents and applications, some to which
each defendant had some right, and some held exclusively by the pooling
corporation General Cable. 547 The decree judgment compelled all
defendants to make openly available licenses for dozens of patents and
patent applications to all potential licensees without restriction, except for
a requirement of reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties. 548 The
defendants were also not allowed to bring an infringement suit against
any licensed applicant. 549
In United States v. Am. Optical Co., 13 American manufacturers of

eyeglass frames and mountings, a national trade association of
wholesalers and 6 individual optical wholesalers, 2 patent holding
companies, and 13 persons were alleged to have conspired to control the
trade in ophthalmic devices including lens, lens blanks, spectacle frames,
mountings, eyeglasses, spectacles, and component parts and
combinations of component parts.5 5 0 The arrangements incorporated the
leading concerns responsible for all ophthalmic goods except sunglasses
542.
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and non-prescription safety glasses.5 5 1 The defendants achieved or
attempted to achieve their anti-competitive objectives through a series of
licensing agreements. 552
The consent decree cancelled the various agreements, enjoined pricefixing and boycotting of wholesalers, cancelled several patents,
compelled the licensing of other patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, and prohibited the purchasing by other
manufacturers by two of the defendants. 553 Defendants American Optical
and Bausch & Lomb were required to notify licensees and sub-licensees
as to the cancellation of their licensing agreements and their opportunities
to reach new agreements subject to the stipulations of the consent
decree. 554 The defendants were directed to grant every applicant a nonexclusive, non-assignable license to make, use, or sell under licenses for
the patents at issue in this case.55 5 The consent decree also enjoined
infringement suits, threats of suits, or the collection of royalties under
prior judgments, and prevented licensors from attempting to enforce
against licensees of U.S. patent rights under foreign patents for
"substantially the same invention" to impede exportation from the United
States. 5 5 6 For five years, each defendant was enjoined from granting or
enforcing provisions of agreements setting prices or conditions of sale,
restricting as to intended uses, quotas on manufacture or use or sale,
territorial restrictions, or restrictions on permitted purchasers. 557
Additionally, the exchange of trade and business information among the
defendants was prohibited as were purchase-tying agreements.5 5 8
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co. was a case involving tungsten cutting
tools. 55 9 Cutting hard metals and machining metal materials requires a

cutting tool or a "nib" for drawing metal wire that is harder than the
metals worked upon and resists wear. 560 Over time, hard metal-cemented
carbides were used for this purpose and for others including extrusion
dies and wear resistant equipment parts. 561 Beginning in 1928, General
Electric and several subsidiaries worked to acquire patents related to
these hard metals in an effort to control the industry. 562
The patents at issue in this case were the Baumhauser patent and two
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Schroter patents. 563 Osram Co., the original owner of the Schroter patents,
assigned its rights to General Electric for use in making electric lamps. 564
Some years later, a General Electric scientist noted a variety of other
valuable uses for the tungsten, generating by the end of the decade more
than fifteen patents acquired by General Electric, including two valuable
'hot-press' techniques 565: the Hoyt patent combining tungsten and cobalt,
and the Gilson patent combining tungsten, carbon, and cobalt in particular
ratios. The German corporation Krupp, using the balance of the patent
rights sold by Osram, also sold its own products in the United States
under the name Widia. 5 66
Krupp assigned to General Electric all current and future patents (3
patents and 6 applications in all) for 15 years with an automatic extension,
unless one party sought termination. 56 7 Whether General Electric
acquired a license to Krupp's patents believing they were dominant to its
own, or to establish a monopoly position through acquisition of
competing patents, was not addressed in the opinion. Under the terms of
the General Electric-Krupp agreement, Krupp and two corporations to
which Krupp had licensed its patents were entitled to continue importing
any product covered under the current or future patents into the United
States. 5 6 8 At Krupp's insistence, General Electric agreed to set prices and
require licensees to sell at or above this fixed price. 5 69 Licensees were to
pay $5.00 per pound into a royalty fund, of which two-thirds (minus
litigation costs) were owed to Krupp. 570 The trial included evidence of
conversations between Krupp and General Electric, that "by pooling the
patents competition could be discouraged." 5 7 1 Almost immediately,
relations between Krupp and General Electric soured, with the former
convinced that General Electric's subsidiary Carboloy (charged with
fixing prices under the agreement) was intent on driving the more
established German company from America as a precursor to establishing
its own position by offering its licensees discounted prices. 572 Krupp and
General Electric renegotiated their agreement in 1936, expanding
General Electric's territory to Canada and the United States and more
explicitly prohibiting exports to other regions (a source of Krupp's
frustration).5 7 3 Eventually, Carboloy acquired two U.S. companies,
563.
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Thomas Prosser & Sons (selling tools) and Morris Simons Unite Wire
Die Co. (selling dies), previously licensed by Krupp. 574 The court found
that General Electric, through its Carboloy subsidiary, acquired these two
Krupp licensees to establish greater dominance in tungsten in the market
for hard metals.

575

The agreement empowered Carboloy to issue manufacturing licenses
with various restrictive conditions such as 576: price-fixing, acceptance of
patents, and access to accounts. In 1932, with the threat of infringement
suits, Carboloy secured a license to a superior product invented by a
German scientist and sold that product in America (Cutanit).57 7 The costs
of the acquisition were shared among Carboloy's existing licensees
interested in the right to use Cutanit.57 8 The company making Cutanit, the
Cuttings Corporation, was licensed to use, make, and sell hard metals
under Carboloy's patents. 5 79 Infringement suits directed at, or initiated
by, other competitors were resolved by granting restrictive management
licenses and by avoiding bringing the issues to trial where the validity of
the patents or the licensing agreement could be questioned.5 8 0 Although
smaller competitors were threatened, they were generally tolerated so as
to avoid the Pandora's box of litigation.5 8 1 The scheme lasted until several
of the patents were invalidated in 1940.582
The court found the defendants guilty of many Sherman Act
violations. 5 83 The court ruled that cross-licensing in which licensees were
permitted to sublicense on condition of fixed prices was illegal after Line
Material.584 The Court also found the manufacturing licenses entitling
Carboloy to fix prices for finished products not covered by its patents
were also prohibited. 8 5 Provisions of the agreement requiring licensees
to assign or cross-license patentable products or processes not yet
developed was also held illegal.5 8 6 Also found illegal were provisions in
the agreement to fix resale prices, which the court viewed as illegal even
for patented products. 587 Other elements of the agreement that were held
illegal were horizontal boycotts, the division of sales territories, the
574.
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acquisition of competitors for the purposes of controlling the industry,
and the direct fixing of prices. 588 Having found a pattern of monopolistic
behavior, and in light of Line Material, the court determined that the
relationship of the patents to each other, whether complementary or
competitive, was not germane and specifically did not consider such
relationships in the opinion. 589
In United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., eighteen American
corporations and several individuals were charged with conspiracy to
control the production and sale of stainless steel through arranging
regular meetings, publishing price lists, fixing prices through the
operation of restrictive patent licensing, and coordinating bids on
government contracts. 590 The consent decree enjoined a range of practices
that give some indication of the anti-competitive provisions of the various
agreements between the defendants. 591 They were enjoined from any
effort to fix or set prices, allow discounts, establish freight rates, enforce
a price list for basic and accessory products, share price or other product
specification information at regular trade meetings or through other
mechanisms except under F.O.B. ("free on board") at place of
manufacture or first shipment at or below that available to any other
purchaser. 592 Finally, the consent decree in the civil case directed the
defendants to offer, without condition, non-discriminatory royalties and
licenses to all interested parties for use of the patents under review. 593
The defendants pleaded no contest and paid a fine of $240,000 in the
criminal case.59 4

&

In United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., the government alleged that
Rohm & Haas Co. and three foreign corporations (including I.G. Farben
of Germany) entered into a conspiracy to establish a global cartel
allocating territories for the manufacturing and sale of plastics by the
pooling of their patent rights. 595 Under the consent decree terminating the
defendant's agreements, entered into on November 18, 1948, Rohm
Haas were compelled to make available royalty-free, licenses to use its
74 patents and its rights under 90 foreign-owned patents to American
parties. 596 Some of the specific acts enjoined under the judgment included
infringement suits or threats of same, or requiring as a condition that
licensees refrain from reselling or distributing competing products. 597
588.
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Also included in the agreements, and cancelled under the judgment, were
regional limits on competition and patent claims and efforts to restrict
research into acrylic compounds. 59 8 The judgment also enjoined future
restrictive agreements among the parties to set prices based on particular
uses. 599 The judgment also enjoined Rohm & Hass against limiting to
only its foreign partners, the use of its trademarks outside the United
States. 600 Finally, the judgment required Rohm & Haas to release
technical information and place its various patents under the control of
the Attorney General who was directed to make them available royalty
free to any acceptable applicant. 60 1
Perhaps because the case did not involve a German defendant, one
patent pool appears to have survived. In the private antitrust case of SuniCitrus Products Co. v. Vincent, Suni-Citrus sued Daniel Vincent and his
partners, alleging their joint plan to pool patents, to grant licenses, and to
fix minimum prices in the citrus feed industry. 602 The court below refused
to grant relief and dismissed counterclaims seeking court approval of the
proposed trust agreement. 6 03 The appellate reversed the denial of relief
and remanded with directions to dismiss without prejudice. 604
An employee of the State of Florida, Wayne M. Neal, discovered a
process for converting citrus waste product into a suitable cattle feed and
filed an application to receive a patent. 605 As the owner of the Neal
application, the State of Florida and Mr. Vincent entered negotiations to
settle patent conflicts and bring peace to the citrus waste industry by
protecting waste processors against infringement suits. 606 The tentative
agreement pooled existing and pending patents, fixed royalties, and fixed
prices for products manufactured under the Neal patent. 607
Plaintiff Suni-Citrus alleged, first, that the trust was an illegal scheme
to fix prices previously set in an open market. 608 Second, Suni-Citrus
asserted the patent application should be in the public domain because
the work in question was produced by an employee of the state and
funded by the state. 609
The district court, looking to Standard Oil v. United States, ruled that
598.
599.
600.
601.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

602. Suni-Citrus Prods. Co. v. Vincent, 72 F. Supp. 740 (S.D. Fla. 1947), rev'd, Suni-Citrus
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the defendant did not demonstrate that if the Neal patent were granted,
that the pooling arrangement created by the agreement would violate the
Sherman Act. 6 10 The defendants counter-claim, seeking the blessing of
the court for the entire scheme was dismissed as premature, owing to the
fact the agreement had not yet been activated. On appeal the Fifth Circuit
declared on the same reasoning that made the counter-claims premature
also made the decision to deny the plaintiffs complaint premature as
well. 6 11 The case was remanded with direction to dismiss both the
complaint and Vincent's counter-claims without prejudice. 6 12
In United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, aggressive
government antitrust action against patent pools continued. 613 A
complaint initiated in late 1945 resulted in a consent decree in early 1949,
which directed several defendant corporations to divest themselves of all
their holdings in co-defendant Scophony Corporation of America and
terminate licenses. 6 14 Further efforts to enforce any provisions of the
agreement were enjoined.6 15 The judgment validated a complaint alleging
a conspiracy to achieve complete control over every element of the
television equipment industry. 6 16 The complaint alleged efforts to create
non-compete agreements within certain territories that excluded
manufacturers not parties to the agreement from obtaining licenses to use
Scophony patents. 6 17

In United States v. Phillips Screw Co., 618 a patent holding company,
American Screw, and other domestic and foreign corporations that
manufactured cross-recessed head screws and their drivers were alleged
to have entered into a collusive agreement employing price-fixing, patent
pooling, and negotiated agreements allocating exclusive territories
outside the United States. 6 19 The consent decree enjoined both Phillips
Screw and American Screw from entering into any contract or
understanding with any other manufacturers to fix prices (or other
conditions) for sale or reselling, to allocate territory globally for sale, to
identify customers, or markets, to limit import or exports to and from the
United States, to establish production quotas, or to agree to refrain from
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the manufacture of any type of cross-recessed head screw. 620 The
defendants were also enjoined from publishing or sharing price lists on
any basis other than Free on Board at the site of original manufacture for
at least three years. 6 21 All existing licensing agreements between Phillips
Screw Co. and American Screw, and between either Phillips Screw or
American Screw and foreign corporations 622 were cancelled, and any
effort to revive their provisions in whole or in part was enjoined under
the judgment. 623 Phillips Screw and American Screw were also enjoined
from initiating any infringement suits on their various patents, and were
directed to 624 : grant to any applicant a non-exclusive license to use or
manufacture under any or all the patents in the pool without condition
except reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties, prohibit transference
of licenses, and eliminate the right of cancellation by licensees. American
Screw was specifically required to publish all technical information
relating to its patents. 625 In addition to the listed patents, the judgment
covered any continuations, reissues, or extensions of the same; patents
eventually issued under current applications; and any patents related to
Cross-Recessed Head Screws of Drivers obtained by any means by either
defendant for a period of five years. 626
In United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co., an indictment of nine
corporations and nine individual defendants alleged a conspiracy to
monopolize the production and sale of gas chlorinating equipment used
primarily to treat sewage; to bleach flour, paper, and textiles; and to
preserve foodstuffs. 627 The indictment alleged the defendants acquired
patents and misused patents; directed threats of infringement suits at
competitors; consolidated their position by purchase of competitors'
businesses; withheld supplies and equipment unless purchased from
defendants; created non-compete zones; fixed prices and conditions of
sale, excluding the bids of competitors using unfair specifications; and
colluded to deny competitors markets and essential parts and materials. 62 8
In March 1947, a motion to dismiss the indictments because of the
absence of women in the grand jury panel was upheld.6 2 9 In May 1947,
one defendant lodged a motion to compel the government to turn over
620.
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copied business documents along with the originals returned following
the opinion in March. 630 The Department of Justice's core defense was
that the subpoenas used to obtain the records were legal even if the
empaneled grand jury was not. 631 A district court in Rhode Island
disagreed, and on February 6, 1948, directed the government to return its
copies of all documents to their original owners because its possession
was the product of a violation of the Fourth Amendment protection
against illegal search and seizure. 632 The government appealed and on
May 2, 1949, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the elements
which rendered the grand jury illegally formed in no manner
compromised the defendants Fourth Amendment rights. 633
In July 1954, a consent decree was issued against each defendant,
except Builders Iron Foundry and Henry Chafee, requiring the defendants
to dedicate to the public their trademarks "Chlorinators," and "Visible
Vacuum Chlorinator," and "Visible Vacuum Control."63 4 The consent
decree also compelled the defendants to make available royalty-free
licenses for their various patents. 635 Corporate acquisitions were
enjoined, as were tying arrangements for unpatented services or other
exclusive arrangements. 636
In United States v. Sand Spun Patents Corp., defendants were alleged
to have conspired to dominate the cast iron pressure pipe industry by
means of a restrictive patent pool. 637 How Sand Spun came to hold its
patents is not revealed in the consent decree, though the other defendants
did receive licenses to manufacture and sell iron pipes produced under
one or more of the patents held by Sand Spun Patents. 638 The consent
decree terminated all existing licensing agreements to which the
defendants were parties and enjoined efforts to reestablish its provisions
in whole or in part. 639 The decree prohibited the defendants, together or
individually, from imposing certain conditions in future licensing
agreements, including granting immunity under a patent, disclosing
technical data or information, specifying the types and sizes of pipe to be
manufactured, compelling cross-licensing or assigning of patents from
others to any defendant, limiting production, or calculating royalty rates
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or rental fees based on the number of machines used. 640 The decree also
restrained from maintaining any contract, agreement, or understanding to
control the distribution of pipes; the allocation of customers, markets, or
fields; and agreements to limit imports from or exports to the United
States or its territories. 64 1 The decree enjoined any effort to assign
exclusive rights to future patents. 642 Finally, the decree required the
dissolution of the patent holding company, Sand Spun Patents, and the
dedication to the public of each of its patents. 64 3
In United States v. General Instrument Corp., four companies and
seven individual defendants were alleged to have engaged in an illegal
scheme to control the production and sale of variability condensers and
permeability tuners used in tuning devices for radios. 644 In 1934, Radio
Condenser, General Instrument, and De Jur Amsco entered into an
agreement to assign to Condenser Development all their current and
future patents, to empower Condenser to acquire other patents or patent
rights, to direct Condenser to initiate and defend infringement suits, to
require Condenser to decline licenses outside the pool without the
unanimous approval of pool members, and to compel recognition of all
assigned and future patents by members. 64 5 The government alleged the
collusive intentions that gave rise to the agreement found expression in a
wide range of anti-competitive and monopolistic practices, including
efforts to exclude competing manufacturers through intimidating
infringement suits and refusing to grant licenses, restraining competition
among pool members through agreements on terms and prices, restricting
the types of variable condensers produced by each pool member,
allocating sales territories, and conducting price wars against
competitors.6 4 6 The agreement was revised in 1937 and again in 1939.647
The government and the defendants were in substantial agreement as
to the facts, and both sought summary judgment. 64 8 The defendants
viewed the facts through the prism of StandardOil Co. v. United States,
which they read correctly, as blessing pooling arrangements for truly
blocking patents or to avoid expensive litigation through agreements. 649
The court pointed out, however, that StandardOil blessed the pool while
noting that the companies did not dominate the industry in which they
operated, but that the facts here were different in that the defendants
640.
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controlled more than 50% of the industry. 650 If pool members enjoy
dominance over an industry, then licensing agreements including pricefixing elements can rise to the level of offending the Sherman Act. 65 1
Furthermore, this power is sufficient to offend even in the absence of
intent. 6 52

A final agreement signed in 1946 sought to address some elements of
the earlier agreements found illegal in court, eliminating direct pricefixing and revising the compulsory assignment of future patents. 65 3 The
court nonetheless invalidated the arrangement as going beyond the types
of pooling permitted under Standard Oil.654
In United States v. GeneralElectric Co., ten corporations entered into
a series of agreements affecting their various patents for disconnecting
switches, switches changing connections among circuits, and grounding
switches used throughout the United States during the late 1930s and
early 1940s. 655 A consent decree entered on November 4, 1949
terminated existing licensing agreements among the defendants and
ordered them to grant non-exclusive licenses to patents currently held, or
developed within five years of the decree, without conditions except for
non-transferability and payment of reasonable royalties. 65 6 The consent
decree also enjoined a range of illegal practices that included agreeing to
fix prices, including differentials and discounts; declining to submit bids,
or colluding in submitting bids; exchanging information about bids, or
providing information relating to prices, terms, or conditions of sales not
generally available to other producers; and, finally, submitting bids for
the primary purpose of deterring customers. 657
In Cutter Laboratoriesv. Lyophide-Cryochem Corp., defendant and
its partners sued Cutter Laboratories claiming infringement of the
Flosdorf patent and the Reichel patent. 65 8 Cutter Laboratories challenged
the validity of the patents, denied infringement, and appealed the adverse
determination of the jury, arguing that the patents had been illegally
pooled.6 5 9
The Reichel patent related to the preservation of biological material
by extraction of moisture, producing a dry and porous lyophilic form. 660
650.
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This condition was achieved by flash freezing the material, subjecting the
product to a high vacuum, adding heat in a vacuum while avoiding
melting, and applying the vacuum until the material is above its freezing
point. 66 1 The court found that several of the claims pertaining to this
patent were based on prior art, and therefore invalid, but that claims
eleven, twelve, and thirteen included in the reissue patent were
sufficiently novel to warrant a determination of validity. 6 62 The court
upheld the jury's view that these claims were valid and that they were
infringed by the appellant. 663
The jury also determined that claims four and five of the Flosdorf
patent were valid and infringed.6 64 The appellant argued that these claims
were not valid because the language only described the objective of the
innovation without specifying a method for meeting them. 665 LyophideCryochem countered, and the jury agreed, that the invention was not in
the use of prior art, but in the unique combination of existing methods to
achieve the novel combination of two non-novel steps 666: the pumping of
vapor at rapid rates in conjunction with the desiccation of biological
matter.
The final issue addressed at trial was whether Lyophide-Cryochem
was formed as an illegal patent pool. 667 Sharp & Dohme, Inc., controlling
the Reichel and other related patents, and F.J. Stokes controlling the
Flosdorf patent formed Lyophide-Cryochem and granted to it the
exclusive power to license under their respective patents, extending this
power to included future discoveries. 668 Relying on Standard Oil v.
United States, the court noted that patent pools were not necessarily
illegal and here the key issue was whether intent to restrain trade
existed.66 9 In this case, any applicant could apply for a license on
reasonable terms and was not subjected to any conditions such as price
setting. 670 Without intent to restrict trade, the mere pooling of patents
provides no new monopoly powers above that enjoyed by the individual
members prior to pool formation. 6 71 Even if the patent pool created the
objective basis for control of an industry by price-fixing, absent intent to
restrain trade, that power was not in and of itself illegal.
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1. 1950-1959
The first case decided in the 1950s was Baker-Cammack Hosiery
Mills, Inc. v. Davis Co., where Davis Co. sued two other manufacturers
of self-supporting hosiery for patent infringement. 672 The patents at issue
in this case related to production methods for self-supporting hosiery with
properties like true "rib fabric" and anti-ravel edging. 673 The primary
defenses were that certain patents were invalid because of prior arts,
double-patenting, and an illegal scheme to restrain trade by the pooling
of patents under the ownership of Davis Co. 674
The court below determined the patents owned by Davis were valid
and were infringed by the defendants. 675 The antitrust defense rested on
the claim that three companies were engaged in an illegal scheme hatched
in 1946 to control the industry by assigning fifteen of their patents to
Davis Co., of which six were at issue in the present case. 676 The court
determined that these patents were "inter-related" and relied on similar
production processes and techniques. 677 The pool was openly
acknowledged by its members as an effort to save the respective
manufacturers from the expenses of infringement suits and excessive
royalties. 678 The court also determined that the patents were
complementary and not competitive, and that under the pooling
arrangement, licenses were freely available to all applicants at a royalty
rate on average half of the amount they obtained prior to pool
formation. 679 Licensees could apply for licenses on these favorable terms
for all or only one of patents. 680 There were no "tying" provisions or
requirements of exclusivity. 6 81

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court on every
point. 682 The court noted in particular that the facts in this case did not fit
the fact pattern in Hartford-Empire, particularly that the degree of
dominance differed, that there was no requirement of exclusivity, and that
no illegal effort to drive competitors from the market existed.683
In United States v. Technicolor Inc., the government alleged that
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Technicolor, Inc., Technicolor Motion Picture Corporation, and the
Eastman Kodak Co. violated the Sherman Act in a scheme to control
current and future patents related to color cinematography and color
photography. 684 The consent decree required Eastman Kodak to license
its active patents to all applicants royalty free, license future patents for a
period of five years at reasonable royalty rates, provide pertinent
technical data to all licensees, and sell its color motion picture film to all
interested parties agreements between the defendants in 1934, 1936,
1938, 1942, and 1945.685 The consent decree also required Kodak to offer
non-exclusive, unrestricted licenses, royalty free, to all applicants for
thirteen patents, and to make available at reasonable rates licenses to
patents not greater than paid by Kodak for a different set of thirteen
patents. 686 Kodak was also required under the decree to make available at
reasonable royalty rates any patents it might acquire during the following
five years. 687 Kodak was enjoined from making any assignment or sale
of the patents and was precluded from becoming the exclusive licensee
of any patents or applications for color cinematography unless given the
power to sublicense. 6 88
A second consent decree cancelled agreements between defendants
Technicolor, Inc. and Technicolor Motion Picture Corporation and
motion picture producers that required the latter to use Technicolor
cameras and services in film production exclusively. 689 The decree
required defendants to license royalty free and without restrictions the
right to make, sell, and use any and all patents they held for film
processing, negative or positive film, color consultant services,
photography, and film prints of color film. 690 Patents and applications
obtained during the ensuing five years were to be made available on an
open basis upon condition of payment of reasonable royalty fees. 6 91
In United States v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., the
government continued its enforcement activities against patent pools. 692
Prior to 1929, nine American corporations competed in exports from the
United States for various types of coated abrasives, essentially
sandpaper. 693 In May of that year, these companies formed the Export
Company and concluded an Export Agreement, formed the Durex Corp,
684. United States v. Technicolor, Inc., [1948-1949] Trade Cas. (CCH)162,338 (S.D. Cal.
1948); United States v. Technicolor, Inc., [1950-51] Trade Cas. (CCH)162,586 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
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a foreign corporation, holding 84% of the stock of the English company
Durex Abrasives, and agreed to license to Durex their foreign patents for
coated abrasives while retaining their various rights to fix prices and
manufacturing standards. 694 The United States brought a complaint
against six American or American-owned foreign companies that were
parties to these agreements. 695
The export agreement required the parties to export only through the
Export Company which held exclusive rights to sales throughout the
world outside the United States and Canada. 696 The Export Company
used the DUREX name for its products to market the goods from the
American manufacturers under a single name. 697 The Export Company
sold coated abrasives through local distributors overseas, sold back to
American exporters, or sold through the foreign subsidiaries of its
corporate parents. 698 The Export Company's share of U.S. exports of this
good rose from under 18% in 1929 to just under 40% by 1948.699
As part of one of the agreements signed in May 1929 (the "main patent
agreement"), the American firms licensed to Durex their various patent
rights related to coated abrasives, with the reserved rights. 700 During the
early 1930s Durex secured licenses for foreign patents from three of the
defendants. 70 1 Durex then sublicensed these patents as a package to the
various foreign subsidiaries of the pool members. 702 The main patent
agreement was revised in 1941 substituting exclusive rights under foreign
patents for the earlier arrangement relying on licensing agreements.7 0 3
The revised agreement also directed Durex to assume the royalty burdens
on the costs of obtaining foreign patents from pool members and directed
Durex to assign on demand patents it acquired for waterproof sandpaper
to 3M, for disc sanders to another defendant, and for electro-coated fields
to a third defendant.7 0 4 Foreign patents for all other coated abrasives
Durex obtained were to be licensed to all interested pool members. 705 No
patents were acquired by Durex from parties that were not defendants in
this case.7 06
The United States issued a complaint charging the defendants with an
694.
695.
696.

Id. at 953-54.
Id. at 950-51.
Id. at 954.

697.

Id. at 952.

698.
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illegal scheme to control the foreign commerce by the major American
producers of coated abrasives. 707 The main defense was that the
arrangement was necessary to overcome barriers erected by foreign
governments in form of duties, excise taxes, quotas, and local shortages
of U.S. hard currency. 708 The court accepted that where local conditions
suppressed profits, arrangements such as those at issue in this case were
potentially permissible. 70 9 The court concluded, however, that the
defendants failed to prove these barriers in fact prevented the profitable
export of coated abrasives. 7 10 The court found the preference for overseas
subsidiaries held together under the agreement was not a function of the
alleged barriers but a desire to enhance profits, that is that profits on
exports overseas were achievable without resort to agreements that
violated the Sherman Act, and that their defense fell, revealing an illegal
pooling arrangement and collusive agreement to enhance profits. 7 11
The consent decree entered in this case required cancellation of all
existing patent licensing and cross-licensing agreements among the
parties and required the issuance of licenses on condition of reasonably
royalties to all interested applicants.7 12 The decree enjoined any effort to
fix prices, control domestic or foreign production, or issue exclusive
1-713
licenses.
In United States v. Textile Machine Works, the government was
successful in obtaining a consent decree that compelled Textile Machine
Works and Berkshire Knitting Mills, manufacturers of full-fashioned
hosiery and related machines, to terminate certain collusive
agreements.7 14 The decree prohibited market territory allocations;
agreements restricting imports, exports, or the production or use of
hosiery-making machinery; the purchase and destruction of older
machinery; or the suppression of competition through stock swapping,
assignment, or exclusive licensing of patents. 7 15 The decree also enjoined
discrimination in the provision of the fruits of research and development,
differential terms, or prices in licensing agreements, or in the fixing of
prices for either hosiery or machinery.7 16 The decree directed the
defendants to offer machine leases on reasonable terms, to make available
707.

Id. at 950.

708.
709.

Id. at 958.
Id.

710. Id. at 961.
711. Id.
712. United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., [1950-1951] Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,724 (D. Mass. 1950).
713. Id.
714. United States v. Textile Mach. Works, [1950-1951] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,709
(S.D.N.Y. 1950).
715. Id.
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non-exclusive patent licenses on reasonable terms, and to supply
technical information and know-how.717
In United States v. PermutitCo., agreements Permutit Company made
with British and German producers of water conditioning equipment and
materials were alleged to have violated the Sherman Act in numerous
ways.7 18 The alleged violations included the allocation of market
territory, exclusive rights to use of the 'Permutit' trademark in defined
territories, regulating U.S. imports and exports, granting to parties
exclusive patent rights and related technical data, and agreeing to limit
competition among themselves. 7 19 The court issued a consent decree that
cancelled these agreements, including the provision of exclusive
discounts and rebates to each other. 720 Foreign licensing of patents by
Permutit and its overseas partners were enjoined as well as the exclusive
exchange of technical data. 721 The American Permutit was also required
to fully divest itself of its stake in its foreign subsidiary based in
Luxemburg no later than nineteen days after the expiration of its patent.722
The decree also required Permutit to offer to all applicants a nonexclusive license to make, use, or sell any water conditioning equipment
or materials under patents owned or controlled by license or sublicense
by Permutit. 723

In United States v. Parke, Davis and Co. and Eli Lilly & Co.,
defendants were charged with illegally controlling the machines used in
the manufacture and filling of gelatin capsules and using this control to
monopolize the industry. 7 24 The court issued a consent decree covering
all patents held by defendants relating to capsules used for ingestion of
drugs, including any process, method, material, or equipment used in
their manufacture. 725 The defendants were enjoined from enforcing
certain provisions of the two agreements or achieving the same ends
through other means. 726 Both defendants were enjoined from acquiring
competitors for a period of ten years, and each was directed to offer a
royalty-free, non-exclusive license to the use of any relevant patent. 727
Both defendants were enjoined from initiating, or threatening to initiate,
717. Id.
718. United States v. Permutit Co., [1950-1951] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,888 (S.D.N.Y.
1951).
719. Id.
720. Id.
721. Id.
722. Id.
723. Id.
724. United States v. Parke, Davis and Co. and Eli Lilly & Co., [1950-1951] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 162,914 (E.D. Mich. 1951).
725. Id.
726. Id.
727. Id.
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infringement suits for any patents related to the manufacture of filling of
gelatin capsules. 728 Non-exclusive licenses for future patents were to be
offered to all applicants without conditions, except recovery of
reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties, non-transferability, and
cancellation for non-payment of royalties. 729 The decree compelled to
offer for sale all machines currently under lease to their lessees within
sixty days, with the offer to expire within six months. 730 Future sales and
leasing of machines for the manufacture of capsules was to be offered on
reasonable terms and prices.731 The defendants were to provide all
pertinent manuals and technical information to all license applicants for
five years, including information needed to design and build gelatinmaking machinery.7 3 2 Exchange of information between defendants was
limited, and tying agreements and price-fixing were prohibited under the
decree. 733 Finally, the decree enjoined price-fixing and discounts for
volume purchases. 734
In United States v. Mager & Gougelman, Inc., the court issued two
consent decrees involving the manufacture and sale of plastic artificial
eyes by defendant corporations Mager and Gougelman, Inc., the Paul
Gougelman Company, and their principal officers. 7 35 The key patent in
question was the Travers patent covering the manufacture of plastic
artificial eyes.736 One decree terminated a joint operating agreement and
compelled the liquidation of their equity positions in each other and in
other companies producing or selling eyes. 737 Agreements between the
defendants to fix prices or terms of sale, market territory allocations, to
exclude third parties were enjoined.7 38
The second decree required the defendants to offer to all applicants on
royalty-free, non-exclusive, and unconditional terms, licenses for their
artificial eye patents .739 The defendants were also enjoined from
obtaining any license, grant of immunity, or similar right under two
specific patents, unless including the right to sublicense of the
unrestricted terms discussed above. 740 Finally, the decree enjoined the
728.
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defendants from any action limiting their power to license or sublicense
under the Travers patent or the other two patents. 741
In United States v. Besser Mfr. Co., the government sued Besser
Manufacturing Co., Steams Manufacturing Co., and several individual
defendants, alleging an illegal plan to establish a dominant position in the
production of machines used to make concrete blocks. 742 In 1938, Besser
acquired from Stephen A. Flam Co. exclusive rights to its current and
future patents throughout the United States except in the west where Flam
was permitted to continue production. 74 3 Besser purchased Flam in 1946
and obtained ownership over these and any patents that might be
approved over the ensuing five years. 744
In 1942, the Stearns Co. held an exclusive license to the Gelbman and
Andrus patents. 745 Negotiations between Besser and Stearns and the
inventors, Gelbman and Andrus, were completed in Dec 7, 1942, in
which the two companies were given joint rights to the Gelbman and
Andrus patents and to any which the inventors might obtain in the
future.7 4 6 The agreement prevented any of the four defendants from
licensing these patents to any third-party.7 4 7 The primary concern of the
court was the collective action, required of the defendants by the
agreement, to prevent open licensing.7 4 8 During 1946, Besser secretly
acquired nearly 50% of the outstanding shares of Stearns. 749
Even though the average price of concrete blocks had not risen in the
wake of these various agreements, the court determined that the
agreements were illegal because they illegally extended patents, divided
territory, and used infringement suits to intimidate competitors. 750 Judge
Picard issued an opinion forcing the two defendant corporations to license
their patents on equal terms to all parties, inform lessees of their right to
terminate leases, liquidate stocks; and enjoining defendants from
resurrecting their scheme. 75 1 On appeal, the Supreme Court not only
found the district court remedy to be appropriate on procedural grounds
but also commented that it found that the allegations that the defendants
had monopolized, and attempted to monopolize, the industry were
741. Id.
742. United States v. BesserMfr. Co., 96F. Supp. 304, 305-06 (D. Mich. 1951), [1950-51]
Trade Cas. (CCH) 162,773 (E.D. Mich. 1951), aff'd, United States v. Besser Mfr. Co., 343 U.S.
444 (1952), [1952-53] Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶67,280 (U.S. 1952).
743. Besser Mfr. Co., 96 F. Supp. at 310.
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. Id.
747. Id.
748. Id.
749. Id. at 311.
750. Id. at 311, 314.
751. Id. at 314-15.
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overwhelmingly supported by the evidence presented to the district
court. 752

In United States v. United Engineering and Foundry Co., United
Engineering had entered into a series of agreements from 1937 to 1951
with seven foreign manufacturers of rolling mill machinery (no German
firms, but one Japanese firm).75 3 The court issued a consent decree
enjoining United Engineering from continuing these agreements
allocating markets, controlling U.S. imports and exports, or using
overseas companies as sales agents.7 5 4 The decree also enjoined United
Engineering from assigning or licensing under any patents with foreign
companies, conditioning the sharing of technical information, or
acquiring foreign manufacturers. 755 The court terminated the operative
agreements and required United Engineering to permit sales in the United
States of articles produced overseas using the know-how provided by
United Engineering, though limitations on the use of this information
overseas was permitted.7 5 6
In United States v. Davis Company, defendants were charged with
illegal efforts to control trade in plain knit elastic-to hosiery and the
machines used to make them. 757 The court issued a consent decree
enjoining the defendants from any effort to collect royalties or initiate
infringement suits for patents controlled by Davis Co. under a series of
agreements between the parties.758 The decree ordered the defendants to
issue licenses to any and all applicants on a schedule of reasonable
royalties, and enjoined them from canceling licenses for any reason other
than non-payment of royalties. 759 The decree also enjoined any attempt
to acquire additional U.S. or foreign patents for elastic hosiery or
machines used in their manufacture. 760
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Manufacturing Co.,
Westinghouse and an international subsidiary, along with two German
subsidiaries of Siemens, had divided among themselves global markets
for electrical equipment and had exchanged technical know-how and
rights to their respective patents. 76 1 The government alleged that by
752. Besser Mfr. Co., 343 U.S. at 449.
753. United States v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., [1952-1953] Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶67,378
(W.D. Penn. 1952).
754. Id.
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means of this agreement the defendants endeavored to dominate both the
domestic American and global trade in the industry. 762 A consent decree
issued in 1953 terminated the agreement and directed Westinghouse to
dedicate to the public some 230 patents it held.7 63 It also required the
production and distribution of technical information it had acquired from
Siemens, and enjoined any attempt to allocate territory, revive provisions
of the terminated agreement, exclude third parties from markets, or limit
U.S. imports or exports of electrical equipment. 764
In United States v. Telescope Carts, Inc., the court issued a consent
decree that terminated agreements between various manufacturers of
telescopic grocery carts with hinged rear gates permitting tight packing
for storage.7 65 The decree compelled the defendants to offer licenses or
sublicenses to all applicants without condition except provisions for nontransference, reasonable and non-discriminatory royalties, and
cancellation for non-payment.7 6 6 Defendants were required to offer
licenses and sublicenses on similar terms for any extension, reissue, or
continuation for a period of five years from the date the decree was
entered and were enjoined from conditioning licenses upon the
assignment or title or right to patents held by licensees.7 67 The decree
cancelled a contract signed by the defendants in June of 1949, and
enjoined efforts to enforce its provisions, or any measures to allocate
market territories.768
In United States v. Bendix Aviation Corp., the government charged
seven American corporations with using their ownership of several
hundred patents to monopolize the trading and production of braking
systems.769 Many of the defendants entered into an agreement with

foreign firms to further their allegedly illegal scheme. 770 The initial
complaint charged that the defendants used their respective patents in the
field in a coordinated effort to further their dominance, tie licensing
agreements to the purchase of non-patented components, suppress
threatening innovations and improvements, and intimidate competitors
with spurious infringement litigation. 77 1 The charges against Dupont
762.
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were dismissed, however, because it ceased production and offered to all
parties on reasonable terms licenses to their patents.7 7 2 Consent decrees
entered against the remaining defendants enjoined a range of practices
including allocating markets, restricting imports and exports, fixing
prices, and concluding contracts that compelled parties to suppress
competition.77 3 The decrees also prohibited infringement suits for any of
the hundreds of patents included in the pool. 774 In one such decree,

defendant Westinghouse was required to offer non-exclusive licenses to
patents it controlled or would come to control in the ensuing five years
without restriction except for provisions requiring non-transferability and
the recovery of reasonable, non-discriminatory royalties.7 7 5 The decree
also terminated contracts Westinghouse had concluded with various
foreign companies in the early 1930s.77 6 Finally, the judgment enjoined
defendants from acquiring a greater stake in other manufacturers of
braking systems.

777

In United States v. Switzer Brothers, Inc., Switzer Brothers and five
other corporate defendants were producers and distributors of daylight
fluorescent materials and devices. 778 The government charged the
defendants with planning to purchase materials themselves, and requiring
the same of non-members, dividing among themselves markets and
product lines, and restricting end product types. 779 Using restrictive
licensing conditions for patents, trademarks, threats, and actual
infringement suits, the government alleged that the defendants colluded
to dominate the trade in both fluorescing materials such as paints and
devices such as billboards. 780
The court issued a consent decree that terminated a series of
agreements signed by the defendants from 1946 to 1950, enjoined a broad
array of practices, and directed defendants to offer licensing for their
patents on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.7 81 The consent
decree directed the various defendants to offer royalty-free, nonexclusive licenses for three specific patents. 782 The defendants were also
enjoined from initiating litigation, save defense of validity, for these same
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patents.78 3 Infringement suits on another patent were enjoined and the
defendants were to offer licenses to this patent without restriction except
for payment of reasonable, non-discriminatory royalties.7 8 4
Specific practices enjoined in this judgment included restriction on the
terms of sale for products covered under the listed patents, requiring
licensees to agree to refrain from the use of competitors' products and
other exclusive tying provisions such as the purchase of unrelated or
unpatented products from the defendants. 785
In United States v. Bearing Distributors Co., the court issued a
consent decree canceling an agreement between several manufacturers
and distributors of tractor cabs. 7 86 The government alleged the defendants
had conspired to fix prices and allocate markets in the production and sale
of tractor cabs.78 7 The decree required the open licensing of patents
currently held or acquired over the next five years at reasonable and nondiscriminatory royalties.7 8 8 It also enjoined attempts to limit pool
members from licensing to third parties, fixing prices, initiating
infringement suits, or allocating markets. 7 89
In United States v. Servel, Inc., the government alleged that defendant
Servel achieved monopoly position in the production of gas refrigeration
equipment through illegal agreements with foreign companies to pool
patents through cross-licensing, allocating international markets,
combining research and development efforts and facilities, suppressing
the exchange of know-how, and limiting the sale globally to products
under a single trade name. 790
The court entered a consent decree that prohibited Servel from
entering into any agreements with foreign companies except sales
contracts and required the open licensing for making, using, or selling
absorption refrigeration equipment currently owned or controlled by the
defendant or which may be issued for a period of five years. 79 1 The only
permissible conditions of these licensing agreements were the payment
of reasonable royalties, non-transferability through sublicensing, and
inspection of accounts to ensure compliance. 792
In United States v. CincinnatiMilling Machine Co., the government
783.
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charged Cincinnati Milling and four other corporations with agreeing to
an illegal cross-licensing scheme to control the domestic milling machine
industry. 7 93 Milling machines were used to mill the finished surfaces for
parts used in an incredibly broad array of industrial machines important
to the economy and security of the nation. 794 The defendants signed at
least eleven separate agreements between 1931 and 1951, with the parties
agreeing to cross-licensing, allocating sales territories, issuing licenses to
third parties only on onerous conditions, granting each other immunity
from infringement suits and requiring licensees to provide such
immunity, and restraining from competition among each other. 795
In addition to canceling the various agreements to which the
defendants were parties, the decree enjoined infringement suits or threats
of suits, and compelled the provision to license necessary technical knowhow without restriction except confidentiality for a period of five
years. 796 The decree enjoined efforts to control advertising, prohibit
licensees from producing certain types of milling machines or processes,
and allocate sales territories.7 9 7 The decree also enjoined tying
agreements in which licensees agreed to the purchase of unpatented
devices or methods, the compulsory disclosure of lists of clients from
licensees, granting immunity from infringement suits, or the setting of
price or terms of sale whether directly or indirectly.7 98
In United States v. Blaw-Knox Co., defendant had signed several
agreements from 1935 through 1938 with English manufacturers of cast
metal rolls that the government alleged amounted to an illegal scheme to
control the industry. 799 The government further alleged the parties to
these agreements conspired to pool their technical knowledge through
exchanges unavailable to competitors, used requirements for the affixing
of trademarks to enhance their respective market positions, restricted U.S.
imports and exports, and exchanged pricing information.8 00
The court issued a consent decree that enjoined these practices and
generally prohibited agreements with foreign manufacturers.8 0 1
Although, defendant Blaw-Knox was allowed to continue to exchange
technical information as long as it did not impose conditions governing
the locations in which the information could be utilized and did not
793. United States v. Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co., [1954] Trade Cas. (CCH)
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 1954).
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preclude the importation into the U.S. products made from the application
of any provided information. 802 Transactions between Blaw-Knox and a
subsidiary in which it held a majority position were also not subjected the
remedies outlined in the decree. 803
In United States v. U.S. Rubber Co., the government brought suit
against three corporations alleging the formation of a plan to control the
production and sale of latex products. 804 The American corporations were
alleged to have formed a number of companies in both the United States
and overseas, and under their collective ownership entered into
agreements with foreign producers in the United Kingdom, Italy,
Holland, France, Canada, and elsewhere beginning in 1932 through
1941.05 These agreements were alleged to have provisions for the
allocation of markets and manufacturing territories, to refrain from
competing with the collectively owned companies, and for the pooling of
patents issued under various jurisdictions, including the United States,
under the control of a patent holding company. 80 6
A consent decree entered in 1954 permitted U.S. Rubber to retain its
equity position in the most important of these foreign companies but
enjoined it from participating in corporate decision making or voting for
directors and members of the board.80 7 The decree terminated certain
agreements between U.S. Rubber and overseas companies restricting
production, fixing prices or terms of sale, and initiating or threatening to
initiate infringement suits. 808 In addition to terminating more than forty
agreements between defendants and foreign companies, provisions of the
decree enjoined territorial allocation or geographic restrictions on
production or sales, compelled open and non-exclusive licensing on
reasonable royalties, eliminated the granting of immunity to suits by
parties to the agreements, precluded the acquisition of additional foreign
patents by U.S. Rubber, and required the provision to all applicants of
relevant technical knowledge. 809 The decree also compelled the
American defendants to adopt, use, and license additional trademarks for
exported latex products.8 10
In United States v. Pittsburgh Crushed Steel Co., more than a dozen
U.S. manufacturers of metal abrasives used in cutting, sawing, cleaning,
or polishing metal and stone and one trade association (Metal Abrasive
802.
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Council) were charged with conspiracy to dominate the industry.8 1 1 The
original complaint charged the defendants with using their dominant
position to drive competitors from the market through price wars,
acquiring competitors or employing their managers and leading
researchers, threatening patent infringement suits, and reaching
agreements with manufacturers of machines used to produce the abrasive
from entering the market as competitors. 8 12 The government also alleged
universal assent to price-fixing.8 13
The court issued a consent decree that enjoined the defendants from
membership in the association at any level as well as the exchange of
technical information among themselves or with the association. 814 The
decree also enjoined price setting and the exchange of pricing lists,
schedules, data, or bids.81 5 Also enjoined was the exchange of
information about production or inventories. 816 Certain defendants linked
by the influence of the Kann brothers were enjoined for a period of ten
years from entering into any agreement with defendants or other
manufacturers of metal abrasives or from acquiring ownership in same
except upon approval of the court. 817
The decree also required defendants to offer to all applicants a nonexclusive and unconditional license, except for the payment of reasonable
and non-discriminatory royalties and provisions against transfer or
sublicensing.8 1 8 Any effort to prevent licensees from challenging the
validity of patents was enjoined while the defendants were precluded
from initiating or threatening infringement suits. 819 For five years the
defendants were to provide technical information to licensees. 820
Licensing agreements were not to include tying agreements that required
the purchase of materials or services from designated sources. 821
United States v. L.D. Caulk Co. involved technology for making
dental impressions. 822 Before 1930, bees wax, plaster of Paris, or other
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unsatisfactory compounds were used in capturing dental impressions. 823
Several inventors, both in America and around the world, experimented
with preferable alternatives, eventually resulting in the Wilding patent for
an alginate dental impression powder, which was eventually assigned to
Amalgamated Dental Manufacturing Company. 824 Until Wilding's
discovery, the primary alternatives to the traditional materials relied on a
derivative of seaweed available exclusively from the Sea of Japan, a
material that became unavailable to most of the world with the onset of
WWII. 8 25 During 1940, defendant Caulk learned of Wilding's pending
application and approached Amalgamated Dental with the intent of
licensing his superior invention. 826 These negotiations produced in
February 1942 an exclusive, non-assignable license with a royalty
payment of 10% which covered the United States, Canada, and three
other countries in the Americas. 827 Defendant Coe Laboratories, then
using a compound under two earlier patents, approached Amalgamated
Dental to negotiate a licensing arrangement. 828 Coe Laboratories was
encouraged by the United States to secure an alternative compound
because of the shortage of the agar-agar compound found in the Japanese
seaweed.8 2 9 In October 1942, with the blessing of Amalgamated Dental,
Caulk granted a non-exclusive, non-assignable license to Coe
Laboratories to produce under the Wilding patent throughout the United
States on a royalty of 15% of wholesale or an "overriding royalty of
5%.830 This license was to expire within six months of the termination
of the war. 831
During the war years Coe Laboratories became increasingly
concerned about third parties infringing on the Wilding patent
unencumbered by the burden of royalty payments. 832 In 1945,
Amalgamated Dental brought an infringement suit against Dental
Perfection, a defendant in the current case, and its principal operator
Stanley E. Noyes. 833 In 1947, the agreement between Amalgamated
Dental and Caulk was amended with a reduction from 10% to 5% of the
royalty rate and the elimination of Caulk's exclusive right to
sublicense. 8 3 4 That same year, Amalgamated Dental's suit against Dental
823.
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Perfection was settled in which Dental Perfection admitted its
infringement of a valid patent, obtained from Caulk a license to this
patent at a royalty rate of 10%, and was relieved of liability for damages
from past infringement. 835 By October 1947 Dental Perfection, by far the
largest manufacturer under the Wilding patent, urged legal action against
smaller players it believed were infringing the patent it was paying
handsome royalties under a recently completed licensing agreement. 836
At a Washington, D.C. meeting of the defendants and agents of
Amalgamated Dental, the government alleged in its complaint that a
conspiracy was hatched to control the industry by means of pooling of
patents, controlling licenses and sublicenses, the targeting of competitors
for infringement suits, and the exchanging of formulae used by alleged
infringers. 837 The court granted the defendants' motion for summary
judgment, arguing the facts presented did not support the conclusion of
an illegal scheme to monopolize the industry, that there was not pooling
of patents but only the lawful licensing and sublicensing to certain parties,
and ultimate control of which rested properly with Amalgamated
Dental.83 8 Further, the court held that the separate legal actions against
certain alleged infringers were properly constructed and were not
evidence of an illegal coordination. 839
In United States v. Kobe, Inc. (Magcobar, Inc.), the government
brought an action against domestic manufacturers of hydraulic oil-well
pumps. 840 In its complaint, the United States alleged that the defendants

conspired to dominate the industry through the formation of a patent pool
under the control of Kobe, which used its position to maintain its
dominance through onerous licensing agreements, acquisition of
additional patents, and threat of infringement suits. 84 1
The court issued a consent decree that required Kobe to offer nonexclusive and unconditional licenses to make, use, or sell without
restriction except for the payment of reasonable and non-discriminatory
royalties, non-transferability, and cancellation for non-payment for the
life of the various patents at issue. 842 The court reserved jurisdiction as
the final arbiter of what constituted a "reasonable royalty" in the event of
irresolvable disagreement between Kobe and an applicant. 843 The
judgment enjoined restrictions on Kobe's right to license, the initiation or
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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continuation of infringement suits, or the issuance of licensing on the
condition of adherence to a specified prices or terms of sale.8 44 The codefendants were enjoined from acquiring stock in Kobe, Inc. or its
successors.

845

In United States v. Associated Patents, six corporate defendants were
charged with pooling their patents for machine tools under the patent
holding and licensing company, and seventh co-defendant, Associated
Patents, Inc. (API) beginning in August 1933.846 The machine tools
covered under the patent pool essentially included station power tools
used to shape or cut metal, such as lathes, shaving machines, drilling
machines, boring machines, milling machines, broaching machines,
grinding machines, gear manufacturing machines, and screw
machines. 84 7 The complaint alleged defendants divided amongst
themselves much of the machine tools industry by receiving exclusive
patents. 848 The complaint also alleged that the agreements forming API
were intended to suppress competition among the defendants and from
corporations not parties to the pool. 84 9

The original agreement from 1933 applied to the backlash eliminator,
the power transmission mechanism, an automated position device, and
their improvements invented by defendant DeVieg.8 50 Each defendant
was to assign improvements to API which accepted the cost of securing
and defending the patents.85 1 In return for an exclusive license under the
pooled patents for their designated area, the defendants paid API a royalty
of 0.5% of net selling price for each improvement. 852 API was given the
exclusive power to license and sublicense under the patents it controlled,
provided it did not infringe on the designated areas of exclusivity
reserved for the defendants. 853
Among the findings of fact by the court was the determination that the
licensing powers given to API were not to enhance the financial returns
of the original patent owners but to suppress competition among them
and therefore, API was little more than a cover for the exclusive crosslicensing of patents among the defendants for controlling the industry and
driving competitors from the market. 854
The court determined that the agreement forming API and its
844.

Id.

845.

Id.

846.
847.

United States v. Assoc. Patents, Inc., 134 F. Supp. 74, 75 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
Id.

848.

Id.

849.
850.
851.

Id. at 76.
Id. at 77.
Id. at 78.

852.
853.
854.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 79-80.

BLUNT MACHETES IN THE PATENT THICKET

2018]

89

operations included a variety of illegal restraints of trade in violation of
the Sherman Act, and that the United States was entitled to a decree
voiding the agreement. 855 The court concluded, however, that because the
outcome of independent litigation involving several parties to the API
agreement would significantly affect its assets and structure, the
determination of relief would be set aside pending the outcome of this
other litigation with the current court retaining jurisdiction. 856
In United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., the Supreme Court again
weighed in on patent pooling. 857 The government filed a complaint
against manufacturers of enamel, varnish, and paints whose products
could be combined in such a way as to harden into a dry, wrinkled
finish.8 5 8 Writing for the Court, Justice Reed focused on the price-fixing
provisions of the agreement and found that the agreement violated the
Sherman Act. 859 Reed argued that with the facts not in question, the only
issue was a question of law. 86 0 The Court reviewed language in the
original agreement creating a compulsory price schedule for all licensees
once the twelve largest producers had joined the pool. 86 1 The primary
mechanism by which New Wrinkle was able to impose price conditions
was its pooling of patents for making wrinkled finishes. 862 Relying on
United States v. Line Material, Justice Reed argued the powers of patent
holders to set terms for the exploitation of their innovation were bounded
by the antitrust objectives of the Sherman Act. 863 Responding to the
defendant's reliance on E. Bement & Sons v. NationalHarrow and United
States v. General Electric to support the right of patent owners to offer
licenses subject to price control by the patentee, Reed noted that in United
States v. Line Material, the Court held that "price control through crosslicensing was barred as beyond the patent monopoly." 8 6 4 Ultimately a
consent decree enjoined New Wrinkle from price-fixing and setting sale
conditions, establishing governing officers, and acquiring competitors of
the pooled patents. 865
In United States v. American Steel Foundries, four corporate
defendants produced the steel components used as the structural
framework for railway freight cars, specifically the undercarriage onto
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axles and wheels were attached.8 66 The government's
noted that for these crucial components, the defendants
83% of the domestic production. 867 The defendants were
have established their dominant positions through various

collusive mechanisms, including a patent pool. 86 8

A consent decree enjoined various practices established under a series
of agreements amongst themselves and with foreign producers, including
dividing sales territories, establishing controls over imports and exports,
granting preferential trading terms to certain international producers,
restricting production, exchanging pricing information, or imposing price
schedules or "basing point" systems. 869 Practices relating most directly to
the formation and operation of a patent pool enjoined by the decree were
efforts to acquire foreign patents, centralize patent licensing for foreign
patents, or offer licensing on exclusive terms. 87 0 The decree required the
American defendants to offer domestic manufacturers royalty-free
licenses, access to manufacturing drawings, and participation in technical
projects.871 The decree also directed the defendants to terminate their
agreements with foreign companies and to offer, subject to reasonable
royalties, licenses to their foreign patents. 87 2
In United States v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., several corporate
defendants were alleged to have violated the Sherman Act by pooling
their patents for the manufacture of dry ice and carbon dioxide in a
scheme to control the industry using the weapon of infringement
litigation to drive competitors from the market. 873 The consent decree
enjoined a wide array of practices including explicit or indirect collusion
in the fixing of prices, allocating markets and clients, discriminating
against purchasers of dry ice to make carbon dioxide, and conditioning
the sale of equipment or the licensing of patents upon agreement to
purchase products exclusively from defendants. 874 The decree also
enjoined Liquid Carbonic, Air Reduction, and Wyondotte from
purchasing assets in or exercising control over International Carbonic
Engineering. 875
For ten years Liquid Carbonic and Air Reduction were directed to
866.

Sept. 30,
867.
868.
869.
870.

United States v. Am. Steel Foundries, [1955] Trade Cas. (CCH)¶ 68,156 (N.D. Ohio
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873. United States v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., [1952-1953] Trade Cas. (CCH)
67,377-78 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1952).
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cancel exclusive mutual purchasing agreements and for ten years were
enjoined from concluding exclusive and restricted contracts with limited
resellers. 876 The volume of dry ice that Liquid Carbonic and Air
Reduction were allowed to purchase on advance orders from regional
producers was severely restricted under the terms of the decree. 877
International Carbonic Engineering, which controlled the primary
underlying patent, was enjoined from continuing or initiating
infringement suits. 878 Each defendant was directed to offer licenses under
their various rights to Patent No. 2,025,698 on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. 879
In United States v. R. Hoe & Co., Inc., the government successfully
obtained a consent decree against various manufacturers of printing
presses, printing machinery, and plate making machinery.8 8 0 The decree
enjoined allocating market and sales territories, fixing prices and setting
terms or conditions, and granting preferential terms under certain foreign
transactions.8 8 1 Enjoined activities pertaining to the provisions of patents
included the sharing of technical information with certain foreign
corporations that were parties to prior agreements. 882 R. Hoe was directed
to use a second trademark for its products overseas that was to be clearly
distinct from the trademark it had used and required for products sold
throughout the world.8 83
In United States v. Michigan Tool Co., the defendants were
manufacturers and wholesalers of gear cutting and finishing equipment
used most importantly in the manufacture of airplanes, tanks, tractors,
and other motorized vehicles vital to the national defense, some of which
were designated as in critically short supply by the National Production
Authority. 884 The complaint alleged that the defendants, beginning in
1937 with the most recent agreement signed in 1951, had illegally
restrained trade in vital machine tools by means of patent licensing and
cross-licensing agreements.8 85
In 1956, the defendants pled no contest, paid a collective fine of just
over $22,000, and submitted to a consent decree terminating their various
agreements and enjoining a large number of specific business
876.
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practices. 886 These enjoined practices included publishing price
schedules, fixing prices, requiring licensees to refrain from the purchase
of competitors' goods, regulating, by agreement with foreign companies,
goods or prices of goods exported to the United States, and requiring that
foreign companies agree to exclusive licenses with the defendants. 887 The
defendants were also enjoined from sharing patent-related technical
information among themselves on an exclusionary basis or from entering
into agreements to grant or accept exclusive licenses or assignment of
rights under patents held by other manufacturers.8 8 8 Each defendant was
directed to publicize the terms of the decree in trade publications, to offer
patent licenses to all applicants on reasonable and non-discriminatory
terms, and to provide, at cost, reproductions of all technical reports,
design information, and the like, for all machines covered under the
patents at issue. 889

In United States v. Ohio Crankshaft Co., the government obtained a
consent decree against two corporate defendants that enjoined certain
business practices related to the manufacture of induction hardened
crankshafts used by engines to derive forward thrust via the transmission
system conversion of the vertical force generated by the engine's
pistons. 890 Muskegon Motor Specialties was enjoined from entering into
any agreement with any other company or individual that included
provisions to refrain from making or selling induction hardened
crankshafts, fix prices or other conditions of sale by licensees to third
parties, exchange clientele lists, or allocate certain markets, geographic
areas, or individual clients. 89 1 Other practices enjoined under the decree
included tying agreements in which licensees agreed to obtain other
services from licensors or restrict the use of licensed machines. 892 Also
enjoined was the granting or receiving patent licenses with provisions
entitling the licensee control over the total number of licenses including
other exclusive powers. 893 Finally, the decree directed the defendant to
offer hardening services on reasonable, per piece, terms and
conditions. 894
886.
887.
888.
889.

Id.
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890. United States v. Ohio Crankshaft Co., [1956] Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,329 (N.D. Ohio
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In United States v. Logan Co., the government charged six
manufacturers of devices used to feed metal sheets into rolling mills with
a scheme to effectively set industry-wide price floors by requiring
licensees to sell at or above minimum prices published in a price
schedule. 895 The final judgement entered in June 1956, enjoined Logan
Co. from pursuing agreements to set prices, control price level changes,
discount rates, or exchange information with competitors about costs or
pricing strategies via published prices schedules or lists. 896 Logan was
directed to issue licenses to all interested parties, without condition on
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. 897
In United States v. Joseph A. Krasnov, the government alleged that
manufacturers of ready-made slip covers held a monopoly position in the
Philadelphia area. 898 The firms allegedly established and maintained this
monopoly via cross-licensing agreements, infringement suits,
disparagement of competing products, distribution control, and other
means. 899 These slipcovers were produced in one of four types (woven
fabric, rubber thread, knitted fabric, and knitted fabric with rubber thread)
with generic dimensions for use on standard household furniture. 900 The
original complaint included allegations that Joseph Krasnov and
members of his family, operating under the trade name Sure-Fit, entered
into an agreement involving licenses and cross-licenses with other
parties, which contained the right to produce a limited number of articles
for the local market. 90 1 The agreement also provided Sure-Fit veto power
over licensing of its Oppenheimer patent, directed one defendant to set a
price for all covers produced under this patent, and required all
defendants to share litigation costs associated with defending this
patent. 90 2 The complaint alleged that one of the defendants would enforce
its collusive agreement by threatening competitors with infringement of
the broad Oppenheimer patent, purchasing competitor's covers in bulk
from distributors in exchange for the signing of exclusive agreements,
reselling these products below the wholesale price offered by their
competitors, providing discriminatory discounts, and making disparaging
comments about competitors' practices and products. 9 0 3
Summary judgment for the United States was issued on July 30, 1956,
enjoining the defendants from enforcing agreements or any of their
895.
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provisions to accomplish their illegal local monopoly. 904 The court
rejected the defendants' use of United States v. General Electric to
support the right of patent holders to set prices by arguing that in this case
both the licensor and the licensee derived benefits by collusion against
their competitors. 905 The price-fixing here was viewed as exceeding what
was necessary and permitted under General Electric to protect a patent
holder's patent monopoly against a licensee. 9 0 6 This court also rejected
the defendants' use of Standard Oil v. United States to demonstrate the
legality of their cross-licensing agreements, noting that the earlier case
arose in the wake of a much more unsettled and unclear body of case law,
which has subsequently become substantially clarified. 907 The court
further noted that, in any event, the rule established in Standard Oil
permitted cross-licensing agreements only in so far as they did not
suppress competition.908
In United States v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., the government
obtained a consent decree enjoining Owens-Coming and two other
defendants from enforcing illegal agreements to control the international
fiberglass trade and canceling several contracts between the American
defendants and certain foreign corporations. 909 The decree also enjoined
a range of practices by all defendants, including dividing territory in the
production and sale of fiberglass products, restraining imports into the
United States, agreeing to refrain from competition in particular markets
or product categories, referring clients to foreign partners, refusing to sell
to some parties except on unreasonable terms or prices, or holding stocks
in Fiberglass Canada. 910 Owens-Coming was also ordered to offer open
licenses to the more than 200 patents it held on glass fiber products on a
royalty-free basis and offer licenses to another sixty patents and all
patents it would obtain in the ensuing five years to all applicants on
reasonable terms. 9 11 The decree also required Owens-Corning to reserve
the right to issue additional sublicenses. 912
In United States v. Robertshaw-FultonControls Co., the government
charged both Robertshaw-Fulton and Wilcolator with Sherman Act
violations under a scheme to pool their current and future patents in order
to dominate the trade in temperature controls used on gas cooking
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ranges. 9 13 By ensuring a steady flow of gas, these devices allow a stove
or range to achieve and maintain a constant temperature. 9 14 The
government alleged that some 96% of the domestic production of these
gauges were produced and sold by the co-conspirators. 9 15
The final judgment cancelled all existing agreements that included
provisions to restrict or fix prices, communicate information valuable in
coordinating prices, or allocate markets or customers. 9 16 The judgment
prohibited either defendant from acquiring a controlling position in a firm
involved in manufacture of temperature controls by any method for five
years 9 17. For an additional ten years, Robertshaw-Fulton was prohibited
from acquiring such ownership without court's approval. 9 18 The final
judgment directed Robertshaw-Fulton and Wilcolator to offer nonexclusive licenses openly to all parties under any or all the patents they
held or would acquire in the following five years. 919 These licenses were
required to be offered without condition except that they be nontransferable, provide for reasonable royalties, allow for the inspection of
books by the licensor, and refer to the present judgment. 920 Defendants
were enjoined from entering licensing agreements that limited in any
manner their ability to offer other licenses or sublicenses or which
reserved 1 for the defendants alone immunity against infringement
92
claims.
In United States v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., it appears that a
consent decree had previously invalidated a patent pool of numerous
patents related to the manufacture of glass products. 922 The defendants
sought the court's opinion on the validity of agreements in which
licensees paid a flat royalty whether licensing one or all of a certain set
of forty-one patents. 923 Given the potentially blocking nature of those
particular patents, the court allowed such provisions. 9 24
In Clapperv. OriginalTractorCab Co., Inc., Clapper brought a patent
infringement claim against Original Tractor Cab, who then counter-
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claimed alleging violations of the Sherman Act. 925 In its review of the
facts, the court of the Southern District of Indiana determined that in
1945, Clapper and Lee Flora separately filed for patents related to heat
covers for use in tractor engines. 926 The following year, Michael A.
Halligan filed an application for a similar invention. 927 The USPTO found
that the claims were interfering in its priority determination and that the
Flora and Halligan side claims were interfering. 92 8 While Clapper's
application was being reviewed, he secured an exclusive license from
Bearing Distributors Company to make and sell a particular cover that
was included in his application. 929 The other two inventors also entered
into exclusive licensing arrangements for their pending patents with two
other corporations.930
Following the determination of interference in 1948, the parties met
in Chicago and devised a plan to resolve their competing claims. 93 1 At
this meeting, before disclosing their respective dates of invention, the
parties agreed they would each derive royalties under a right to license
under patents awarded for any and all of the applications pending as well
as any future patents which may later be awarded. 93 2 They devised a
scheme to divide royalties and settle invention priority dates. 933 This
basic framework assumed greater specificity at meetings later that year
in St. Louis and, particularly, in Des Moines in August 1948.934 In Des
Moines, the court determined the parties agreed to establish Clapper with
the priority for the basic invention on which all three had claims (Patent
No. 2,452,834) and Flora received priority for the associated cover plate
(Patent No. 2,461,974), for which it and Halligan had interfering claims,
but Halligan agreed not to claim any great priority. 935 This agreement was
eventually dissolved in 1953 in the face of an antitrust action by the
United States in the Western District of Missouri.9 3 6
During the operation of this agreement, Clapper, Flora, and Halligan
agreed to limit their respective sales offices to one apiece, to pay Clapper
925. Clapper v. Original Tractor Cab Co., 165 F. Supp. 565, 567 (S.D. Ind. 1958), rev'd,
270 F.2d 616 (7th Circ. 1959); See generally Mason City Tent & Awning Co. v. Clapper, 144 F.
Supp. 754 (W.D. Mo. 1956) (litigation of the same patent pool).
926. Clapper, 165 F. Supp. at 568.
927. Id.
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a royalty of one dollar on each tractor they sold or fifteen cents on
windshields sold separately, to assign Flora receipt of twenty-five cents
for each tractor sold that included the cover, to determine that any
innovations produced by one of the three was available under royalty-free
licenses to the other parties, and to require unanimous consent before any
party could license or sublicense. 937 The agreement also included
provisions for the licensing of any patents that may eventually be granted
to Halligan and for Flora and Clapper to contribute to a common litigation
defense fund for the patents. 9 38 In 1948 and 1949 Clapper, tapping into
this fund, sent letters of intent to sue and initiated infringement claims
against Original Tractor Cab and distributors of its tractor covers, causing
Original Tractor to suspend production for a limited period. 939 A request
to license the patents by Original Tractor was rebuffed.9 4 0
The court determined that Clapper's patent to capture waste heat from
the engine and funnel it into the cab for heat was an obvious adaptation,
not a patentable invention since three almost identical devices were
created by the three inventors at about the same time. 94 1 Given the
invalidity of its patent, Clapper had no case related to infringement. 94 2
Turning its attention to the legality of the Des Moines Agreement
under the Sherman Act, the court determined the agreement was illegal
because each of its elements-coordinated infringement suits and threats
of suits, required unanimous approval of sublicenses, and restricted
production sites were each illegal when pursued as part of an illegal
scheme. 943 In essence, the court held that potentially legal elements of a
pool become illegal when pursued to achieve the illegal purpose of
restraining trade. 944 Particularly offensive to the court was the effective
combination of non-competing patents under one licensing agreement
including the veto provisions. 945
The court argued that what "may be legally done by a patentee, or his
assign, singularly or collectively, is no criterion for the measurement of
the legality" under the Sherman Act of any particular licensing
arrangement. 946 The bulk of the opinion determines the scope of damages,
settling on a figure of just over $27,611.947
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2. 1960-1969
Beginning in the 1960s the number of pooling cases that were litigated
dwindled significantly, and few of the opinions addressed the legality of
the pools themselves. As Merges notes:
federal antitrust policy is the most likely explanation for the small
number of patent pools existing today. Ever since myriad forms of
inter-firm cooperation were condemned in the "trust-busting era,"
firms have been reluctant to initiate industry-wide arrangements of
every ilk, including pools. . . . [T]he relative scarcity of pools on
the present landscape-especially given the increasing presence
and strength of patents in many industries-suggests a classic case
of excessive deterrence. 948
In the 1960s the attitude of the antitrust enforcement regime was quite
hostile towards patent licensing, 949 as both the USDOJ and the FTC
applied a presumption of market power to the patent grant without any
consideration of the structural characteristics of the marketplace in which
the patented products competed. 950 Similarly, those agencies also
afforded little weight to efficiency considerations of any licensing
restrictions.
In United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., however, a district
court rejected each of the government's claims alleging a conspiracy to
illegally restrain the international trade in sewing machines. 9 51 This case
turned on agreements relating to claims included in the successful
application for five patents then owned by The Singer Manufacturing Co.,
a sewing machine company. 952 The government asserted that Singer's
acquisition of certain patents was not necessary for the production and
sale of its sewing machines but part of a larger scheme to monopolize the
industry. 9 53 The specific complaints were that Singer had, through this
combining of all patents related to zigzag home sewing machines, made
agreements to confer to Singer and its partners the "broadest possible
patent claims" for their respective patents so as to exclude the claims of
competitors. 954 The complaints also asserted that Singer tried to use its
patents to exclude imports from the United States, determined the product
948.
949.

See Merges, supra note 15, at 1351-52.
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lines of European partners, consummated a cross-licensing arrangement
with Messerschmitt, and then acquired the application for the purpose of
limiting competition from foreign producers. 955
The district court found that an agreement to decline to challenge the
scope of patent claims of other parties was not illegal. 956 In other words,
failure to oppose another patent or application is not illegal. Similarly,
the court found the agreement between the parties to refrain from
infringement suits was permissible because the parties were entitled to
avoid litigation, were not obliged to pursue possible avenues for
litigation, and in this agreement, exchanged something of value (the right
to sue) to the other in return for something of value (freedom from suit
and
cross-licensing). 957 The cross-licensing
agreement
with
Messerschmitt was found to be permissible and not evidence of either
intent or effect of a restraint in trade. 958 The acquisition of the U.S. patent
rights of foreign companies was also viewed as legal in the absence of
intent or actual restraint. 959 Suits against Japanese manufacturers of
sewing machines alleging infringement of one or more of the patents
pooled by Singer through acquisition were not evidence of a conspiracy,
and in any event, were only marginally successful. 960 Coordinated legal
actions with foreign partners were also legal because they related solely
to suits on U.S. patents legally owned by Singer for goods sold in the
United States. 9 61

The district court also found favorably for the defendant on the other
major issues in the case. 962 It found that the selective licensing of patents
was not evidence of a conspiracy to exclude other parties illegally, but a
justifiable business decision based on rational business calculations. 963
The patent owners were also legally entitled to refuse to license to some
competitors and eliminate infringers. 964
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, holding that there had been a
conspiracy to exclude Japanese competitors in household zigzag sewing
machines. 965 The controlling factor in determining that a conspiracy had
occurred was the overall common design to destroy the Japanese sale of
infringing machines in the United States by placing the patent under

955.

Id.

956.
957.
958.
959.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

960.
961.

Id. at 409.
Id.

962.
963.

Id. at 432.
Id. at 431.

at 411.
at 409.
at 431.
at 432.

964. Id.
965.

Singer Mfg., 374 U.S. at 175.
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Singer's control.96 6 Finding this concerted action to restrain trade to be
clearly established by the course of dealings, the Court found Singer in
violation of the antitrust laws. 967
In International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., Landon controlled two
blocking patents 96 8: the Pace patent covering a fluid circulation device
making it possible to filter swimming pools continuously without
excessive backpressure and the Cavenah patent, which added a
vacuuming capability to a Pace device. When Landon sued International
Manufacturing and Rodolfo Jacuzzi, the defendants countered that
Landon had violated the antitrust laws within its use of the Pace and
Cavenah patents. 969 Trials in lower courts concluded that both patents
were valid and were infringed.9 7 0
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Jacuzzi and International lost again
except the court partially reversed on the question of the willfulness of
the infringement. 97 1 The court found that the combination patent was
valid because of the unique benefit emerging from the union, even where
such combinations had previously been attempted without similar
results. 972 The court concluded that before the first unfavorable opinion
as to infringement, International Manufacturing and Jacuzzi were not
infringing merely by challenging the validity, but that their infringing
behavior became willful after losing their first appeal in early 1961.
Both the lower court and the Ninth Circuit held that because the two
patents covered the combination of the processes of filtering and
vacuuming, no device could be patented that would feature both
processes without violating one or the other patent. Because of the
blocking patent relationship, the court found that Landon's policy of
mandatory licensing for both patents was legal.9 74 Earlier cases in which
similar tying agreements, linking the licensing of several patents together,
were found illegal were not blocking patents. 975
In McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the granting of summary judgment against McCullough Tool for
infringement of patents covering a device measuring radioactivity.97 6 The
court found that McCullough's slight modifications to accomplish
966.
967.
968.

Id. at 194.
Id. at 196.
Int'l Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723, 724-25 (9th Cir. 1964).

969.

Id.

970.
971.
972.
973.
974.
975.
976.

Id. at 724.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 731.
Id. at 730.
See generally McCullough Tool Co. v. Wells Surveys, Inc., 395 F.2d 230, 241 (10th

Cir. 1968).
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essentially the same ends through the same processes and tools did not
protect it from infringing on Well Surveys' patents. 9 7 7 The court held that
the Swift patent was sufficiently broad as to cover a number of slightly
different techniques. 9 7 8 Regarding McCullough's claim that Well
Surveys illegally used a patent pool in an effort to dominate the industry
through burdensome litigation, the pool did not deny the relief.979
Regarding the claim of an illegal collection of royalties, the court argued
that patent pools were illegal only when they were illegally acquired or
used, but little to no evidence of this was presented by McCullough. 980 In
refusing to license McCullough, the court determined that Well Surveys
merely refused to license on the terms proposed by the applicant. 9 81
In Arthur J. Schmitt Found. and Morris Bean Co. v. Stockham Valves
& Fittings,Inc., the Schmitt Foundation and Morris Bean Co. had entered
into a joint licensing arrangement for resin-coated sands used to form
molds for shaping molten metal.98 2 These forms had the property of
holding their shape and strength long enough for the metal to harden. 9 83
They then lose their adhesiveness so they could be easily cracked off the
final metal object. 9 84 Schmitt and Bean had determined that the patents in
question were blocking and eventually negotiated a joint licensing
agreement. 985 The defendant in an infringement suit alleged that this joint
licensing agreement and other acts proved that plaintiffs were misusing
their patents under their collective arrangement. 986
The court found that if the plaintiffs' reasonable joint-license offers
did not exclude separate licensing, then the pooling arrangement was not
a misuse of patent rights. 987 The court also determined that the use of a
sliding royalty scale and the direct licensing to manufacturers were not
evidence of plaintiffs' misuse of their patents. 9 8 8 Even if the patents were
complementary, if they could be licensed separately and were not
otherwise used improperly, offering them together under a joint licensing
agreement did not offend the law. 989
The Supreme Court addressed the patent pooling issue again in Zenith
977.
978.

Id. at 234.
Id. at 238.

979.
980.
981.

Id.
Id. at 239.
Id.

982. Arthur J. Schmitt Found. v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., [1968] Trade Cas.
(CCH) 172,639 (N.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd, [1968] Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 72,640 (5th Cir. Ala. 1968).
983. [1968] Trade Cas. (CCH) 172,639.

984.
985.
986.
987.
988.
989.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. 990 The dispute arose out of an
infringement claim initiated in 1959 against Zenith Radio by Hazeltine
Research, a patent holding and licensing company. 99 1 Zenith
counterclaimed, charging antitrust violations. 9 92 The main patent at issue
covered automatic contrast controls for televisions. 993
In issuing a judgment for defendant Zenith, the district court found
that the patent was invalid because of prior arts, rejected the claim that a
1949 application was a continuation of a 1946 application, and
determined that even if valid, the Zenith process did not infringe. 994 The
district court opinion also found that Hazeltine Research repeatedly
violated the Sherman Act by requiring television manufacturers to license
all of its roughly 500 patents or face infringement suits, and that licensing
individual or smaller sets but only at excessive rates was not a defense. 995
The district court also found that by working in concert with a Canadian
patent pool, Hazeltine illegally conspired to remove foreign competitors
from the U.S. market. 996 Zenith was awarded treble damages under the
Sherman Act. 997
Hazeltine appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which reversed and
remanded with specific instructions. 998 Specifically, the Seventh Circuit
vacated the antitrust judgment against Hazeltine, in part because of a

failure to prove actual damages in Canada to Zenith's sales; affirmed the
1949 patent application was invalid; and directed the court below to enter
a judgment for $150,000 for Zenith against Hazeltine. 999 The Appeals
Court also lifted an injunction imposed by the district court against
further association with foreign patent pools by the defendants. 1000
The Supreme Court affirmed much of the Seventh Circuit's holding
but reversed on some grounds. 100 1 The Court agreed the original

injunction against Hazeltine's association with a Canadian patent pool
was necessary because facts established at trial proved a conspiracy to
exclude Zenith and others from the Canadian market. 1002 Although, it

990. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N. D. Ill. 1965), aff'd
in part, and rev'd in part, 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1968), aff'd in part, and rev'd in part, 395 U.S.
100 (1969), on remand at, 418 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1969).
991. Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 104.
992. Id. at 105.
993. Id. at 104.
994. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. at 68.
995. Id. at 71, 77.
996. Id. at 75, 77-78.
997. Id. at 107.
998. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 388 F.2d 25, 39 (7th Cir. 1968).

999.
1000.

Id. at 35-39.
Id. at 39.

1001.
1002.

Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 141 (1969).
Id. at 131.
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reinstated the treble damages awarded to Zenith because of Hazeltine's
antitrust violations in association with the Canadian pool. 1003 In the eyes

of the Supreme Court, not only was this fact established convincingly by
the trier of fact, but also the rationale used by the Seventh Circuit to
address questions of fact was inapplicable. 1004 The Court also restored the
injunction against future foreign pool associations, dismissing as in error
the Circuit Court's premise that a failure to prove damages also required
the lifting of the injunction against collusion. 1005 The Court also reversed
the Circuit opinion by holding that licensing agreements tied to
Hazeltine's entire "domestic licensing portfolio" were illegal if they were
offered on an all-or-nothing basis and covered products or processes not
directly within the reach of the patent. 1006
E. The Era of the Nine No-No's: 1970-1995

Having amassed an impressive set of victories, in 1970 the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department articulated what came to be known as
the "Nine No-No's," essentially a watch list of nine specified licensing
practices that the division viewed as anticompetitive and would attract
the scrutiny of the Division. 1007 These licensing practices were described
in at least one speech by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bruce B.
Wilson as practices "which in virtually all cases are going to lead to
antitrust trouble because of their adverse effect upon competition."o1008
The prohibited licensing practices consisted of the following:
* Requiring the licensee to purchase unpatented supplies
(tie-ins);
* Requiring the licensee to assign to the patentee patents that
may be issued to the licensee after the licensing
arrangement is executed (mandatory grantbacks);
* Imposing post-sale restrictions on resale by purchasers of
patented products;
* Restraining licensees' commerce outside the scope of the
patent (tie-outs);
* Giving licensees veto power over grants of further licenses;
* Mandating package licensing;
1003. Id. at 114.
1004. Id. at 118.
1005. Id. at 132.
1006. Id. at 135.
1007. See generally Gilbert & Shapiro, supra note 11 at 283-336; see also Tom & Newberg,
supra note 11.

1008.

Bruce Wilson, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Patent and Know-

How License Agreements, Field of Use, Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, Remarks
Before the Fourth New England Antitrust Conference (Nov. 6, 1970).
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* Requiring payment of royalties in amounts not reasonably
related to sales of the patented product;
* Restraining sales of unpatented products made by a
patented process;
* Specifying prices licensees could charge upon resale of
licensed products. 1009

Although it is unclear whether every "No-No" was understood by the
Antitrust Division to constitute a per se violation of the antitrust laws,
Wilson further noted that "the validity of licensing
practices other than
10 1 0
these nine is to be tested under the rule-of-reason."
In Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., Arthur Schwerdle had received a
patent for a selective herbicide applied to post-emergent plants,
particularly crabgrass, which would do relatively little harm to nearby
grasses. 10 11 During the 1950s, the American Research Association
asserted ownership of the patent on the grounds that Schwerdle
discovered the patented formula while he was an employee. 10 12 This case
was settled in an unusual manner prior to trial where the patent was
assigned to a foundation with both ARA and Schwerdle receiving nonexclusive licenses. 101 3 In 1956 Schwerdle began sending shipments of his
herbicide, di-sodium methyl arsonate (DMSA) to Scott & Sons.

10 14

Scott

&

fulfilled this contract, then began marketing a dry version of the herbicide
under the name Clout without payment of any royalties to Scott.10 15 Then
in 1962, the foundation to which the patent was assigned sued Scott
Sons for infringement. 1016 The district court judge found the second claim
of the patent invalid because of over-claiming but rejected Scott's other
invalidity claims, arguing that Scott had failed to prove patent misuse and
that the patent, if valid, was being infringed by the production and sale of
Clout. 10 17 Both parties appealed, and the Sixth Circuit court reversed in

part, affirmed in part, and remanded for determination of damages
owed. 1018
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court, finding that the second
patent claim did not render the patent invalid. 10 19 The Circuit Court
upheld the finding that since the sole active ingredient in Clout was
1009.
1010.

Id.
Id.

1011.
1012.
1013.
1014.
1015.
1016.
1017.
1018.

Noll v. O.M. Scott & Sons Co., 467 F.2d 295, 296 (6th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 296-97.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 295.

1019.

Id. at 300.
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DMSA, Scott infringed the patent. 10 2 0 Scott's other major defense rested
on the claim of misuse of patents. 102 1 They charged that the Trust
Agreement receiving the Schwerdle patent represented an illegal attempt
to limit the market for DMSA. 1022 They also alleged that the trustees
worked to expand the scope of the patent illegally by collecting royalties
from the use of DMSA for other weed control purposes or for other
chemical compounds beyond its scope. 1023 The Circuit Court upheld the
opinion of the district court judge on both counts. 10 24 The Court agreed
that because both the Vineland Company, to which Schwerdle assigned
his patents and offered his knowledge, and the ARA, for which he had
previously worked, had defensible, but slightly different claims that could
have reasonably been viewed as blocking, the trust arrangement they
formed was permissible and pro-competitive. 1025 Because the patent was
viewed as both valid and general, royalties paid for other uses or related
compounds was legal in the eyes of the district court and was upheld in
this opinion. 1026

In United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., several drug companies were
engaged in the manufacture and sale of an antibiotic compound. 1027 The
companies agreed to pool their patents on the drug. 1028 The government
alleged that the agreement was an illegal restraint of trade, but the district
court refused to order mandatory sales of the drug and reasonable-royalty
licensing of the patent. 1029
On appeal the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the district court's
position to be an unduly narrow view of the controlling cases. 1030 The
Court also ruled that the validity of the pooled patents could be disputed
if the government alleged that conduct by the companies was illegal
under the antitrust laws, absent the patent. 103 1 The Court held that the
district court should have ruled favorably on the government's demand
for mandatory sales and compulsory licensing because the patents at issue
gave the companies the economic leverage with which to insist upon and
enforce the bulk-sales restrictions imposed on the licensees. 1032 The Court
furthered that the companies should have been required to sell the bulk
1020.
1021.
1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.
1026.
1027.
1028.
1029.
1030.
1031.
1032.

Id. at 301.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 301, 303.
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 302.
See generally United States v. Glaxo Group, Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 53 (1973).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 63.
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form of the drug on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and to grant
patent licenses at reasonable-royalty rates in order to pry open the market
that had been closed by the companies' legal restraints. 1033 The case was
remanded to the district court with instructions to impose mandatory
selling on specified terms and compulsory patent licensing at reasonable
charges.

1034

IV. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS AND AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION
While the original intent of the historical examination of patent pool
litigation was to develop a categorization scheme that would inform the
examination of modem pools, the historical data in many ways defies
categorization. Until the creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, few if any court decisions were ever based on any expertise about
patents, much less the underlying technologies embodied within the
patents. Nonetheless, it is possible to group the cases on certain
dimensions.
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

Government enforcement activity vs. private antitrust
litigation
Blocking and/or complementary vs. substitute patents
Patent
pool
via
assignment,
cross-licensing,
mergers/acquisition, or patent holding entity
Patent pool as the primary scheme or element of larger
collusive scheme
Presence of foreign corporations (particularly German
corporations) in the pool
Presence or absence of tying provisions
for unrelated patented products and processes
non-patented products or services
Exclusive distribution, manufacturing, or sales provisions
Level of industry dominance
Pre- or post-WWII
Provisions for territorial allocations
Sales
Manufacturing
Agreement not to challenge other patents in the pool
Provisions covering future patents acquired or successfully
innovated
Coordinated litigation for purposes of intimidation via
infringement suits

1033. Id.
1034. Id. at 64.
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10'

Pooling of patented products, processes or both

In terms of overall litigation outcomes, between 1900 and 1970,
approximately 20% of the identified patent pools survived litigation.
Interestingly, of those pools that did not survive, more than 96% were
invalidated by governmental enforcement actions. Conversely, 70% of
the instances where a pool survived were cases where the litigation was
a private antitrust action. 1035 Absent an assessment of the innovation
friendliness of the actual pooling agreements, it would be difficult to
speculate as to the reasons for the widely divergent outcomes.
A. PreviousHistoricalExaminations
Given the range of issues considered by the courts in the identified
patent pool cases, building a model to predict litigation outcomes is
clearly fraught with difficulty. In his analysis of twenty patent pooling
decisions, Gilbert proposes to categorize pools along three dimensions:
* The competitive relationship of the patents in the pool
* The presence of vertical restrictions in licensing terms that
affect competition related to the patented products or
processes
* The existence of agreements not to license the patents and
to cooperate in the defense of the patents 1036
He then develops a scoring mechanism to assess the relative levels of
anti-competitiveness of the pools. 1037 Gilbert laments that while he would
have preferred to see high scores for combinations that were found to
have violated the antitrust laws and low scores for those that did not, such
a pattern did not emerge until approximately the same time that the Nine
No-No's were announced. 1038
Lerner takes a different approach and examines the agreements
themselves rather than the opinions. 1039 Based on the analysis of sixtythree patent pooling agreements, he proposes categorizing pools along
the following dimensions:
* Pool allows independent licensing by pool members
* Pool allows licensing to third parties
1035. The survival assessment was based on the outcome of the highest-level proceeding,
since in certain instances an appellate court reviewed the findings of a lower court.

1036.

Id.

1037.

Gilbert, supra note 86.

1038.

Id.

1039.

Lerner, supra note 54.
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* Pool members able to use pooled patents on a royalty-free
basis
* Pool size
* Pool requires members to assign subsequent patents to the
pool automatically
* Control provisions for infringement litigation
* Pool formed before or after Hartford Empire decision1 04 0
While the lack of a clear categorization scheme may be disappointing,
a valid explanation for the pattern of patent pool decisions could be that
while judges may have been able to assess the competitive implications
of specific provisions in a patent pooling agreement, they were illequipped to evaluate the technological interrelationships between
patents. Otherwise it would be difficult to see how StandardOil could be
the competing patents case that is always cited for what it says about
blocking patents, while Line Material is the blocking patents case that is
rarely cited for what it says about blocking patents. 104 1 But then how do
we explain the relatively high rate of pool survival prior to 1939?
Perhaps judicial examination of thicket questions was possible after
all. In terms of analyzing the economic relationships between patents, it
is interesting to note that prior to 1939, of the twenty-two cases identified,
at least ten specifically addressed the issue of interrelationships between
the patents. While a few of those analyses may have been questionable,
the courts were at least attempting to examine the issue. In contrast from
1939 to 1949, forty-three pools were litigated, but economic relationships
between the patents were only considered five times. In all the other
thirty-six cases, the patent interrelationships do not appear to have been
examined at all.
By the time the Nine No-No's were issued in 1970, thirty-nine
additional patent pools were litigated. In those cases, between 1940 and
1969, the economic relationships between the patents appear to have been
examined only four times.
B. PatentPool Litigation: 1900-1970
The exhaustive search of several electronic and hard copy sources
yielded 124 cases of alleged patent pools accused of antitrust violations
by either the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, the FTC, or private antitrust
actions. 1042 At times, a given pool was the subject of multiple litigation
1040. Id.
1041. Newberg, supra note 34.
1042. The search began with the Lexis databases GENFED and Mergers and Acquisitions
(M&A) Cases - Federal. The GENFED search resulted in 361 hits and the M&A search resulted
in 126 hits (all of these turned out to be repeats of the GENFED results). The searches were then
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proceedings, while at other times unfavorable decisions were appealed
and the appellate proceeding was then separately identified in the search
for cases. Thus, a total of 101 cases between 1900 and 1970 were
analyzed. 1043
Although the set of patent pools identified is limited to those that were
litigated, it is sufficient to provide a degree of insight into the evolution
of antitrust enforcement and the criteria used to evaluate such pools. In
examining the cases, we specifically looked for instances where the
courts explored questions related to patent thickets.
In reviewing the 101 cases during this time period, the litigation
appears to be categorized along five primary dimensions:
*
*
*

Examination of patent thicket questions
Government enforcement activity vs.
litigation
Pre- or post-WWII decisions

*
*

Market issues 1044
Contractual issues

private

antitrust

104 5

Given that the main focus of the review of patent pool litigation was
the examination of the first category, only the analysis relevant to judicial
examination of patent thicket questions is presented here. In terms of that
analysis, it appears that judges examined patent thicket questions more
often in the early litigation than they did in more recent litigation. Of the

repeated in the Westlaw databases ALLCASES and ALLCASES-OLD. The ALLCASES search
resulted in 282 hits and the ALLCASES-OLD search resulted in forty-five hits.
The next step was to inspect the results and remove cases where patent pooling was not a major
theme (in some instances, the courts cited a case involving patent pooling for reasons unrelated
to the pool itself). The resultant set of cases was compared to the "Pooling and Interchange"
section of the CCH Trade Regulation Reports, and a few cases were added that were not
previously identified in the Westlaw/Lexis searches.
1043. While an organizational structure where multiple firms collectively aggregate patent
rights existed in most of the identified cases, it should also be noted that to be included in the list,
a case merely had to raise the issue of patent pooling. The distinction between certain crosslicensing regimes and a formal patent pool was not readily discernable in some cases. A
comparison of the actual agreements, such as those identified by Lerner, would certainly facilitate
a further refinement of this list of cases, as it is possible for one party to raise allegations regarding
the operation of a pool without a patent pool actually existing.
1044. Including the level of industry dominance and the presence or absence of foreign
corporations (particularly German corporations) in the pool.
1045. Contractual issues included patent pool via assignment,
cross-licenses,
mergers/acquisition, or patent holding entity; patent pool as the primary scheme or element of
larger collusive scheme; presence or absence of tying provisions; provisions for territorial
allocations, agreement not to challenge other patents in the pool, provisions covering future
patents acquired or successfully innovated, litigation coordinated for purposes of intimidation via
infringement suits.
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twenty-two cases litigated prior to 1939, at least ten specifically
addressed the issue of the existence of patent thickets. In contrast, from
1939 to 1949, forty-three pools were litigated, but patent thicket questions
were only considered five times. 104 6 The likelihood of thicket
examination was even slightly lower during the next three decades. Of
the thirty-nine additional patent pools litigated between 1940 and 1969,
patent thicket questions appear to have been examined only four times.
Although patent thicket questions were infrequently examined, it
seems that their examination was potentially quite important for pool
survival. In terms of overall litigation outcomes between 1900 and 1970,
21% of the identified patent pools survived litigation. 1047 When patent
thicket questions were addressed, however, 59% of those pools survived.
When the data are cross-tabulated, a Chi-Square test indicates an
association between pool survival and the examination of thicket
questions.1048

1046. A lack of a sufficient factual record may explain two instances of non-examination of
thicket questions during this period, such as in United States v. Wayne Pump Co., 317 U.S. 200
(1942), where the Supreme Court criticized the government for not even introducing any evidence
that the patents might have been substitutes. On the other hand, in United States v. General
Electric, 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), the district found the conduct so egregious that it
decided that the patent thicket questions were not germane. In 36 of the 43 cases, however, the
patent thicket questions do not appear to have been examined at all.
1047. The survival assessment was based on the outcome of the highest-level proceeding,
since in certain instances an appellate court reviewed the findings of a lower court.
1048. In their examination of the actual pooling agreements, Lerner supra note 54, they
develop an analytic model of contract structure that bifurcates their sample into pools formed
before and after Hartford-Empirev. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945). Bifurcation at this point
also divides the sample into pre- and post-WWII decisions, as Hartford-Empirewas the last patent
pool case decided before the end of WWII. Justice Black wrote in Hartford-Empire that the

"history of this country has perhaps never witnessed a more completely successful economic
tyranny over any field of industry than that accomplished by [the pool members]." 323 U.S. at
436-37. The remedy imposed matched the harshness of the rhetoric. The Court upheld the district

court's order requiring that a receiver be appointed for the lead company free from any claim to a
stay, that royalties received pending final resolution be set aside for return to licensees, and that
all its patents be made available royalty free to any interested party. The Court also cancelled all
current agreements, leases, and licenses required. The remedy was truly a nuclear bomb in terms
of antitrust enforcement. Hartford-Empire appears to have been a watershed event in terms of
antitrust enforcement against patent pools. In terms of the impact of that decision on the
association between pool survival and the examination of thicket questions, however, bifurcating
the sample does not appear to change the result for either cases up through Hartford-Empire
(Fisher's Exact p = 0.004) or cases after Hartford-Empire(Fisher's Exact p = 0.035). A Fisher's
Exact was used in these cases instead of a Chi-Square test because certain cell counts were less
than 5.
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Table 1. Test for an Association Between Pool Survival and the
Examination of Patent Thicket Questions in Patent Pool Litigation
Between 1900 and 1970.

Pool Survived?
No
Yes
Total
Pearson X2 = 25.0508

Thicket Questions
Examined?
No

Yes

Total

71
8
79

9
13
22

80
21
101
Pr = 0.000

The data indicates an association between pool survival and the
examination of thicket questions by the courts, so it is certainly possible
if more courts had examined thicket questions, more pools might have
survived. One case in particular, United States v. Line Material Co.,
certainly had a dense thicket that seems to have been ignored by the
court. 1049 If that case had come out in favor of the pool, the dismal record

of patent pool survival after WWII might have been fundamentally
different, as Line Material was often cited as precedent in subsequent
patent pool litigation.1 05 0

As Professor Barnett has described, patent pool formation has
increased dramatically in arenas dominated by technology standards, but
what about the need for pools in industries without technology standards,
such as medicine or pharmaceuticals? Although at least one pool has been
formed in the last decade, the specter of the PRK litigation still looms
large for pools that do not follow the MPEG standards-based approach.

V. CONCLUSION: A TRIBUTE TO PROFESSOR JOSHUA NEWBERG

I first interacted with Professor Newberg when I was the managing
editor of the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology in 2000 when we
accepted his article on antitrust and technology markets. At a 2002
meeting of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business, after re-reading
Professor Newberg's 2000 Atlantic Law Journal article, I had a
conversation with him regarding how the FTC litigation involving the
PRK patent pool either ignored or failed to detect the blocking
1049. See generally Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287.
1050. See IP Guidelines, supranote 24, §§ 3.4 & 5.5. Ultimately the IP Guidelines implicitly,
but quite unmistakably, reject the holding in Line Material, 333 U.S. at 313-14.
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relationship between the pooled patents. We wondered if such a failure
was a unique occurrence, or had it happened before? Was the failure due
to a lack of analytical tools or frameworks, and if so, had prior litigation
examined the economic interrelationships between pooled patents? These
questions could only be answered by examining the history of patent pool
litigation and specifically looking to see if the courts had investigated
thicket questions.
At that time, I was completing my doctoral thesis at the Harvard
Business School and completing my Lewis Fellowship at the Harvard
Law School. Professor Newberg had been instrumental in guiding me
through the archives of the FTC litigation of the PRK pool, and we
discussed collaborating on a historical examination like the one Professor
Gilbert had conducted, but I first needed to complete my own doctoral
thesis.
One of my thesis chapters focused on a network analytic approach to
patent thicket detection, based on Josh's initial comparison of the MPEG
and PRK pooling cases, and I completed my doctorate in 2004. In that
chapter, I also included the empirical analysis of the historical cases, but
without the case summarization contained in this article. The textual
summarization of those cases was to be the basis for our collaboration on
this Article, and over the next couple of years, we tossed around the ideas
of what courts should do outside of the technology standards context.
During that time, I had also started a project on tribal finance, which was
accepted for publication in 2006. Josh and I discussed focusing our
attention on this article once I finished working with the law review
editors on that publication. Unfortunately, on March 26, 2007, while I
was completing the final edits to the print proofs of the tribal finance
article, Josh lost his lifelong battle with a debilitating condition and
passed away.
That day, I lost both a mentor and a friend, and my motivation to
continue this Article vanished. It has now been almost exactly ten years
since Josh passed away, and I decided that this article had remained
unfinished too long. So, I reached out to Josh's family and sought their
permission to posthumously include him as a co-author, and they
graciously agreed.
So, I conclude this Article by proposing the "Newberg Rule" for the
judicial evaluation of a patent pool that is not based on a technology
standard. As this article has discussed, such pools are far less common
than standards-based pools, yet the problems of patent thickets are not
confined to industries with technology standards.
Given our shared objection to any per se analysis of patent pooling,
and since we both agreed a long time ago that the characterization of the
technological and economic interrelationships among pooled patents is
crucial to the antitrust analysis of any patent pooling arrangement, in
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honor of my colleague and friend, and in the hopes that any patent
thickets related to the condition that afflicted Josh can be cleared by a
pro-competitive patent pool, I propose the following Newberg Rule: "any
judicial examination of patent pooling must apply the rule of reason and,
in the absence of a technology standard to guide a determination of
essentialness, must thoroughly examine the technological and economic
interrelationships among and between the pooled patents." Such a rule
will eliminate the specter of the flawed PRK litigation, eliminate the
deleterious impact of Line Material, and facilitate the formation of procompetitive patent pools to solve the problem of patent thickets in
industries without dominant technology standards.
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